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This thesis is an examination of the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 
with respect to children's rights, specifically the right not to be hit. New Zealand's journey 
towards the abolishment of physical punishment was fraught with public concern and 
misunderstanding. Consequently, a full repeal of s59 of the Crimes Act 1961 was abandoned 
in favour of a substitution provision that would do away with physical punishment but allow 
parents to use some degree of force against their children. However, the failure to completely 
remove the legitimised use of force against children means that children still do not enjoy the 
same level of protection from assault as adults under the law. Furthermore, the Parental 
Control provision has created ambiguities in the law that never existed in the past. 
Chapter one outlines competing rights arguments. This chapter is designed to give a 
theoretical and jurisprudential foundation for the conclusion that children have the same right 
not to be hit as adults. 
Chapter two explores the history of New Zealand's domestic discipline legislation, and the 
consequences of ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This 
chapter also briefly highlights the reasons behind public resistance to the repeal of s59. 
Chapter three is an assessment of the new Parental Control provision. The problems with the 
provision are highlighted, and its impact on children's rights is explored. 
6 
Chapter four contains a case analysis to compare the new Parental Control provision with its 
predecessor. In this chapter, real and hypothetic cases are put through three tests: The old 
s59, the new s59, and the complete repeal of s59. 
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Introduction. 
In 2007, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 was amended to replace the 'domestic discipline' 
defence with a new defence of 'parental control'. 1 The effect of this amendment was to 
remove the justification of reasonable force for the purposes of correction, 2 and to fill an 
existing gap in the law concerning the parental use of force for purposes other than 
correction. 3 
In its original form, the Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) 
Amendment Bill4 was a bid for a full repeal of s59. However, severe public resistance to, and 
political interest in, the Bill meant that amendments were made to its content to ensure that it 
could be passed into law. Section 59(1)(a)-(d) now sets out the situations where parents or 
persons in the place of a parent may still use reasonable force. Subsection 4 affirms the police 
discretion not to prosecute inconsequential cases of force used against a child. 
This thesis explores how the amendment to s59 has failed to address the inequality between 
children and other members of society with respect to physical integrity. Physical integrity is 
a fundamental human right, and as it stands children still do not enjoy the same level of 
protection from invasion of this right as adults. Section 59 qualifies children's rights by 
creating a new defence of reasonable force for parents. Specifically, despite abolishing the 
1 Section 5 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007. 
2 Section 59(1) Crimes Act 1961, prior to amendment. 
3 Section 59(1)(a)-(d) Crimes Act 1961. 
4 2005, no 271-1 
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use of reasonable force for the purposes of correction, s59 has failed to recognise an 
important part of physical integrity: the right not to be hit. 
Adults enjoy the right not to be hit. There are certain situations where an adult's right to 
physical integrity can be justifiably invaded, for example, restraining a person who is about 
to commit suicide,5 or patting someone on the back,6 however hitting is not tolerated.7 
Hitting requires intention. It requires the person administering the blow to intend to make 
physical contact with another person, and perhaps cause them some degree of pain. 
The definition of assault in the Crimes Act8 is: 
"the act of intentionally applying or attempting to apply force to the person of 
another, directly or indirectly, or threatening by any act or gesture to apply such force 
to the person of another, if the person making the threat has, or causes the other to 
believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; and to 
assault has a corresponding meaning." 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'hit' as: "strike (a person or thing) with a 
blow or missile; deliver (a blow or stroke); strike (a person etc. a blow etc.)".9 'Smack' is 
defined as "strike (a person, part of the body, etc.) with an open hand or something having a 
flat surface; slap."10 Smacking or hitting as a form of corporal punishment in our culture 
might best be described through the Straus and Donnelly definition: 
5 Section 41 Crimes Act 1961. 
6 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1173 suggests that the common law might excuse "all 
physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life". 
7 The existing police guidelines give police discretion not to prosecute minor cases of assault, 
where prosecution would not be in the public interest. 
Prosecution Guidelines, Crown Law Office, March 1992, para 3. 
8 Section 2 Crimes Act 1961. 
9 Brown (ed) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (51h Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Volumes 1 at page 1248. 
10 Ibid, volume 2 at page 2883. 
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The use of physical force with the intention of causing a child to experience pain but 
not injury, for the purpose of correcting or controlling the child's behaviour. 
The phrase "pain but not injury" helps to distinguish corporal punishment from 
physical abuse: our subject is socially acceptable and legal corporal punishment. The 
phrase "with the intention of causing a child to experience pain" distinguishes 
corporal punishment from acts that have other purposes but may also cause pain, such 
as putting antiseptic on a cut. It also makes explicit the fact that causing pain is 
intentional, not incidental. This point may seem obvious, but is salutary to emphasise, 
since our culture leads people to focus on why the child was hit, rather than the fact 
that hitting hurts. 11 
'Hitting', 'smacking', 'spanking' or even 'punching', and 'kicking' are not specifically 
referred to in the definition of assault, nor is the intention behind the use of the force. 
Technically, any intended application (or threat of application) of force on another can 
amount to assault. In chapter four I will demonstrate that the reasons why a child is hit are 
relevant under our current law, and how this has resulted in a failure to ban smacking. 
The parental control provision reads intention into the justifiable and prohibited uses of force 
against children. It specifically prohibits the use of force for the purposes of correction, and 
this is what the 'smacking' debate was largely focused on. Parents can no longer smack a 
child as a disciplinary technique, however, the wording of the Act means that they cannot 
apply any other form of force either, when their intention is to correct the child. 12 
Before s59 was amended, uses of force other than for the purposes of correction technically 
amounted to assault. Prior to 2007, parents had a defence for smacking13 if the smack was 
11 Straus, M. A. & Donnelly, M., "Theoretical Approaches to Corporal Punishment" in 
Straus, M. A. & Donnelly, M. (Eds.) Corporal Punishment of Children in Theoretical 
Perspective, Yale University Press, London, 2005, page 3. 
12 For example, picking a child up and putting them in time out. 
13 Where the force used was considered to be reasonable in the circumstances. 
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administered for the purpose of correction, but they had no statutory protection from 
prosecution for other uses of force that technically amounted to assault. 14 The Justice and 
Electoral Committee drafted subsection l(a)-(d) to fill this gap in the law in an attempt to 
calm a nervous public, despite the fact it had never caused any ridiculous outcomes. 15 
The amendments to the bid for a full repeal of s59 answered a completely different issue to 
the one that was concerning the New Zealand public. The public were (and still are) 
concerned with the parental right to smack or hit their children as a form of discipline. The 
amendments to the bill were designed to address these concerns, but instead made provision 
for an entirely different set of circumstances, where the use of force is not for the purposes of 
correction. 
What is widely misunderstood, however, is that this law is not 'anti-smacking'. The Parental 
Control provision continues to grant parents the use of reasonable force against their children, 
and even though it sets out the situations in which reasonable force may be used, it does not 
prohibit smacking. Reasonable force is left undefined, therefore any use of force could 
potentially be used against a child, whether it be hitting or restraint, so long as it comes 
within the parameters on subsection (l)(a)-(d). Furthermore, subsection (l)(a)-(d) is drafted 
in such an imprecise manner (presumably to cover the maximum number of potential 
situations where legitimate force can be used) that loopholes are created for the use of force 
14 For example, restraining a child to put a seatbelt on, or snatching a child's hand away from 
a hot element. 
15 Just because a statute is silent on an area of law, does not mean there is no protection from 
ridiculous prosecutions. In chapter 3 I will discuss the common law alternatives to the 
parental control provision, and in chapter 4 I will demonstrate how the law would be more 
effective, and better promote children's rights if s59 had simply been repealed. 
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for the purposes of correction. Prosecution for smacking rests on the ability of the prosecutor 
to prove the intention behind the smack. Was it to discipline the child, or was it to prevent the 
child from engaging in offensive or disruptive behaviour? Arguably, this will be a near 
impossible task, and therefore the hitting of children, for whatever purpose, can legitimately 
continue under New Zealand law. 
The decision to amend s59 rather than to repeal it means that children are still inferior to 
other groups in society with respect to basic physical integrity. The fact that s59 exists at all 
separates children from adults in the eyes of the law. While it might be practical for parents 
to be able to use force against children to protect them from harm or to carry out normal 
parenting tasks, it is unnecessary to codify this power in the Crimes Act, as the lack of 
statutory protection never existed in the past, and its absence never caused any problems. 
Codification in this case has failed to protect children from hitting or smacking through a lack 
of definition, and has set children apart as a group in society who are less deserving of basic 
human rights. A simple repeal of s59 would have better addressed children's rights, and 
ironically, the law surrounding the use of force against children would have been clearer if it 
was silent on the issue. Children would have held the same status as adults with respect to 
their bodily integrity: hitting would not be tolerated, and all other uses of force could be dealt 
with under common law, just as they were before the amendment. 
This thesis justifies children's rights, specifically the right not to be hit. In chapter two I will 
examine the history of domestic discipline in New Zealand, the impact of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and some of the factors that formed the public 
resistance to the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007. In chapter three I 
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will look at the shortcomings of the Act, particularly the ways in which it failed to meet its 
original purpose. In chapter four I will put the Parental Control provision through some 
hypothetical tests to see whether it has significantly improved the situation for children with 
regards to protection from assault. 
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Chapter One: Children's Rights to Physical 
Integrity. 
In this chapter, I will explore children's rights and the human right to physical integrity. 
'Physical integrity' has a number of facets, including restraint and the application of force in 
situations that do not amount to discipline or correction. However, the central theme of this 
thesis is smacking.16 Do children have the same right not to be hit as other members of 
society? 
1. The claim of a right to physical integrity. 
In New Zealand, the s59 defence of domestic discipline, prior to amendment, arguably 
infringed upon children's basic human rights because it effectively defined them as a group 
in society that could be legally assaulted. As I will demonstrate in chapter four, the new 
Parental Control defence has not improved the situation significantly with regard to the right 
not to be hit. Under the new provision, children can still be hit by their parents, but for 
different reasons. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) has three basic principles: respect for 
human dignity, right to physical integrity and equal protection under the law. These are 
human rights. The New Zealand defence of Parental Control means that these three principles 
do not apply to a defined group of the population who can still be legally subjected to 
physical assault, despite the abolishment of the defence of domestic discipline. There is still 
16 See introduction, page 10 
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no respect for human dignity or physical integrity and the reform definitely does not give 
children the same protection under the law as adults. By denying a defined group basic 
human rights, are we effectively saying that they do not meet the criteria of 'human' and 
therefore do not qualify for the associated human rights? 
The European Court of Human Rights in A v United Kingdom
17 made it clear that children 
are included in the wider group of 'humans', and they cannot be made exempt from the 
articles of the European Convention of Human Rights. They are not excluded from human 
rights just because they are children. In fact, their status as children warrants further 
protection from rights violations, rather than less: 
"Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State 
protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against serious breaches of personal 
integrity." 
The right to physical integrity, specifically the right not to be hit is well established by law. 
While it might be socially acceptable to touch others in some circumstances, it is not 
generally acceptable to hit other people, regardless of the reason. In New Zealand, hitting 
another person constitutes assault. 18 We have criminalised the behaviour, which sends a clear 
message to citizens that it is not OK to hit. However, until recently, legally sanctioned 
smacking was a common parenting tool, which meant there remained one group in society 
who could actually still be lawfully hit. 
In the lead up to the repeal of s59, there were many suggestions and submissions on how to 
repeal s59 without eliminating a parent's ability to hit their child. Amendment options 
17 A v United Kingdom [1998] 2 FLR 959. The court in this case found that the physical 
chastisement defence under UK law breached article 3 of the convention: "No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 
18 Section 2 Crimes Act 1961. Section 196 is the offence of common assault. 
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generally sought to define "reasonable force", so as to make smacking safer, and to narrow, 
but not do away with, the range of legitimate assaults against children. 19 The rationale behind 
defining the use of force that can be used against a child is not to promote children's rights, 
but rather to eliminate the possibility that more severe cases of child-beating can no longer 
slip through the 'reasonable force' test.20 Advocates of the 'gentle smack' are able to separate 
themselves from child abusers, and manage to distinguish smacking from child abuse.21 
Legislating a defence that covers the lightest of smacks but nothing more might have 
achieved their purpose, however it still does not address the fundamental physical integrity 
issue: A defence that allows hitting, regardless of the degree, sets children apart from other 
humans in society who enjoy the human right not to be hit, and therefore in this regard, 
children are regarded as sub-human. 
The Parental Control provision, which eventually replaced the old s59, ·was meant to do away 
with the use of force for the purposes of correction, and at the same time plug a gap in the 
law which technically deemed other use of parental force as assault. However, the Parental 
Control provision has failed to adequately address the most significant problem with the old 
s59. It has failed to completely criminalise hitting. Its nickname, the 'anti-smacking 
19 See chapter 2. The options proposed to limit the use of disciplinary force to smacking 
below the shoulders, or smacking without an implement for example. 
2° For example, the proposed amendment to section 59 put forward by Chester Burrows, 
which was considered as "option 2" by the law commission. Palmer, G., Section 59 
Amendment: Options for Consideration, Report of the Law Commission for the Justice and 
Electoral Committee, 8 November 2006 
21 Maxim Institute, Maxim Institute written submission on the Crimes (Abolition of Force as 
a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, 1 February 2006, 
http://www.maxim.org.nz/index.cfrn/policy_research/article?id=618 
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legislation', is misleading, because it has not banned smacking, it has merely re-labeled it.
22 
Children are still the only people in society who can be legally hit. As a society, we have not 
yet managed to appreciate that "hitting people is wrong, and children are people too".
23 In 
that sense, children are seen as sub-human.24 
Peter Newell suggests that the level of protection given to children directly reflects how we 
hold them in our esteem: 
"One measure of how society regards groups within it is the comparative degree of 
protection afforded to them. Over the years in the UK there has been a growing yet 
gradual acceptance of the wrongness, and also the ineffectiveness and dangers, of 
hitting people as punishment. Thus our society has moved away from treating as 
acceptable the hitting of wives, servants and apprentices; more recently, away from 
the acceptance of corporal punishment in the armed forces and judicial corporal 
punishment; and most recently, away from allowing children to be hit in schools and 
child care institutions."25 
In the New Zealand context, the abolishment of the use of force for the purposes of 
correction might raise children's rights in the eyes of society. However, the retention of a 
reasonable force defence for parents means that there will forever be a glass ceiling for 
children's rights. We, as a society, cannot claim to recognise children as full human rights 
bearers, with the right not to be hit, while our criminal code undermines this right with the 
Parental Control provision. 
22 See Chapter 4 for an analysis of situations where the legitimate force used against a child 
under the parental control provision includes hitting or smacking. 
23 Newell, P. Children are People Too. The case against physical punishment, Bedford 
Square Press, London, 1989, page 12. 
24 "[t]he issue of smacking is unavoidably a question of rights. It is a human right not to be 
hit and children are humans." Hodgkin, R. Why the 'Gentle Smack' Should Go (1997) 11 
Children and Society, page 203. 
25 Supra No. 23, at page 13. 
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For all the effort, debate, blood, sweat and tears that went into abolishing hitting as a form of 
punishment in New Zealand26 it is hypocritical that the end result is a new defence that still 
allows hitting. Perhaps this was unintentional, an unfortunate by-product of bad drafting. 
However, it is more likely that our new Parental Control provision was borne out of a 
reluctance to recognise children as people deserving of human rights. Instead of repealing s59 
outright, the legislature bowed to public and political pressure to retain smacking, and opted 
to create a defence of reasonable force, claiming that it was necessary to codify an empty area 
of the law. Even smacking in its common sense (as a disciplinary practice) was not 
completely removed under the "anti-smacking" legislation, because at the last minute, the 
police discretion not to prosecute was affirmed within the words of the Act27 to "give parents 
confidence that they will not be criminalised for lightly smacking their children."28 In fact, as 
it stands, it will be very difficult for police to prosecute parents for disciplinary smacking, 
because they will have to be able to sufficiently prove that the child was smacked for the 
purposes of correction, and not for one of the four legitimate purposes in the new section 
59(1).29 If a law is too difficult to enforce, then the contemplated behaviour really has not 
been banned at all, and the point of the law is just to pay lip-service to the idea that children's 
rights exist. 30 
26 See Wood, B., Hassall, I., Hook., G, Unreasonable Force. New Zealand's journey towards 
banning the physical punishment of children, Save the Children New Zealand, 2008 for an 
overview of New Zealand's journey towards abolishing physical punishment, specifically the 
role of the media in fuelling the public debate. 
27 See chapter 3, The Effect of Affirming Police Discretion. 
28 Key, John, Some sense on smacking- at last! Newsletter: Keynotes No 9, 
http://johnkey.co.nz/index.php?/archives/101-NEWSLETTER-KeyNotes-No-9.html, May 2 
2007. 
29 See chapter 4. The analysis of the Parental Control provision shows that a disciplinary 
smack can easily be reclassified as legitimate hitting under s59(1). 
30 See Cairns, L. "Participation with purpose" In Tisdall, E. K. M, Davis, J. M., Hill, M., & 
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2. Do children have the right to physical integrity? 
Rex Adhar and James Allan31 are critical of the child's equal right to physical integrity 
argument put forward by authors such as the Ritchies,32 Michael Freeman33 and Peter Newell, 
who contends: 
"if children are to have the status they deserve, as individual people, it is their right to 
physical and person integrity- to protection from all forms of inter-personal violence 
- which must be upheld. This is not demanding extra protection, or special laws -
merely the protection that the rest of us take for granted."34 
Adhar and Allan suggest that there is no consistency in the children's rights arguments. They 
contend that advocates for children's rights can conveniently claim that children are equal to 
adults in some circumstances, but then highlight their incapacity in others: 
"Children's rights advocates appear to turn on and off their paternalism as the 
situation suits. At times we hear that children are different from adults, that they need 
extra guidance and attention and even that they cannot be considered fully 
autonomous. Then, when it comes to smacking, we hear from them that children are 
identical to adults."35 
They distinguish between smacking and violence, 36 and contend that smacking is legitimate if 
everyone, including children, embraces it. 
Prout, A. (Eds.), Children, Young People and Social Inclusion. Policy Press, Bristol, 2006. 
The fact that a mechanism exists to give children rights does not mean that children's 
participation rights are necessarily being promoted. Cairns suggests that instruments such as 
UNCROC have been adopted to give the impression that children have rights, but if in reality 
they are not observed then "it is reasonable to question the depth of the commitment to the 
human rights of children." (page 217). 
31 Ahdar, R. and Allan, J., Taking Smacking Seriously: The case for Retaining the Legality of 
Parental Smacking in New Zealand [2001] New Zealand Law Review 1, 1-34 
32 Ritchie, J. & J. Spare the Rod, George Alien and Unwin, Sydney, 1981. 
33 Freeman, M. Children are Unbeatable (1999) 13 Children and Society, 130-141. 
34 Newell, P. "Why we must stop hitting children" in Bainham, A., Pickford, R., & Pearl, D. 
(Eds.) Frontiers of Family Law Chichester, New York, 1995, page 245. 
35 Supra, No. 31, page 31. 
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However, as Woods, Hassall and Hook state, "it is a fundamental right that all humans are 
entitled to equal protection under the law. Children are humans, therefore they too are 
entitled to equal protection ... Human rights are universal and are not subject to the whim of 
the majority :m If rights acts as 'trumps' as Ronald Dworkin38 would suggest, this right 
cannot be overridden just because the public want to retain smacking. John Stuart Mill 
illustrates this point with reference to the right to free speech: 
"If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified 
in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be in silencing 
mankind. "39 
The Adhar and Allan criticism of children's rights looks at paternalism, but fails to examine 
major children's rights theories, and therefore is too simplistic. Children, by definition, are 
limited in their capacities, so of course general rights theories are not going to adequately 
contemplate them.40 However, this does not preclude them from having rights. There is not 
one set policy or way to best respect children's rights, and different situations demand 
different approaches to be taken.41 A paternalistic approach is most appropriate in situations 
36 Hon. Alastair Nicholson remarks that it is troubling when people are unable to characterize 
the hitting (including smacking) of children as child abuse. Nicholson, A. Choose to hug not 
hit (2008) 46 Family Court Review 1, 11-36. 
37 Wood, B., Hassall, I., Hook., G, Unreasonable Force. New Zealand's journey towards 
banning the physical punishment of children, Save the Children New Zealand, 2008, page 
139. 
38 Dworkin, R. "Rights as Trumps" in Waldron, J. (Ed.) Theories of Rights, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1984, 153-167. 
39 Mill, J. "On Liberty" (1859) reprinted in Collini, S. (Ed.) On Liberty and Other Essays, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, page 20. 
40 See below, under Children's Rights. Children's rights are necessarily different from adults 
due to their immaturity, but this does not preclude them from basic human rights that do not 
require capacity to be held. 
41 The articles in UNCRC recognize that sometimes autonomy for children is paramount, and 
other times it is more important to promote protection for children. Henaghan, M. "New 
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where the child's limitations clearly prevent them from acting in their own best interests, for 
example, feeding and clothing an infant. In other situations, where rights are in issue, a 
different approach can be taken, one that does not discriminate against the child by virtue of 
his incapacities. This blend of rights theories is not restricted to children. A mixture of 
·paternalistic and rights based approaches is taken with adults as well. For example, everyone 
is required to wear seat belts in cars for their own best interests, harmful drugs have been 
prohibited, and no one may drive while intoxicated. 
Children are human first and foremost, and their age status simply puts them in a human 
subcategory, just like other human characteristics such as gender and race further define us 
into subcategories. We would not deny human rights to those who happen to be female or 
black, because that would qualify as gender or race discrimination. Similarly, we would not 
deny elderly people their basic human rights on the basis of their age, so why would we 
discriminate against children on the basis of their age? Discrimination against children is 
often distinguished from other forms of discrimination on the basis that children lack mental 
capacity. However, even this is not a universal test for denying the right to physical integrity, 
because other groups in society who lack capacity, such as mentally handicapped persons, 
enjoy the right not to be hit. Capacity is not what separates children from adults in the 
smacking debate, it is age. 
Zealand and the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Lack of Balance" in Freeman, M. 
(Ed.) Children's Rights. A Comparative Perspective, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, 
Aldershot, 1996. 
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a) Human Rights. 
"The young are denied rights because, being young, they are presumed to lack some 
capacities necessary for the possession of rights."42 However, in the context of human rights 
it is natural to assume their 'humanness' is enough to qualify them for basic, fundamental 
rights. 
i) Fundamental human rights 
The right to life is a fundamental human right that is widely accepted, and applies to all 
people in New Zealand,43 regardless of whether they are young or old, male or female, black 
or white. It is a fundamental social guarantee that one does not have to qualify for. 
Furthermore, cultural and religious differences do not affect this fundamental right. For 
example, some cultures demand that a woman be put to death for adultery,44 but in New 
Zealand she has a fundamental right to life. This is not because she is a woman, or an adult, 
and not even because we take a different stance on adultery. The woman has the right to life 
because she is a human being, and therefore all fundamental human rights are available to 
her. 
The right to physical integrity is a fundamental right, affirmed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the 
42 Archard, D. Children: Rights and Childhood, Routledge, London, 1993, page 58. 
43 The New Zealand justice system does not use capital punishment, and there is no provision 
for assisted suicide or euthanasia. Section 8 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
states that no one shall be deprived of life except on such grounds as are established by law 
and are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. Our current law does not 
establish any grounds for the deprivation of life, therefore every one has the right to live. 
44 In Pakistan, adultery is a crime under the Hudood Ordinance. The Ordinance sets a 
maximum penalty of death. 
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New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,45 the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)46 and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989),47 to name a few. 
Children are humans in the first instance, and sub-adults because of their developmental 
stage, not sub-human. The fact that they are children does not divorce them from other 
human variables such as gender, class, ethnicity, age and mental capacity. All humans have 
combinations of these variables, but they are still humans. Age is just another variable.48 We 
do not deprive other human beings of rights just because they display other variables like race 
or class. In the context of physical chastisement, we used to discriminate on the basis of 
gender (a husband could chastise his wife), race (a white person could chastise his black 
slave) and status (an employer could chastise his employee) because all of these subordinate 
groups were considered to be just that: subordinate. · Arguably some rights must be age 
discriminative, (e.g. right to vote) but fundamental rights should not. It seems absurd that we 
should take fundamental rights away from people that are too old, or too young. In fact, we 
45 Section 9 states that everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. Arguably, this does not 
apply to 'everyone' when there is a group in society who can be legally hit. The words 'cruel 
and degrading' are strong, however they match other international documents that promote 
physical integrity. 
46 The United Nations Committee Against Torture and Other forms of Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment recommended that New Zealand repeal the old section 
59. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: New Zealand. 
United Nations (2004) paragraph 7(e). 
47 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child also criticized New Zealand's 
domestic discipline defence. See chapter 2. 
48 James, A. "Understanding childhood from an interdisciplinary perspective: Problems and 
potentials" in Pufall, P.B., & Unsworth, R.P. (Eds.) Rethinking Childhood, Rutgers 
University Press, New Brunswick, 25-37. 
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do not take the right to bodily integrity away from the elderly, even though, like children, 
they are often physically weak, and for those who have dementia, lack adult mental capacity. 
ii) Capacity and age discrimination. 
Children and elderly people with dementia are different from other adults because they lack 
mental capacity, and therefore require different levels of protection and cannot exercise the 
same decision-based rights. Elderly people might assign a power of attorney to make 
decisions for them that require capacity, and children have their parents or guardians. The 
difference is of course that a power of attorney cannot hit an old person, or give consent for 
that person to be hit. 
Mental capacity cannot be said to be the defining factor that prevents children being entitled 
to physical integrity, because others who lack capacity enjoy this right.49 Why do we not hit 
other people who lack full adult mental faculties? Surely it is because it is ridiculous to claim 
that a person needs an adult mental capacity to deserve the right not to be hit. 
Mentally handicapped persons and some elderly are unable to function as an adult. Like 
children, they need guidance and protection where they cannot look after themselves. We do 
not age discriminate when it comes to basic human rights- we do not hit elderly people when 
they turn 80 and appear to have lost the ability to function like a rational adult. Like children, 
they are at a different developmental stage to most adults, but that still does not take away 
from the fact that they are humans. Elderly people and children are in the same subset of 
humans with the following characteristics: 
49 Breen, C., The Corporal Punishment of Children in New Zealand: The Case for Abolition 
[2002] New Zealand Law Review 3, 359-391. 
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- both are at developmental stages where their capacity is not that of an adult's. 
- both are at physical stages where they are weaker than an adult and therefore are 
more vulnerable. 
- both are humans. 
Imagine a person who is physically small and weak, cannot fully comprehend adult language, 
concepts and behaviours, and is making a scene in a supermarket for which their guardian 
gives them a smack. I could be describing a two year old, in which case the guardian (parent) 
would be justified in his actions under current law, because the Parental Control provision 
bestows these special powers to parents. 5° I could equally be describing a mentally 
handicapped person, but in this case, a guardian who hit him would have no such safeguard, 
because that person has the same right to be protected by the law from assault as everyone 
else. 
In New Zealand discrimination on the basis of age is prohibited by the Human Rights Act 
1993.51 In 2005 the Human Rights Commission released the New Zealand Action Plan on 
Human Rights52 which "fully recognises children as human beings entitled to rights."53 The 
50 See chapters 3 and 4 for an explanation of how the Parental Control provision still allows 
hitting for certain purposes. 
51 Section 2l(l)(i) 
52 Human Rights Commission, New Zealand Action Plan on Human Rights, retrieved 4 
March 2008 from http://www.hrc.co.nz/report/actionplan/Oforeword.html 
53 Supra, No. 37 page 62 
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report recommend the repeal of the old s59, in "respect for children's rights to human dignity 
and physical integrity."54 
iii) Capacity and consent 
The right to bodily integrity is a fundamental right and fundamental rights are general by 
nature. They apply to everyone, despite their individual needs. A person might consent to 
having their physical integrity invaded, 55 however this consent can only extend so far. One 
cannot consent to assault that causes actual bodily harm. 56 This demonstrates how much our 
law values bodily integrity, even when it infringes on individual interests. 
In some circumstances a child is deemed to lack the necessary capacity for consent, 57 
therefore surely cannot consent to being assaulted. 58 Consequently, an argument for smacking 
that rests on the notion that children are not equal to adults because they lack adult capacity is 
flawed in the fact that children also lack adult capacity to consent to assault. Children are 
different to adults. We do not give them the right to vote or drink because they lack the 
requisite mental faculties to carry out these rights. So if children are so different, why do 
smacking advocates conveniently ignore their inability to consent to being hit, and replace it 
with the more drastic inability to have physical integrity? Provisions like Parental Control are 
54 Supra, No. 32 chapter 2.4 
55 A-G's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715; [1981] 2 All ER 1057 (CA) 
56 R v Brown [1992] 2 All ER 552; R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 
57 Eg, for participation in research, refusing medical treatment, etc. Supra No. 31. 
58 Children are deemed unable to consent to sex or sexual acts, therefore the fact that 
someone under the age of consent might have given their permission does not serve as a 
defence to a charge of sexual conduct with child under 12 for example. (s132 Crimes Act 
1961). lnglis v Police (1986) 2 CRNZ 463 
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enacted to get around this, because hitting children is the exception to the general rule that 
you can only hit those who consent to it. 
b) Children's Rights. 
Some rights for children must necessarily be different to those for adults, because children 
are different to adults. They are deemed to lack the mental capacity and maturity to exercise 
certain rights, such as making the decision to marry, or to smoke cigarettes for example. 
However none of the various general rights theories nor the theories specific to children's 
rights necessarily deny children basic, fundamental human rights. 
i) The Will Theory 
The Will Theory of rights (also known as the 'choice theory') states that "the holder of a 
legal right is normally permitted and empowered in law to choose whether or not on any 
given occasion he should avail himself of his right by insisting on performance by another 
party of the relevant duty."59 Will theorists argue that a rights holder has the ability to control 
whether others must or must not act in particular ways, and there is no such thing as an 
unwaivable right. According to this theory, rights can only be held by people who are capable 
of waiving them, hence they cannot apply to children.60 Obviously our society does not 
subscribe to this theory of rights when talking about fundamental rights, rather than political 
rights for example. The right to life is unwaivable, and, as mentioned above, people other 
59 MacCormick, N., "Children's Rights: A Test-Case for Theories of Rights" (1976) in 
Freeman, M. (Ed) Children's Rights Volume I, Aldershot, Ashgate Dartmouth, 2004, page 
314. 
6° Cruft, R. Rights: Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory? (2004) 23 Law arid Philosophy, 
347-397. Also see Hart, H. L. A. Are There Any Natural Rights? (1955) 64 Philosophical 
Review 2, page 181. 
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than children who lack mental capacity are not denied the fundamental right to physical 
integrity. 
While the will theory is unhelpful in determining fundamental rights entitlements, it is useful 
in determining children's entitlements to activities that require capacity, such as voting. 
Voting is a right that requires capacity to exercise or waive, and because children lack this 
capacity they are not entitled to this right.61 In New Zealand, a person must be 18 before they 
are eligible to vote. 62 While it is true that some children at age 17 might be better equipped to 
make political choices than their 18 year old counterparts, the letter of the law must be set 
somewhere in the interests of consistency and application. It is a far simpler electoral system 
where persons over a certain age are generally deemed to be competent to vote, than to have 
to assess every voter individually. Elderly people with dementia are included in the 
"competent" category for this reason. This is not to say that children under 18 are universally 
deemed too immature to vote. In Austria and Brazil the voting age is 16, and in New Zealand 
Green Party MP Sue Bradford announced in June 2007 that she intended to introduce her 
Civics Education and Voting Age Bill which would lower the voting age to 16. However, she 
later abandoned the Bill, due to an adverse public reaction.63 
61 Some children's rights theorists argue that the right to participate and have a political voice 
is a fundamental right, and therefore children should be entitled to vote. See Cairns, L. 
"Participation with purpose" In Tisdall, E. K. M, Davis, J. M., Hill, M., & 
Prout, A. (Eds.), Children, Young People and Social Inclusion. Policy Press, Bristol, 2006. 
62 Section 12 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
63 Radio New Zealand News, "Green MP abandons voting age bill", 26 July 2007, Retrieved 
13 August 2008 from 
http://www .radionz.co.nz/news/latest/20070726131 0/ green_mp _abandons_ voting_age_bill 
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ii) The Interest Theory 
The interests theory of rights64 was developed by Joseph Raz. "According to Raz, a person 
may be said to have a right if and only if some aspect of her well-being (some interest of 
hers) is sufficiently important in itself to justify holding some other person or persons to be 
under a duty."65 The purpose of a right, according to this theory, is to further the right-
holder's interests. An owner has a right, "not because owners have choices, but because the 
ownership makes the owner better off."66 The interest theory is more versatile than the will 
theory because it recognises that some rights are unwaivable, and it also recognises that 
people who lack capacity can still have rights. 
Neil MacCormick67 discusses this theory with reference to children and the right to care and 
nurture. He concludes that this right exists not by virtue of a parent's duty to provide care and· 
nurture, rather the duty exists because of the right. If there was no parent, the child's right 
would still exist. Under the interests theory, "when a right toT is conferred by law on all 
members of C, the law is envisaged as advancing the interests of each and every member of 
C on the supposition that T is good for every member of C, and the law has the effect of 
making it legally wrongful to withhold T from any member of C."68 If we insert 'the right not 
to be hit' as the right 'T', and 'children' as group 'C', then this statement makes perfect 
sense: It is in the interests of all children to have the right not to be hit, and it would be wrong 
to withhold this right from them, therefore they have this right. Of course, there are smacking 
64 Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom Oxford, Clarendon, 1986 
65 Waldron, J. Rights in Conflict (1989) 99 Ethics 3, page 504. 
66 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, retrieved 26/6/08 from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2.2 
67 Supra. No 59 
68 Supra No 59, page 311 
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advocates that claim that the right not to be hit is not good for children, i.e. that smacking is 
good for children, however this is a highly contentious position, with little scientific 
support. 69 Research seems to show that there is a slippery slope between mild physical 
punishment and child abuse.70 Empirically this is supported by the dramatic decrease of child 
deaths in Sweden due to maltreatment, after a total ban on physical punishment was 
introduced in 1979.71 
A brief summary of the research into the effects of physical punishment. 
Anne Smith points out that most studies agree that when corporal punishment is employed, 
parents are aiming for short-term effects, in the form of immediate compliance with a request 
or direction.72 Similarly, Gershoff carried out a meta-analysis of 92 studies of corporal 
punishment, and found that it was only associated with one desirable behaviour: immediate 
compliance.73 She also suggests that parents not only seek instant obedience, but also want 
the obedience to be ongoing, which is not usually the case. In fact, physical punishment can 
lead to an increase in non-compliance as well as other behavioural problems.
74 
69 Caldwell, J. L. Parental Physical Punishment and the Law (1989) 13 New Zealand 
Universities Law Review, 370-388. 
70 Wilson, S., & Whipple, E., 'Communication, discipline and physical child abuse'. In 
Socha, T., & Stamp, G. (editors) Parents, Children and Communication: Frontiers of therapy 
and research, 299-317, Lawrence Erlbaum 
71 Smith, A. B. The Discipline and Guidance of Children: A summary of research, Children's 
Issues Centre, University of Otago, and the Office of the Children's Commissioner, June 
2004 
72 Ibid. The Effects of Physical Punishment. 
73 Gershoff, E. T. Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child Behaviours and 
Experiences: A meta-analytic and theoretical review (2003) 128 Psychological Bulletin, 4, 
539-579 
74 Kalb, L. M., & Loeber, R. Child Disobedience and Non-Compliance: A Review (2003) 
111 Pediatrics, 3, ~41-652. 
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Gershoff' s analysis has been criticised by several researchers who believe the inclusion 
criteria for the studies were incorrect, and the findings were consequently based on 
correlational research. Larzelere suggests that mild physical punishment is a suitable avenue 
for achieving short-term compliance, and studies that find otherwise have focused on severe 
physical punishment at the other end of the scale. 
75 Larzelere suggests that within the 
following guidelines, corporal punishment is acceptable and effective for immediate 
obedience: 
"-Not too severe; 
-the punisher is under control (i.e. not punishing in anger); 
-the age of the children is from two to six years; 
-it is accompanied by reasoning; 
-it is done privately; 
-it is motivated by 'concern for the child"'76 
This appears to be an attempt to draw the line, and illustrate an area where smacking is 
acceptable. However, the area that Larzelere has defined is intensely restricted by very 
specific guidelines, which are probably more often than not breached. This prompts the 
question: is there really much point in defining situations when corporal punishment is 
effective if it is such a narrow window that is difficult to stay within? Advocates for 
abolishment of all physical punishment suggest that alternative methods (for example, 'time 
out') work just as well, even in the short term, so there is no real need to identify 
circumstances where physical punishment may or may not be effective. Straus points to 
75 Larzelere, R. E. Child Outcomes of Non-Abusive and Customary Physical Punishment by 
Parents: An updated Literature Review (2000) 3 Clinical Child and Family Psychology 
Review, 4, 199-221 
76 Ibid. 
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studies where non-physical alternatives were just as effective at achieving immediate 
compliance. 77 
On the other side of the debate, Crittenden argues that non-physical punishment can 
sometimes not only be ineffective, but can be entirely inappropriate.78
 She gives the example 
of a toddler running out on to a busy street, and says that the child will remember a spanking 
and the intense anger and fear of the mother, but will not remember a gentle telling off or 
explanation of the consequences, because toddlers have a limited capacity to process verbal 
information. This is consistent with the Larzelere's guidelines, but comes from a slightly 
different reasoning. Crittenden suggests that abusive behaviour is in fact a protection 
mechanism, in that parents are cued to dangerous situations, and children learn from the 
violence that is associated. She illustrates this point with the higher incidences of violence in 
dangerous neighbourhoods. There is also an evolutionary spin off: 
"Species evolve in a way that promote the good of the many, whereas individuals 
adapt to promote individual well-being within the constraints of specific contexts. It 
may be that injury of children is an unfortunate outcome of evolved processes 
selected because they more often promote safety."
79 
Short-term effectiveness is not the only concern for those advocating a ban on smacking. 
Research shows that there can also be several long-term effects, often undesired and 
unforeseen by the punisher.80 Smith says long-term effects may include aggression, 
77 Straus, M. A., "Corporal Punishment and Academic Achievement Scores of Young 
Children: A Longitudinal Study" In Straus M. A., (Ed.) The Primordial Violence: Corporal 
Punishment by Parents, Cognitive Development and Crime, AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, 
CA, 2004 
78 Crittenden, P. M., "Dangerous Behaviour and Dangerous Contexts: a 35 year perspective 
on research on the developmental effects of child abuse" In Tricket, P. K., & Schellenbach, 
C. J., (Eds.) Violence against children in the Family and the Community, American 
Psychological Association, Washington, 2002 
79 Supra, No. 78. 
80 Ibid. 
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behavioural problems, delinquency, cognitive and intellectual development, mental health 
problems and difficulty establishing relationships.
81 The idea is that excessive use of power 
assertive discipline threatens secure attachment. Secure attachment comes from warm, 
positive parenting which helps children internalise rules. Physical punishment, on the other 
hand, models aggressive behaviour and can work to suppress the development of moral 
internalisation. 
Naturally, since this is a sensitive and controversial topic, there are limitations on gathering 
empirical evidence, and much of what is known about the effects of physical discipline 
comes from retrospective reports and limited outcome studies. Furthermore, causality can be 
disrupted with confounding variables, and there cannot be randomly assigned children or 
control groups. Benjet and Kazdin suggest that causality can be effectively measured if a 
baseline point is set in time in a longitudinal study, and it can be shown that one event 
occurred prior to another.82 
A recent Dunedin study looked at a cohort of 26 year olds and the lasting effects of physical 
punishment. The study concluded that not only was non-physical punishment more effective 
in creating long term compliance, there were also lasting emotional effects from being 
physically punished. Eighty per cent of the participants reported receiving physical 
punishment as a child or adolescent, but when asked what the most effective punishment they 
ever received was, most of them reported that it was non-physical. The authors admit that the 
result could be explained by the recency effect- the participants were 26 years of age and 
81 Ibid. 
82 Benjet, C., & Kazdin, A. E. Spanking Children: The Controversies, Findings and New 
Directions (2003) 23 Clinical Psychology Review, 2, 197-224 
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therefore more likely to recall events in their adolescence, a time when there was a lesser 
incidence of physical punishment. However, it is more likely that the results simply show that 
non-physical punishment, such as privilege loss, has a more pronounced effect and sticks in 
the mind in the long term.83 This has implications for parents, especially for punishment in 
late childhood or adolescence. 
Crittenden's research agrees. She suggested that toddlers would not learn from reasoning due 
to their limited verbal capacity,84 but this is not to say that they would respond to a loss of 
privilege (for example a toy) any less than a smack. 
The Dunedin study also reported that nearly a quarter of those giving accounts of physical 
punishment in an interview became emotionally distressed, which further indicates that it has 
lasting negative effects. 
Smacking brings about an array of emotions within children including sadness, hurt, fear and 
resentment, none of which is intended when attempting to produce immediate compliance 
with a direction.85 From a child's perspective, it is confusing that adults cannot hit each other, 
but they can hit children. Straus suggests that mental health problems can arise later in life 
due to suppression of childhood anger about being hit by the adults whom they are dependent 
on for love and protection. 86 
83 Millichamp, J., Martin, J., Langley, J. On the receiving end: young adults describe their 
parents' use of physical punishment and other disciplinary measures during childhood (2006) 
119 The New Zealand Medical Journal, 1228. 
84 s upra. No. 78. 
85 Willow, C., & Hyder T. It Hurts You Inside: Children talking about smacking, National 
Children's Bureau/ Save the Children, London, 1998. See also Dobbs, T. Insights: Children 
and young people speak out about family discipline, Save the Children, Wellington, 2005. 
86Straus, M. A. Is it Time to Ban Corporal Punishment of Children? (1999) Canadian 
Medical Journal161(7), 821-822. 
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iii) Positive and Negative Rights 
Rights are sometimes described as 'positive' or 'negative'. A positive right entitles the right 
holder to be provided with something, from another person or from the state. A negative right 
entitles the right holder to be free from interference. The right not to be hit is a negative right, 
because it simply requires that no one interferes with the right holder's physical integrity.
87 
An example of a positive right might be the right to receive state health care or education. 
Arguably, negative rights are easier to respect, because they do not require anybody to do 
anything, other than refrain from interfering with one another. 
The right not to be hit only becomes a positive right when enforcement is required.
88 In other 
words, to enforce the right not to be hit, the state must do something. The state already takes 
positive action to respect an adult's negative right not to be hit, but it has only undertaken to 
criminalise parental hitting against children when the motive is correction, or when the force 
used is more than is considered to be reasonable.89 
The right to enforcement is a peripheral issue to whether the right not to be hit exists in the 
first place. The difficulty (or perceived difficulty) in enforcing a right should not mean that 
the right does not exist. The negative right not to be hit is fundamental. It does not impose 
any burden onto anyone, and does not belong exclusively to people who have adult capacity. 
Some theorists argue that children, by virtue of their incapacity and dependence, have a 
87 Narveson, J. The Libertarian Idea, Broadview, Ontario, 2001. 
88 Holmes, S., & Sunstein, S. The Costs of Rights, W.W. Norton, New York, 1999. 
89 Section 59 Crimes Act 1961. 
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greater claim to the positive right of protection than adults.9
0 This is affirmed in article 19 of 
UNCRC.91 Vulnerability and dependence means that children have special safeguards that 
are not available to other citizens who are capable of caring for themselves. We see this in 
our domestic law in guardianship provisions92 and in the criminal code, which sets out a 
mandatory duty for parents or guardians to provide the necessaries of life.
93 
iv) Best Interests and Paternalism. 
Some entitlements for children are given to them in their 'best interests', which is an example 
of paternalism as Adhar and Allan point out. 9
4 Paternalism means that the state (or perhaps a 
parent) can override a person's autonomy or free will because the person would be better off 
or protected from harm if decisions are made for them.95 However, paternalistic conditions do 
not just apply to people who lack capacity. The requirement that everybody wear a seatbelt in 
a car is an example of paternalism. 
The welfare principle, or the principle of 'best interests' for children, requires that any action 
taken on behalf of a child is done to maximise the best outcomes for that child.
96 There are 
many different ideas about what constitutes the best outcome for the child, but a popular line 
of thought is that of Rawls: 
90 See Tamar, E. A positive right to protection for children (2004) 7 Yale Human Rights and 
Development Law Journal, 1-50 for a comprehensive analysis of a child's positive right to 
protection in the corporal punishment context in America. The author claims that this right is 
rooted in dignity. 
91 See chapter 2. 
92 Care of Children Act 2004 
93 Section 151 Crimes Act 1961. 
94 Supra. No. 31, page 31 
95 Potion, N. Paternalism (1979) 89 Ethics 2, 191-198. 
96 Buchanan, A., & Brock, D. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision 
Making, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
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'We must choose for others as we have reason to believe they would choose for 
themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding rationally.'
97 
The idea of welfare, or 'best interests' is a common theme in discourse surrounding 
children's rights. Micheal Freeman's theory of 'liberal paternalism' best outlines this. He 
suggests that we need to balance nurture with self-determination, and develop laws that 
respect children's rights while at the same time protecting them from harm.
98 
The welfare principle is well accepted in our society. Article 3 of UNCRC makes the child's 
welfare a primary consideration: 
"In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." 
Section 4 of the Care of Children Act 2004 goes one step further than making best interests a 
'primary consideration' and instead makes it a paramount consideration in decisions made 
about children.99 
Most of the time, what is in the best interests of a child will be in line with the child's 
rights. 100 In the context of smacking it is arguably in the best interests of a child not to be hit 
and they have a right not to be hit, therefore there is not a problem. However, difficulty can 
97 Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. 
98 Freeman, M., 'Taking Children's rights more seriously (1992) 6 International Journal of 
Law and the Family 52, page 69 
99 Fisher J in Sharma v Police High Court Auckland A168/02, 7 February 2003 pointed out 
that the old Domestic Discipline provision was at odds with New Zealand's family law 
jurisdiction. 
100 Herring, J. Farewell Welfare? (2005) 27 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 2, 
159-171. 
38 
arise when the right is the autonomy to make decisions, for example when a child wants to do 
something that harms them, 101 such as refuse to undergo a medical procedure.
102 
v)Autonomy 
"Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to refer to the capacity to be 
one's own person, to live one's life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one's 
own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces."
103 To have autonomy 
is to have the ability to decide matters for oneself, and to bear the responsibility for one's 
own choices, therefore people who lack capacity necessarily lack full autonomy.
104 Some 
theorists argue that children cannot have full autonomy, and any attempt to bestow it upon 
them causes a breakdown in the family institution.105 However, respecting a child's 
autonomy does not have to mean giving them full adult rights and responsibilities. It is 
possible to acknowledge that a child has developing autonomy
106 while at the same time 
acknowledging their vulnerabilities and protecting them from harm.
107 This is especially 
relevant in discourses surrounding the child's right to participate in decisions that affect 
101 Eekelaar, J. The interests of the child and the child's wishes: the role of dynamic self-
determinism (1994) 8 International Journal of Law and the Family, 42-63. 
102 See below for a potential autonomy and best interests conflict in the smacking debate. 
103 Supra. No. 66 
104 Dworkin, G. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1988. 
105 Morita, A. Family Dissolution and the Concept of Children's Rights: A Historical and 
Culture-Comparative Analysis, retrieved 16/3/07 from 
http://www .fww .org/articles/congres 1/amorita.htm. 
106 Woodhouse, B., "Re-visioning Rights for Children" in Rethinking Childhood, Pufall et al, 
eds. Rutgers Press 2004. 
107 Supra. No. 98 
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them. 108 However it is not so important when discussing rights that do not require capacity to 
be held, such as the right not to be hit. 
vi) Needs based rights and dignity based rights 
Children are different to adults with respect to their capacities and capabilites, therefore 
discussion of rights for children must necessarily take into account children's immaturity, 
vulnerability and dependency. However, none of these things should be considered 
handicaps, they are merely human variables and should not preclude a person from holding 
rights, especially rights that do not require full adult capacity. Michael Freeman suggests that 
the argument for children holding rights despite their inherent dependency comes from 
feminist theory: 
"Dependency should not be a reason to be deprived of choice and respect. An 
important contribution of feminist moral theory has been to question the firmly 
embedded assumption that moral agency and citizenship rights require as a pre-
condition that a person be independent, totally autonomous ... Dependency is a basic 
human condition. The United Nations Convention, using largely an autonomy model, 
would as much as possible give children the opportunity to be independent. But it is 
also possible, as is argued within feminism, 109
 to accord respect and participation 
rights in decision-making to those who are dependent.',] 10 
The right to participate in decision making that Freeman mentions is a positive right, because 
it requires others to include the child and facilitate his or her views. Negative rights do not 
demand anything from anyone, therefore are easier to respect. If children can hold positive 
108 Morrow, V. "We are people too": Children's and young people's perspectives on 
children's rights and decision making in England (1999) 7 The International Journal of 
Children's Rights, 149-170. 
109 "For example, V. Held, 'A Non Contractual Society' in M. Hanen and K Neilson (eds.), 
Science, Morality and Feminist Theory (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1987)." 
11° Freeman, M., The Sociology of Childhood (1998) The International Journal of Children's 
Rights 6, page 440. 
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rights and still be dependent, they can definitely hold negative rights. The right not to be hit is 
a negative right, and one that can be held by children, despite the fact that they are dependent. 
Barbara Bennet Woodhouse111 suggests that rights can be divided into two categories to 
reflect dependence and autonomy: needs-based rights and dignity-based rights. Rights that do 
not require capacity to be held are known as 'dignity-based' rights, and belong to everyone. 
Children's needs-based rights "would include the positive right to nurture, education, food, 
medical care, shelter and other goods without which children cannot survive let alone 
develop into autonomous adults and productive citizens."
112 This formulation of rights is very 
simple, and applies to everyone, not just children, but is especially useful in children's rights 
discourses because it highlights how some rights apply in some situations and not in others: 
"[c]hildren's ability to reason and understand evolves over time, but their dignity-
based rights are fully present at birth. Dignity-based rights remind us that children, 
despite their lack of capacity, do have rights based on their present humanity as well 
as on their potential for autonomy ... Thinking realistically about children's rights 
involves integrating children's needs with their capacities and acknowledging that 
dependence and autonomy are two sides of the same coin. A scheme of rights that 
focuses exclusively on one or the other will be incomplete, whether applied to adults 
or to children."113 
The right not to be hit is not a needs-based right because children's dependence does not 
require us to do anything special in this area. The right not to be hit is a dignity-based right, 
and belongs to everyone. A child's dependence might invoke a needs-based right to 
protection however. Just as a child has a right to goods and services to meet their needs until 
they can develop sufficiently to meet their own needs, they also have a right to be protected 
111 Supra. No. 106 
112 Ibid, page 233. 
113 Ibid, page 234. 
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from hitting until they reach a stage where they can protect themselves. In that sense, a 
child's right not to be hit is stronger than an adult's, because the need is stronger.
114 
By definition, children are children because they have not developed fully into adult humans 
yet. 115 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (UNCRC) declares 
that children need extra rights over and above their basic human rights, because of the fact 
they are immature and dependent. In the preamble it says, "due to the physical and mental 
immaturity" of children, they need "special safe guards and care including appropriate legal 
protection". Physical punishment is contrary to the articles of UNCRC
116 because the right 
not to be physically assaulted is a human right, and applies to all people equally, even 
children. In fact, it applies especially to children. The rights set out in UNCRC are there to 
promote children's welfare, not to undermine adults' ability to care for the children. Taking 
away the ability to hit a child is not impinging on a parent's right because this right never 
114 Supra, No. 100. 
115 The relevant dictionary definitions of 'child' and 'childhood' are: 
1. a foetus; an infant 
2. A boy or girl. .. a youth approaching on or entering on manhood. 
3. A person who has (or is considered to have) the character, manner, pr attainments of a 
child, esp. a person of immature experience or judgement. 
4. A pupil at school/ 
'childhood': 
The stage or stage of life of a child; the time during which one is a child; the time from birth 
to puberty. 
Brown (ed) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Volume 1, pages 393-394. 
116 Article 19. See chapter 2 for an analysis of how the UN Committee specifically proclaims 
the use of physical punishment as inconsistent with UNCRC. 
42 
existed. Rather, by propping up children's entitlements to protection, UNCRC acts as an 
"essential counter to the misuse of adult power."
117 
vii) Is there a parental right to hit a child? 
To give children rights could potentially impact on the rights of parents to raise children the 
way they see fit. In 2003 this was a hot topic in the UK, with a proposed law change. Health 
Secretary Liam Fox said: "Outlawing smacking would be an outrageous intrusion by the state 
into parents' legitimate rights and duties."
118 Similarly, Woods, Hassell and Hook suggest 
that in the lead up to the amendment of s59 in New Zealand, parents were worried that the 
"imposition of children's rights upon families through legislation would compromise parental 
autonomy and authority. 119 Banning physical punishment would mean that parents could be 
prosecuted for smacking their children. To some, this seems outrageous and overzealous, and 
they feel that the criminal prosecution should be left for cases of serious assault. 
Article 5 of UNCRC recognises that State parties should respect the guidance and direction 
that guardians give to their children, however the Committee has unequivocally stated that 
this article does not open the door for the child's right to physical integrity to be invaded.
120 
Parents do not have the right to hit their children, however the Parental Control provision 
creates a legal privilege. Caldwell best describes this, with reference to the old s59, Domestic 
Discipline: 
117 Stainton Rogers, W. "Promoting better childhoods: constructions of child concern" in 
Kehily, M. J. (Ed.) An Introduction to Childhood Studies, Open University Press, 
Maidenhead, 2004, page 137. 
118 'Pressure grows over smacking law', BBC news, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/llhi/uk/3015226.stm 
119 Supra. No. 37, page 56 
120 See chapter 2. 
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"Although parents are often loosely said to have a legal "right" to physically punish 
their children (and this is the term used in section 38 of the Infants Act 1908), it may 
be more accurate, adopting a strict Hohfeldian analysis, to state that they enjoy, under 
both section 59 and the common law, a legal "privilege". If corporal punishment were 
indeed a parental "right", it would be necessary to find, on the Hohfeldian analysis, 
that a child was under a correlative duty to submit to the use of force.
121 That would 




If anything, a parent has a duty not to hit their child. In the past, before the damaging effects 
of hitting children were known, it may have been possible to conclude that physically 
chastising children was part of a parent's duty.
124 The duty comes from the child's 
entitlement125 to a good upbringing, not from a parent's right to hit.
126 But now, since the 
dangers of hitting are known, the concept of what is good for a child has changed. The 
parent's duty to provide that still exists, and this means they now have a duty not to hit.
127 
Parents do not own their children, and "guardianship does not override an individual's right 
not to be abused."128 
121 "See the comments by Wallington, "Corporal Punishment in Schools" 1972 N.S. 17 
Juridicial Review 124 at 125." 
122 Ibid. page 125. 
123 Supra. No. 69, page 372 
124 Ibid. 
125 John Locke has a vastly different approach, which contradicts the modern theory of 
children's rights. Instead, he emphasizes the duties that children have to their parents. Locke, 
J. Lock on Parental Power (1989) 15 Population and Development Review 4, 749-757. 
126 "parental rights to control a child do not exist for the parent. They exist for the benefit of 
the child and they are justified only insofar as they enable the parent to perform his duties 
toward the child." Lord Fraser in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbench Health Authority 
[1986] AC 112 at 170. 
127 A parent's duty to provide necessaries is codified in the Crimes Act 1961, section 152. 
Arguably, if a parent has a duty not to hit, then they must not hit to abide by this section. If 
they fail in their duty to the extent that the child dies, the child's life is endangered or the 
child's health is permanently injured, the parent faces imprisonment of up to 7 years. 
128 Hall, M. Child Abuse vs. Domestic Discipline (1998) Youth Law Review, November, 10-
12. 
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viii) An instance where rights might clash: Best interests v autonomy in giving evidence. 
Even before smacking for the purposes of correction was abolished, instances of assaults 
against children were an area of serious underreporting. Only a tiny proportion of abusers are 
actually convicted, compared with the number of abuse-centered assaults committed on 
children. 129 In New Zealand there are specific legislative provisions surrounding the reporting 
of abuse: 130 anyone can report it, and the police or social workers have a duty to follow it up. 
This does not necessarily mean that a conviction will be sought however. Working Together, 
a UK Department of Health report on how agencies and professionals should work together 
to promote children's welfare and protect them from abuse and neglect, suggests that there are 
three factors to be taken into account when deciding to initiate criminal proceedings: whether 
or not there is sufficient evidence, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute, and 
whether or not prosecution will be in the child's best interests.
131 
The 'best interests' argument does not produce a straightforward result in this context of 
enforcing the child's right not to be hit. The decision to prosecute might be made because it 
would be in the child's best interests to be taken away from an abusive parent. Conversely, it 
might be in the child's best interests not to prosecute because of the damaging effects of trial 
and process. 
In England, it is presumed that children are competent to give evidence in criminal trials no 
matter how young they are, unless they cannot understand the questions asked of them or 
129 Fortin, J. Children's Rights and the Developing Law, 2nd Ed. 2003, page 520 
130 Section 15-17 Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 
131 Department of Health (1999) in Fortin Children's Rights and the Developing Law, 2nd Ed. 
2003, page 523. 
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they cannot answer them in a way that is understandable by the court.
132 In Australia there is 
a specific piece of legislation dedicated to children's evidence. 
133 In New Zealand, the 
Evidence Act 2006 provides children with alternative methods of giving evidence in sexual 
assault cases, however there are no rules that say that children cannot be compelled to give 
evidence at all. The court has discretion to take into account the immaturity of the witness, 
and can make allowances to ensure that the child is comfortable and can give their testimony 
freely. Section 4 of the Care of Children Act 2004 says that the child's welfare and best 
interests should be paramount in a situation such as this. However, it must be remembered 
that the purpose of a trial is to get to the truth, and to allow the defendant a fair, due 
process.134 
When children are in court, there are two sets of competing rights-
135 do we protect them by 
virtue of their vulnerability, or do we recognize their autonomy as individual citizens with the 
same rights as everyone else? Some judges have expressly said that children owe a duty to 
society as a whole, just like adults, to give evidence, 136 which resembles the interest theory, 
that along with rights come responsibilities. 137 
When children are in court as defendants, this dichotomy is even more evident. A classic 
example is the Bulger case in England, where the process was dampened because the boys 
132 s53(1) and (3) Youth Justice Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
133 Evidence (Children) Act 1997 
134 Law Commission, The Evidence of Children and Other Vulnerable Witnesses: A 
discussion paper, Wellington, 1996. 
135 See Falk, Z. W. "Rights and Autonomy- or the Best Interests of the Child" in Douglas, G. 
& Sebba, L. (Eds.) Children's Rights and Traditional Values, Dartmouth Publishing 
Company Ltd, Aldershot, 1998. 
136 Lord Donaldson MR in Re R (minors) [1991] 2 All ER 193 at 198 
137 Supra. No. 59 
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were so young, yet they were being tried as adults for a serious crime. On one hand they were 
deemed capable of committing a crime, but on the other, incapable of answering it in the 
same way as adults. The European Court of Human rights in that case said that the court must 
take into account the age and maturity of the child when dealing with him or her in court.
138 
Unlike sexual assault cases, there are no specific statutory rules allowing children alternative 
methods of giving evidence in cases of common assault, and this could be potentially 
problematic. In sexual cases, a defendant is prohibited from directly examining the child 
victim, 139 and it is arguable that a vulnerable witness should have the same protection in 
cases where the s59 defence is raised, since this defence is only applicable to the parent or 
care giver of the child witness. The legislature has recognised that cross examination by the 
child's abuser would be traumatic and likely to compromise evidence in sexual assault 
cases, 140 however it has not recognised that it would be equally hard for a child to give 
evidence against his or her own mother and/or father for physical assault. Perhaps this is 
because New Zealand has seen only a few cases actually go to court, and require the child to 
give evidence. However, to further New Zealand's commitment to the United Nations 
Convention, the paramouncy of the child's best interest needs to be considered in cases such 
as this, so perhaps more needs to be done to protect children as vulnerable witnesses in non-
sexual assault trials, while at the same time ensuring a fair and just process for the accused.
141 
138 T v UK; V v UK[2000] Crim LR 187, ECtHR, 
139 Section 23F Evidence Act 1908 
140 Zajac, R., Hayne, H. I don't think that's what really happened: The effect of cross-
examination on the accuracy of children's reports (2003) 9 Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 3, 187-195. 
141 Davies, E., Seymore, F. Child Witnesses in the Criminal Courts: Furthering New 
Zealand's commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1997) 4 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 1, 13-24 
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3. How child-centred policy is influenced by our understanding of 
children's rights. 
Literature on the sociology of childhood and children's rights can help to explain how 
policies concerning children are developed. How policy makers view children and their place 
in society will shape the way they formulate strategies and procedures for dealing with 
children's issues. 142 
The common concepts of 'children' or 'childhood' can be said to be socially constructed. 
This means that the way we understand these concepts is influenced by attitudes and 
assumptions, so that rather than being simple realities, "they are always the products of 
human meaning-making."143 The social construction of children that a policy maker might be 
working with will vary depending on whether the discourse is needs or rights based, or 
focused on the child's quality of life. 144 
In addition to this, the concept of children's rights has changed over time, "from child-saving 
(protecting children) to propagating the personhood, integrity and autonomy of children 
(protecting their rights)."145 This is evident in the historical development of international 
children's rights declarations. In 1959 the United Nations Declaration on the Rights ofthe 
Child purported to be about children's rights, however it was more clearly framed in terms of 
142 Supra. No. 33 
143 Ibid, page 126. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Supra, No. 110, page 434 
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children's needs. 146 In comparison, UNCRC, which was created some 30 years later, uses 
largely "an autonomy model, which would as much as possible give children the opportunity 
to be independent."147 
As mentioned before, the concept of children's rights can be broken down into two major sub 
groups: needs-based rights and dignity-based rights. Children should not be denied basic 
human rights or 'dignity-based' rights by virtue of their incapacity. These rights recognise 
their status as individual persons. Dignity-based rights are different from 'needs-based' rights 
which recognise that children are different from adults, and require protection and nurture. 
UNCRC recognises this arrangement to some extent. The rights that it promotes fall within 
three main categories: 
"• provision of appropriate support and services for healthy development; 
• protection from exploitation and abuse; 
• participation in decisions made about their upbringing and care."
148 
New Zealand's ratification of the UNCRC in 1993 was a significant step towards the 
recognition of children as bearers of human rights. While it does not necessarily advocate full 
autonomy for children, 149 the various articles set out fundamental rights which, by virtue of 
article 4, state parties are required to promote, and where necessary, amend domestic law to 
accommodate. Therefore, ideally, the children's rights principles from UNCRC would 
influence domestic policy, however this is not always the case.
150 
146 Supra. No. 33 
147 Supra No. 110, page 441. 
148 Supra No. 117, page 135 
149 Supra No. 110 
150 Breen, C. "The role of New Zealand's international obligations in the development of 
national strategies: Investing in and protecting the 'whole child"' in Breen, C. (Ed.) 
Children's needs, rights and welfare: Developing Strategies for the 'Whole Child' in the 2F
1 
Century, Thomson Dunmore, Southbank, Australia, 2004. 
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One of the most pertinent examples of this in New Zealand is the abolishment of corporal 
punishment. It is a policy concerning children's rights, yet one that appears to have been 
influenced by other social constructions, namely relationships. 15
1 Children are seen in the 
context of their relationships with their parents, and the issue of parental rights may have 
influenced the policy development of corporal punishment of children. New Zealand has 
been reluctant to change this policy, and defended it in its periodic reports to the Committee, 
despite the Committee's numerous criticisms and recommendations of repeal. 152 
When other policies concerning children are developed in New Zealand, it is possible to see 
which particular theory of children's rights influenced the formulation. Cheyne et al153 
suggest that policy and theory are inextricable. Policy formulation depends on theory, and not 
simply a set of facts that require practical solutions. 
The Ministry of Social Development, in its 2002 Agenda for Children (the Agenda), 
demonstrated that theory impacts on strategy. The 'whole child approach' is heavily 
advocated in the Agenda, which is a movement away from viewing children as dependants in 
need of adult protection, control and guidance by virtue of their immaturity. The 'whole child 
approach' reflects the needs and dignity based rights described by Woodhouse, and the 
autonomy of children described by Freeman. However, as Breen points out, having a policy 
is one thing, implementing it is another. 154 To get any of the policies advocated in the Agenda 
off the ground, specifically the "key action area" of addressing violence in children's lives, 
151 Supra No. 110 
152 See chapter 2. 
153 Cheyne, C., Obrien, M., & Belgrave, M. Social Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand: A 
critical introduction, 3rd ed. Oxford University, Auckland, 2005. 
154 Supra No. 130 
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there needed to be substantial government funding. Having a policy that recognizes 
children's rights is not really useful unless there is the ability to actually implement those 
rights. 
The Parental Control provision is a good example of a policy that is not based on children's 
rights theory. Theoretically, children should have the same right not to be hit as every one 
else (arguably they should have extra rights to protection) but this provision sets them apart 
from other members of society and still justifies parental hitting. 
In chapter two I will look at the lead up to the amendment of s59 and the creation of the 
'Parental Control' provision. There were several reasons why New Zealand struggled to 
simply recognize a child's right not to be hit and implement it into domestic law. 
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Chapter 2: Changing the law. 
In this chapter I will explore the events that led up to the introduction of the Crimes 
(Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline)1
55 Amendment Bill, and the 
reasons behind the massive public resistance to it. 
1. A brief New Zealand history of domestic discipline legislation. 
The common law and statutes governing the parental use of force against children has 
undergone several developments since the New Zealand legal system was established. One of 
the major influences on the most recent change was the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 1989. 
a) The development of legislation 
The British settlers to New Zealand brought with them their legal traditions from which our 
system of law was ultimately based. The New Zealand system of law, in its earliest stages, 
reflected the statutes and common law of England.
156 The common law principle in relation 
to physical punishment of children was that parents, caregivers and teachers could use force 
to correct children, and the standard of 'reasonableness' was eventually read into this: 
"In an oft-cited passage, Blackstone simply noted that a parent "may lawfully correct 
the child, being under age, in a reasonable manner." 157 1t has rightly been assumed, 
sub silento, by later courts that the "correction" referred to was correction by way of 
physical punishment."158 
155 2005, no 271-1. 
156 Supra No. 37, page 23. 
157 1 Bl. Comm. 452. 
158 Supra No. 69, page 371. 
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The settlers to New Zealand were accustomed to using physical chastisement on children, 
however there is evidence to suggest that the Maori population was not. Tariana Turia, Maori 
Party eo-leader, in the lead up to the 2007law change blamed colonisation and Christianity 
for this learned behaviour, stating, "Our people did not hit their tamariki. 159 That only came 
about through colonisation and through Christianity actually."160 Wood, Hassall and Hook 
describe Maori life before the settlers consistently with Turia' s comment: 
"The early nineteenth century missionary the Revd Samuel Marsden of the Church 
Missionary Society wrote thus of Maori domestic life: 
I saw no quarrelling while I was there. They are kind to their women and children. I 
never observed either struck with a mark of violence upon them, nor did I ever see a 
woman struck. 161 
Early Maori writers, recalling life in the days before the European influence became so 
pervasive, also described a peaceful domestic scene that contrasted strongly with the 
violence of customary intertribal conflict. They suggest that Maori never beat their 
children but were always kind to them, and that this seemed to strengthen the bond of 
affection which remained among Maori throughout life ... 162 But as the European 
presence in Aotearoa became more pervasive, Maori began to adopt the child rearing 
advice of the Christian missionaries or imitate the practices of the Pakeha settlers. 
Physical punishment ofMaori children became more common163."164 
Historical accounts of indigenous cultures in other parts of the world also show that physical 
chastisement was an introduced phenomenon: 
159 'Tamariki' means children. 
160 "Turia says colonisation and Christianity to blame for smacking", New Zealand Herald, 
30 April 2007. Retrieved 8/5/08 from: 
http://www .nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story .cfm?c_id= 1 &objectid= 1 0436914&ref=rss 
161 Salmond, A. Two Worlds: First meetings between Maori and Europeans 1642-1772, 
Viking, Auckland, 1991, page 422. 
162 Makereti, "The way it used to be" in: Ihimaera, W (Ed.), Growing up Maori, Tandem 
Press, Auckland Press 1998, page 24. 
163 Metge, J. New growth from old: The whanau in the modern world, Victoria University 
press, Wellington, 1995, page 265. 
164 Supra No. 37, pages 21-22. 
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"On the North American continent, when the white people arrived, there were both 
peaceful and warrior cultures that did not endorse hitting children. Their leaders were 
shocked when they observed white men hitting children. There is a story of a great 
Nez Perce Indian chief who was on a peace mission to meet with an American 
General. While riding through the settlement he observed a soldier hitting a child. The 
chief reined in his horse and said to his companions, "There is no point in talking 
peace with barbarians. What could you say to a man who would strike a child?"165 
Irwan A. Hyman suggests that our acceptance of hitting children is not ingrained, it is a 
cultural phenomenon which we learn, and therefore can unlearn. Hyman goes on to say that 
the Native Americans were eventually indoctrinated with Western theology and were 
convinced to beat the devil out of disobedient youths: He points out that cultures who 
traditionally never hit children now have high rates of child abuse, and cites this as evidence 
of a connection between the mere cultural acceptance of hitting children and the eventual 
escalation into abuse. 
Section 68 of the Criminal Code Act 1893 was the first codification of the common law right 
to use force for the purposes of correction in New Zealand: 
Section 68 Domestic Discipline. 
(1) It is lawful for every parent or person in the place of a parent, or schoolmaster, to use force 
by way of correction towards any child or pupil under his care: 
Provided that such force is reasonable under the circumstances. 
(2) It is lawful for the master or officer in command of a ship on a voyage to use force for the 
purposes of maintaining good order and discipline on board of his ship: 
Provided that he believes on reasonable grounds that such force is necessary: 
Provided also that the force used is reasonable in degree. 
(3) The reasonableness of the force used, or any of the grounds on which the force was 
believed to be necessary, shall be a questions of fact and not law. 
This provision was maintained in the Crimes Act 1908 as section 85. The wording of the 
provision was not updated until the Crimes Act 1961: 
165 Hyman, I. The Case Against Spanking. How to discipline your child without hitting, 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1997, page 4. 
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59 Domestic discipline 
(1) Every parent of a child and, subject to subsection (3) of this section, every person in the place of the 
parent of a child is justified in using force by way of correction towards the child, if the force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
(2) The reasonableness of the force used is a question of fact. 
In 1990, Section 59 was amended to recognise the abolishment of corporal punishment in 
schools. Subsection 3 was added: 166 
[(3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section justifies the use of force towards a child in contravention of 
section 139A of the Education Act 1989.] 
In June 2007, section 59 underwent a transformation and was replaced with the 'Parental 
Control' provision: 167 
s59 Parental Control. 
(1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified in using force 
if the force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of-
(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or 
(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal 
offence; or 
(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or 
(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use offorce for the purpose of 
correction. 
(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1). 
( 4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against a 
parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the use of 
force against a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no public 
interest in proceeding with a prosecution.] 
166 Subs (3) inserted by 1990 No 60s (28)(3) 23 July 1990. 
167 Section 5 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007. 
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It is interesting to note that the language in subsection 1 has not changed since the original 
domestic discipline provision from 1893. The 1893 provision would seem outrageous by 
today's standards: it would be unconscionable to give ship masters the ability to assault their 
crew to maintain discipline, yet virtually the same words are still in effect in the 2007 Act 
with respect to children. The only differences between the historical provision and the current 
one are the terms "correction" and "discipline". The idea prevails that one person is justified 
in using reasonable force against another, subservient person, in certain circumstances. 
b) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC). 
UNCRC was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, and to date has been 
ratified by 191 states.168 New Zealand ratified the Convention in 1993. UNCRC is "the first 
binding universal treaty dedicated solely to the protection and promotion of children's 
rights." 169 The convention covers "not only civil and political rights, but also social, 
economic, cultural and humanitarian rights."170 
Article 4 of the convention requires that state parties "undertake all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognised in the 
present Convention." The articles relevant to physical punishment are 19 and 37. Article 19 
requires state parties to take measures to ensure that children are protected from abuse and 
168 Status of Ratifications of the Principle International Human Rights Treaties, as at 9 June 
2004, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, retrieved 8/5/08 
from: http://www. unhchr.ch/htmllmenu3/b/k2crc.htm 
169 Fottrell, D. 'One Step Forward or Two Steps Sideways? Assessing the First Decade of the 
Children's Convention on the Rights of the Child', page 1, in Fottrell, D. (Ed.) Revisiting 
Children's Rights (2002) Great Britain, Kluwer Law International. 
170 McGoldrick, D. The United Nations Convention on th~ Rights of the Child, (1991) 5 
International Journal of Law and the Family, 133. 
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neglect. This includes physical and mental violence, physical and sexual abuse, neglect, and 
maltreatment. 
The second part to Article 19 states that countries should put in place programmes to support 
children and to prevent abuse. Programmes should include procedures for reporting, referral, 
investigation, intervention and treatment for children. 
Article 19 is closely linked to Article 37, which requires state parties to ensure that children 
are not subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. This article 
deals with slightly more extreme forms of violence, and sets out standards for deprivation of 
liberty, life imprisonment and capital punishment. However, it is still related to the general 
violence provision because it promotes the inherent dignity of children and their right to be 
treated with the same respect that is afforded to adults. 
Neither article 19 nor article 37 specifically refer to smacking, chastisement, or physical 
discipline. 171 Attempts have been made to read legitimate physical punishment into the 
· Convention under Article 5, which requires state parties to respect the guidance and direction 
that guardians give to their children. However, the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of the Child's (the Committee) response was unequivocal: 
It must be borne in mind, however, that article 19 of the Convention required all 
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to be taken to protect the child 
against, inter alia, physical violence. A way should be found of striking a balance 
between the responsibilities of the parents and the rights and evolving capacities of the 
child that was implied in article 5 of the convention. There was no place for corporal 
171 McLeod, R. "The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Implications for 
Domestic Law" LLM Research Paper, Victoria University, Wellington, 1995. See also 
Freeman M. "Children's rights ten years after ratification" in Franklin, B. (Ed.) The New 
Handbook of Children's Rights: Comparative Policy and Practice, Routledge, London, 2002. 
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punishment within the margin of discretion accorded in article 5 to parents in the 
exercise of their responsibilities. 172 
Article 19 unambiguously states that children shall be protected from "all forms of physical 
and mental violence". The obvious response from advocates of corporal punishment is that 
reasonable discipline is not violent, 173 however this is not the position taken by the 
Committee. The Committee have made it explicitly clear, through guidelines, reports and 
general comments that it regards physical punishment as contradictory to the principles of the 
Convention. 
i) Guidelines 
The Committee has set guidelines for State parties to follow when making their periodic 
reports. 174 The guidelines require the reports to include relevant information on "[t]he right 
not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
including corporal punishment (art. 37 (a))" .175 These guidelines are an updated form of those 
adopted by the Committee in 1996,176 which "required reports to include 'whether legislation 
172 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (1995) Concluding observations of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, 8th Session, CRC/C/15 Add 34. 
173 Newell, P. "Respecting children's right to physical integrity. 'What the world might be 
like ... "' in Franklin, B. (Ed.) The Handbook of Children's Rights, Comparative Policy and 
Practice, Routledge, London, 1995. 
174 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2005) General Guidelines 
Regarding the Form and Content of Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 44, paragraph l(b), of the Convention, Adopted by the Committee at its thirty-
ninth session on 3 June 2005, CRC/C/58/Rev.l 
175 Ibid at para 25 
176 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (1996) General Guidelin·es 
Regarding the Form and Content of Periodic Reports to be Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 44, paragraph l(b), of the Convention, 343rd meeting, CRC/C/58 
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(criminal and/ or family law) includes a prohibition on all forms of physical and mental 
violence, including corporal punishment' ."177 
ii) Reports 
The Committee has criticised state parties for maintaining corporal punishment laws that are 
contrary to Article 19.178 In 1995 New Zealand reported to the Committee on corporal 
punishment: 
"187. Corporal punishment of children and young people within government 
institutions is prohibited. It is not permissible to use physical punishment in the form of 
discipline on children or young people within institutions under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Social Welfare or the Ministry of Education. 
188. An amendment to the Crimes Act 1961 in 1990 outlawed the use of force to 
discipline children in early childhood centres or registered schools. Parents are legally 
justified in using force by way of correction towards a child provided the force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances. However, the use of unreasonable force against a child 
is a criminal offence and extensive measures are in place for the protection of children 
from abuse and maltreatment. 
189. The Commissioner for Children has promoted the idea of alternatives to physical 
punishment for disciplining children and has advocated the repeal of section 59 of the 
Crimes Act. Also, as part of its activities in focusing on family relationships, the 
Committee for the International Year of the Family ran a campaign for a "Smack-free 
Week" to show parents how to be effective in disciplining their children without having 
to resort to physical punishment."179 
177 Supra No. 33 
178 Ibid, page 135 
179 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (1995) Initial reports of States 
parties due in 1995: New Zealand. 12/10/95, CRC/C/28/Add.3. (State Party Report) 
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The Committee responded by asking whether New Zealand was considering repealing s59 of 
the Crimes Act as had been suggested by the Commissioner for Children.180 The Committee 
then recommended that New Zealand review s59 of the Crimes Act. 
29. The Committee recommends that the State party review legislation with regard to 
corporal punishment of children within the family in order to effectively ban all forms 
of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse. It further recommends that appropriate 
mechanisms be established to ensure the physical and psychological recovery and 
social reintegration of children victims of such ill-treatment and abuse, in the light of 
article 39 of the Convention. 181 
Later, in 2003, New Zealand reported to the Committee again. New Zealand had been 
criticized by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child for failing to bring 
corporal punishment legislation in line with principles of the convention. Until recently, s59 
of the Crimes Act 1961 allowed parents or guardians to use reasonable force for the purposes 
of disciplining their children. New Zealand did not review the law, and justified this to the 
Committee by stating that s59 did not sanction the use of violence against children, and that 
there was other legislation available to protect abused children. Instead of repealing s59, New 
Zealand opted for an education campaign, to teach parents alternative methods of discipline 
to smacking: 
"79. Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 has not been reviewed during the reporting 
period and it continues to provide a defence for parents to use force that is reasonable in 
the circumstances to discipline their children. New Zealand believes it provides 
sufficient protection through: 
• the fact that section 59 does not sanction any form of violence or abuse against 
children 
180 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (1996) Implementation Of The 
Convention On The Rights Of The Child, List of issues to be taken up in connection with the 
consideration of the initial report of New Zealand, 14th session, CRC/C/28/Add.3 
181 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (1997) Concluding observations of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child: New Zealand. 24/01197, CRC/C/15/Add.71 
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• the provisions of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 provides 
protection when abuse is substantiated. 
(Please see paragraphs 187 to 189 of New Zealand's Initial Report.) 
80. Submissions criticised Government for not reviewing section 59 of the Crimes Act. 
One argument was that physical abuse of children will remain unreported in the 
community because hitting is seen as "standard parental discipline". Others thought 
that removing it would lead to loss of parental control. The opponents of corporal 
punishment recognised parents do need to be "effectively" educated and supported if 
the law is changed. Reference was made to educational material on alternatives to 
corporal punishment produced by non-government organisations, especially EPOCH 
and the Peace Foundation. 
81. In October 2000 the Government directed officials to report as soon as possible on 
how other comparable countries (particularly in the European Union) have addressed 
the issue of compliance with UNCROC, including the education campaigns that 
preceded legislative change."182 
New Zealand justified the failure to review s59 of the Crimes Act by highlighting existing 
legal 'safeguards' and an education campaign that was launched to raise awareness of the 
alternatives to physical punishment amongst the public: 
"Legal Safeguards 
Corporal punishment 
497. Education campaigns on alternatives to smacking have been developed. However, 
the legal framework for corporal punishment has not changed. (See paragraphs 187-
189 of the Initial Report.) 
498. Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 does not sanction child abuse or protect a 
parent from the consequences of using excessive force. The legislation is clear in its 
requirement that physical force may only be administered to a child where it is done for 
the purpose of correction and where the degree of force used is "reasonable". 
499. The Court considers a number of factors to decide if the degree of force used by a 
parent was reasonable, including: 
• the age and maturity of the child 
• other characteristics of the child, such as physique, sex and state of health 
182 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003) Second periodic reports of 
States parties due in 2000: New Zealand. 12/03/2003, CRC/C/93/Add.4, pages 20-21 
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• the type of offence 
• the type and circumstances of punishment. 
500. The section does not sanction uncontrolled punishment carried out in anger. Nor 
does this section make it acceptable for a parent to apply an unreasonable degree of 
force in disciplining a child. 
501. The Government is reviewing other countries steps to address this issue, including 
the education campaigns that have preceded legislative change (see paragraphs 79-81). 
502. New Zealand uses education as the primary means to encourage parents to find 
alternatives to corporal punishment of children. In September 1998, Child, Youth and 
Family launched the "Alternatives to Smacking" campaign, the fourth stage in the 
Breaking the Cycle programme that commenced in 1995. The main objectives are to 
raise awareness of the alternatives to smacking and encourage parents and caregivers to 
think about using them. This campaign focused on television as the key medium, 
supported by postersl an 0800 freephone help line and pamphlet distribution 
(Annex 46). 
503. Results show the campaign was successful in raising awareness of the alternatives 
to 
smacking. It also found a positive attitudinal shift and a significant behavioural shift 
from 
pre-contemplation to contemplation of the alternatives to smacking. 
504. A submission stated that physical abuse of children will continue to happen 
unreported in the community because hitting is seen as "standard parental discipline". 
Other people thought that to do away with it will mean loss of parental control. 
Opponents of corporal punishment recognised that parents do need to be "effectively" 
educated and supported if the law is changed. Reference was made to educational 
material on alternatives to corporal punishment produced by EPOCH and the Peace 
Foundation."183 
The committee was pleased with this effort, however deemed that it was not enough. New 
Zealand's policy on physical punishment still lay outside the perimeters of the convention, 
which requires state parties to protect children from all forms of violence, including corporal 
punishment. Section 59 was doing nothing to promote a child's right to human dignity and 
physical integrity. The Committee again asked New Zealand why s59 had not been 
reviewed: 
183 Ibid, pages 99-100 
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Please provide information on the reasons some of the recommendations contained in 
the Committee's previous observations (CRC/C/15/Add.71) have not yet been fully 
implemented, in particular those related to the harmonization of domestic legislation 
with the Convention including ... the prohibition of corporal punishment and 
establishment of mechanisms to ensure the recovery of victims of ill-treatment and 
abuse (para. 29). 184 
The Committee urged New Zealand to ban corporal punishment, and was critical of the fact 
New Zealand had done nothing about earlier recommendations: 
" ... the Committee notes with concern that some recommendations have been 
insufficiently addressed. The Committee is particularly concerned about the 
recommendations relating to the harmonization of domestic legislation with the 
Convention, including the age of criminal responsibility and minimum age of 
employment (para. 23), and the prohibition of corporal punishment and the 
establishment of mechanisms to ensure the recovery of victims of ill-treatment and 
abuse (para. 29)"185 
"29. The Committee is deeply concerned that despite a review of legislation, the State 
party has still not amended section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, which allows parents to 
use reasonable force to discipline their children. While welcoming the Government's 
public education campaign to promote positive, non-violent forms of discipline within 
the home, the Committee emphasizes that the Convention requires the protection of 
children from all forms of violence, which includes corporal punishment in the family 
and which should be accompanied by awareness-raising campaigns on the law and on 
children's right to protection. 
30. The Committee recommends that the State party: 
(a) Amend legislation to prohibit corporal punishment in the home; 
(b) Strengthen public education campaigns and activities aimed at promoting 
positive, non-violent forms of discipline and respect for children's right to human 
dignity and physical integrity, while raising awareness about the negative 
consequences of corporal punishment." 186 (Committee's emphasis) 
184 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003) Implementation Of The 
Convention On The Rights Of The Child, List of issues to be taken up in connection with the 
consideration of the second periodic report of New Zealand, 34th session, CRC/C/93/Add. 4 
185 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003) Concluding observations: 
New Zealand, 27110/2003, CRC/C/15/Add.216, page 2 
186 Ibid, page 6 
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In 2007, there was an attempt to repeal s59, 187 which would have answered the Committee's 
recommendations, however there was so much opposition to the Bill that there was a risk that 
it would not pass into law.188 Instead, a compromise was reached, and s59 was amended into 
a very complex provision that attempts to clearly set out situations where reasonable force 
can be used against a child. 189 Physical force for the purposes of discipline was abolished. 190
 
It is possible that the Committee will still not be satisfied with New Zealand's efforts. They 
may commend the removal of corporal punishment, but criticise the new Parental Control 
provision, which still does not promote a child's right to human dignity and physical 
integrity, because it lays out all of the circumstances where are child's rights can be 
breached. 191 Children are still unequal rights bearers in the context of physical integrity and 
protection from assault. "All forms" of violence have not been eliminated if the legislation 
retains an avenue for the hitting of children. 
iii) General Comments 
In the 2006 the Committee released its General Comment No.8
192 on corporal punishment. 
The purpose of issuing the comment was to "highlight the obligation of all States parties to 
move quickly to prohibit and eliminate all corporal punishment and all other cruel or 
187 Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill2005, 
no 271-1. 
188 See below, "what went wrong.' 
189 See chapter 3, The Problem of Parental Control. 
190 Section 59(2)Crimes Act 1961 as substituted by section 5 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) 
Amendment Act. 
191 See chapter 3, The Prescriptive Quality of the Parental Control Defence. 
192 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2006) General Comment No. 8, 
The right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading 
forms of punishment (arts. 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, inter alia), 42nd session, CRC/C/GC/8, 
Geneva, 15 May-2 June 2006 
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degrading forms of punishment of children and to outline the legislative and other awareness-
raising and educational measures that States must take.'d 93 'Corporal punishment' or 
'physical punishment is defined as: 
" ... any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree 
of pain or discomfort, however light. Most involves hitting ("smacking", "slapping", 
"spanking") children, with the hand or with an implement - a whip, stick, belt, shoe, 
wooden spoon, etc. But it can also involve, for example, kicking, shaking or throwing 
children, scratching, pinching, biting, pulling hair or boxing ears, forcing children to 
stay in uncomfortable positions, burning, scalding or forced ingestion (for example, 
washing children's mouths out with soap or forcing them to swallow hot spices). In 
the view of the Committee, corporal punishment is invariably degrading. In addition, 
there are other non-physical forms of punishment that are also cruel and degrading and 
thus incompatible with the Convention. These include, for example, punishment which 
belittles, humiliates, denigrates, scapegoats, threatens, scares or ridicules the child."194 
The Committee makes it clear that corporal punishment is a form of violence, which Article 
19 specifically prohibits with the words "all forms of physical and mental violence." It is also 
made clear that corporal punishment "directly conflicts with the equal and inalienable rights 
of children to respect for their human dignity and physical integrity."195 The Committee 
reiterated that State parties have an obligation to take legislative measures to prohibit 
corporal punishment, and also to take measures to implement that prohibition by raising 
awareness and putting in place reporting, referral, educational and monitoring mechanisms. 
It seems strange that as a party to an international treaty, New Zealand can have domestic 
legislation contrary to the clear principles in the treaty. However, as Michael King196
 points 
out, the procedures for implementing children's rights advocated in UNCRC lack 'structural 
193 Ibid, at para 2. 
194 Ibid, at para 11. 
195 Ibid, at para 21. 
196 King, M., A Better World for Children: Explorations in Morality and Authority, 
Routledge, London, 1997. 
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coupling'. Basically, this means that UNCRC lacks teeth when compared to other 
Conventions because it has no Court to enforce legal processes. A Court's decision that a 
country's policy is contradictory to a Convention not only puts political pressure on that 
country to change, but legal pressure as we11. 197 Consequently, "[r]esponsibility for any 
unpopular changes in domestic legislation and administrative practice can be passed from the 
national government to the Commission or Court. Where no such structural coupling exists, 
as in the case of the UNCRC, this displacement of political responsibility is not possible."
198 
In the case of corporal punishment in New Zealand, deferment of responsibility for a 
seemingly unpopular law change to the Convention and international law would have 
prevented political issues getting in the way of children's rights advancement. The s59 issue 
in New Zealand became a political 'hot potato', and the focus of the Bill was lost. 
King has made a prediction, an accurate one in New Zealand's case, that without structural 
coupling, governments will at most make 'cosmetic' changes to legislation to fulfil 
international obligations, so long as they do not compromise their political objectives: 
"In the absence of any structural coupling between law and politics, therefore, 
complaints from legal or quasi-legal international organizations about violations of 
children's rights become reconstructed not as legal duties but as threats to national 
government and seen as unjustified and ill-informed criticism that the government is 
unable or unwilling to fulfil its international or constitutional obligations. The obvious 
political response of governments is to defend themselves against these charges by 
denying them, thus undermining the authority of their accusers. Only where absolutely 
necessary do they respond by complying with their international obligations. But even 
197 King provides the example of the European Human Rights Convention: "The terms of the 
convention ensure that the Court's decision or the settlement between the parties results in an 
'irritation' for governments, imposing a political and legal obligation on the government 
found to have committed a human rights violation to change its laws in order to avoid future 
violations. This obligation provides for the eo-evolution of legal and political programmes 
around the decisions of the European Human Rights Court and Commission." 
Ibid, page 179. 
198 Ibid, pages 179-180. 
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here the changes that they introduce are likely to take the form of cosmetic reforms in 
the law, which are unlikely to affect the government's political objectives. What they 
are least likely to do is take substantive measures to improve children's lives (even if 
this were possible), where these would conflict with their political programmes or 
compromise the ideological stance that won them the confidence of the electorate or 
those pasts of the electorate on which they rely for their support."199 
Despite the fact that the Committee has urged New Zealand to review its domestic discipline 
legislation, the lack of legal obligations and sanctions within UNCRC meant that the impetus 
for change had to come from within New Zealand. This meant that the issue was a hotly 
contested domestic issue, with two sides to be taken. King's predictions were accurate: 
politics got in the way of reforming the legislation as consistent with UNCRC. Rather than 
completely fulfilling its obligations to UNCRC, the New Zealand government made 
'cosmetic' changes to s59, so as to protect their political agendas at the same time. 
Consequently, the substance of the complaint, children's rights, has been undermined. In 
other words, had UNCRC been a legally enforceable international treaty, children's rights 
would have been better promoted. A full repeal of s59 would have been a matter of course in 
order to comply with our international legal obligations, rather than being a domestic political 
issue, available for compromise. 
The changes New Zealand made to 59 were merely cosmetic in that that they did not fully 
ban parental hitting of children.Z00 To fully recognise children as individual social actors with 
equal rights to protection under the law, all forms of assault that are not justified for other 
members of society should have been done away with. By doing away with the use of force 
for the purposes of correction, but not all uses of force, it seems like New Zealand is trying to 
hit two birds with one stone: A void international embarrassment after mounting pressure 
199 lbid, page 180 
200 See chapter 4. 
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from the UN to abolish corporal punishment while at the same time appeasing the distressed 
domestic population by not removing all uses of force. New Zealand appears to be talking the 
talk as far as children's rights are concerned, but is it really walking the walk2
01 if the 
provision that replaced Domestic Discipline does nothing to promote children's rights, and 
might actually violate them even more?202 
2. The lead up to the amendment of Section 59 of the Crimes Act 
1961. 
When Sue Bradford introduced her Bill, it had a specific purpose, which was to repeal s59 
and respect the child's right not to be hit. The repeal of s59 of the Crimes Act 1961 was not 
only about correcting a children's rights injustice, but also precipitating social change, by 
guiding society's attitudes and behaviours away from violence. However, by the time the Bill 
was passed into law, this purpose seemed to have morphed into something completely 
different, due to widespread hysteria and misunderstanding.203 
a) What the initial Bill was about. 
The Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill2005 
(the Bill) was a simple bid for a full repeal of s59 of the Crimes Act 1961. The explanatory 
note to the Bill described its purpose as: 
201 Supra No. 130. 
202 See chapter 4 for an explanation of how the Parental Control provision actually allows 
more justifiable invasions of children's physical integrity. 
203 See below, 'What went wrong?' 
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" ... to stop force, and associated violence being inflicted on children in the context of 
correction or discipline. Presently, section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 acts as a 
justification, excuse or defence for parents and guardians using force against their 
children where they are doing so for the purposes of correction and the force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances. The Bill will repeal that provision. 
The effect of this amendment is that the statutory protection for use of force by parents 
and guardians will be removed. Children will now be in the same position as everyone 
else so far as the use of force (assault) is concerned. The use of force on a child may 
constitute an assault under section 194(a) of the Crimes Act, a comparatively new 
provision in the criminal law, and the repeal of section 59 ought not revive any old 
common law justification, excuse or defence that the provision may have codified."204 
In the first reading205 of the Bill, Sue Bradford made several points very clearly about the 
intentions behind the proposed law change: 
1) That the Bill is about bringing children's rights to bodily integrity and protection from 
assault in line with other members of society: 
"It is about giving children and young people the same legal protection from physical 
assault that adults have. I do not understand at all why it is illegal in New Zealand to 
beat my spouse, another adult, a policeman, or even an animal harshly with a horse 
crop or a piece of wood, but it can be legal to do the same thing to my child. It seems to 
me that section 59 of the Crimes Act is a relic of English 19th century law and thinking, 
which said that children were simply the property of their parents and were subject to 
their total control and to harsh physical discipline. At that time the same applied to 
wives, servants, and horses. Strangely, it is only children to whom this quaint but 
dangerous law still applies." 
2) That the Bill is about fulfilling New Zealand's obligations to UNCRC: 
"It is high time we lived up to our commitments as a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. We are currently in breach of the convention, 
despite paying lip service to it, because we allow State-sanctioned force here. I believe 
that Government has a responsibility to lead the way on this." 
204 Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill2005, 
no 271-1. See Appendix 1. 
205 (2005) 627 NZPD 22086 
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3) That the Bill is about changing attitudes towards children's rights, and curtailing violent 
behaviours: 
"In practice, section 59 conveys the message to all New Zealanders that the State thinks 
it is legitimate and OK to use so-called reasonable force against those who, at least until 
they grow up, are smaller, weaker, and less mature than we are." 
"Our country has an all-pervasive culture of violence against children that leads to us 
having one of the highest abuse and child mortality rates in the developed world. 
People coming to this country for the first time, even from places like Israel, are 
shocked by the culture of violence we have here in the household and in the family." 
"I welcome the national debate that my bill has opened up about how, as a society, we 
regard and treat our children." 
4) That the Bill is not about banning light smacking: 
"What I am not doing is proposing a new law that might, for example, make it a crime 
to lightly smack a child or to physically restrain a child when such restraint is 
manifestly necessary, such as when a toddler is closing in on a power point with a fork 
in hand." 
"This bill is not about imposing penalties on parents who currently use light physical 
discipline. It is about giving children and young people the same legal protection from 
physical assault that adults have." 
5) The Bill is not about criminalising parents: 
"I am not seeking in any way to criminalise ordinary parents. I just want to remove a 
legal defence that is used when some people seriously hit or beat their children." 
"It is a nonsense to say that, as so many of my political opponents are doing at the 
moment, should repeal of section 59 happen, parents will suddenly be subject to arrest, 
prosecution, and conviction if they lightly smack their child. There is no way the 
Department of Child, Youth and Family Services will abruptly abandon its huge current 
caseload to remove children from parents who smack them, as United Future 
ridiculously alleges; nor will police, all at once, start arresting parents who put their 
child in a room for a bit of time out. It is patently ridiculous to think that all of a sudden 
the removal of the defence of reasonable force will lead to police all over the country 
arresting people for such actions. Goodness knows, they have enough other work to do. 
The aim of this repeal is not to subject parents to prosecution for trivial assault. In other 
countries where laws like this have been changed, there has not been a marked increase 
in such arrests. I certainly would not expect it to happen here, where the climate of 
public opinion is so manifestly not ready for a ban on smacking." 
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b) An exercise in social change. 
Repealing the defence of reasonable force for the puiposes of correction can be seen as an 
exercise in social change.206 When the State, through its legislation, no longer endorses the 
hitting of children and begins to recognise children as individual citizens deserving of equal 
rights, then gradually the public attitudes should follow. Prior to the amendment of s59, the 
Crimes Act legitimised assault against children, which sends a very clear message to the New 
Zealand public, that this is a socially acceptable behaviour. Polls have shown that the 
majority of New Zealanders believe that smacking is a socially acceptable behaviour.207 
Ideally, by removing this endorsement and justification, people will gradually change their 
attitudes and eventually physical chastisement will become socially unacceptable, just like 
some practices of our ancestors that shock us or make us cringe now. 208 Removing the 
defence forces people to change their behaviour, which in turn causes a shift in attitude.
209 
206 Keating discusses the UK corporal punishment scenario and how the government has 
failed to encourage attitudinal changes. Keating, H. Protecting or punishing children: 
physical punishment, human rights and English law reform (2006) 26 Legal Studies 3, 394-
413. 
207 73% percent of those polled opposed the Bill in March 2007. Nine months after the 
Parental Control provision was passed "74% of New Zealanders believed parents should be 
able to smack their children, contrary to the repeal of Section 59 of the Crimes Act". The 
maximum margin of error is+/- 4.7% (at the 95% confidence level). 
Kiwis remain opposed to "anti-smacking" legislation, Research New Zealand, Media 
Release, 20 February 2008. 
208 
" .•. we are rightly appalled by the previous legal privileges accorded to husbands to beat 
their wives, and to masters to beat their apprentices and servants. Our descendants will 
probably be equally appalled by the existing legal privilege accorded to us to beat our 
children." Caldwell, J. L. Parental Physical Punishment and the Law, (1989) 13 New Zealand 
Universities Law Review, 387. 
209 "Often behaviour change precedes attitude change ... In time they will develop attitudes 
supportive of their new behaviour." Katz, D. The Functional Approach to the Study of 
Attitudes (1960) 24 The Public Opinion Quarterly 2, 163-204. 
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As Sue Bradford pointed out, New Zealand has done away with legislation that legitimised 
assault in the name of chastisement on other groups in society, including students and 
seamen.210 The only group that was left was children: 
"Some of our ancestors brought with them, unfortunately, a culture and law that said 
that women, wives, servants, and children were the property of the master, the man, and 
the husband. With that attitude came a law that said it was OK to beat the wife, the 
servants, and the children. 
We have got rid of those laws. We used to have them, but we have got rid of the laws 
that allowed the husband to beat the wife. We got rid of the laws that said it was OK for 
a master to beat a servant, or an employer to beat an employee. But the relic of those 
laws is section 59 of the Crimes Act, which allows all of us as parents to beat our 
children: in the name of child discipline."211 
Social attitudes towards women's rights to physical integrity have changed with the 
abolishment of legislation that made their rights subservient to their husbands. For example, 
spousal immunity to rape has been relatively recently abolished,212 along with the social 
attitude that a woman's body belongs to her husband. Similarly, it is no longer socially 
acceptable for a man to physically chastise his wife for bad behaviour.213 A comparable 
attitude shift surrounding violence against children might happen if children are no longer 
singled out as the only group in society against which the state endorses the use of force. 
Evidence that social attitudes can change regarding physical punishment of children has been 
found in studies of attitudes in Sweden, which banned corporal punishment in 1979:214 
210 Taylor, N. Physical punishment of children: international legal developments (2005) 5(1) 
New Zealand Family Law Journal14 
211 (2007) 638 NZPD 8432 
212 Crimes Amendment Act (1985) No.3 
213 See government website, 'Family violence, it's not ok'. Accessed 14/5/08 from 
http://www .areyouok.org.nzlhome. php 
214 "The goal of the ban was to alter public attitudes and to acknowledge children's rights as 
autonomous individuals ... " The Swedish ban came under the Parent's Code rather than the 
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"Public support for corporal punishment has declined markedly. Whereas in 1965 a 
majority of Swedes were supportive of corporal punishment, the most recent survey 
found only 6 per cent of under 35-year-olds supporting the use of even the mildest 
forms. Practice as well as attitudes have changed; of those whose childhood occurred 
shortly after the ban, only 3 per cent reported harsh slaps from their parents, and only 1 
per cent report being hit with an implement (contrast the position in the UK and other 
countries where a quarter or more of young children are hit with implements). Child 
abuse mortality rates are extremely low in Sweden; for 14 years from 1976 to 1990 no 
child died as a result of abuse. "215 
Joan Durrant has found that the change in attitude about corporal punishment in Sweden is 
"too dramatic to be attributable solely to forces that somehow alter cultural norms regardless 
of legal structures."216 Sweden was in similar position to New Zealand, in that before the ban 
on corporal punishment, most of the public supported its use, however the Swedish case has 
demonstrated that law reform and attitude change can resemble the chicken and the egg; 
neither one necessarily presupposes the other: 
"Certainly, as cultural beliefs evolve they can, in turn, contribute to the reform of the 
law. But as the Swedish experience has shown, this is not a necessary condition for 
legal reform or for the attitude shifts that can follow it. When Sweden's corporal 
punishment defence was removed from the Penal Code, at least half of the population 
believed that physical punishment was necessary in childrearing. It was after the law 
was changed that these attitudes shifted rapidly. In fact, in only one of the countries 
(Finland) that have explicitly abolished physical punishment was the majority in favour 
of abolition before the law was changed (Boyson, 2002217)."218 
criminal code, and read: "Children are entitled to care, security, and a good upbringing. 
Children are to be treated with respect for their person and individuality and may not be 
subjected to physical punishment or other injurious or humiliating treatment." 
Durrant, J. E. "The Swedish Ban on Corporal Punishment" in de Gruyter W. Family Violence 
Against Children: A Challenge for Society, Berlin, New York, 1996, 19-25. 
215 Newell, P. "Global progress towards giving up the habit of hitting children" in Franklin, 
B. (Ed.) The New Handbook of Children's Rights, Comparative Policy and Practice, 
Routledge, London, 2002, page 384. 
216 Durrant, J. E. Legal Reform and Attitudes towards physical punishment in Sweden (2003) 
11 The International Journal of Children's Rights, page 169 
See also, Ziegert, K.A. The Swedish Prohibition of Corporal Punishment: A Preliminary 
Report (1983) 45 Journal of Marriage and the Family, 917-926. 
217 Boy son, R. Equal Protection for Children: An Overview of the Experience of Countries 
that Accord Children Full Legal Protection from Physical Punishment, National Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, London, 2002. 
218 Supra No. 216, page 169. 
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3. What went wrong? How the purpose behind the Bill was lost. 
Just like in Sweden, there was a massive public resistance to the Bill in New Zealand.219 In 
the time between the Bill being introduced and the Parental Control provision being passed, 
the focus of the repeal became less about children's rights and more about child abuse, 
criminalisation of parents and religion. As a result, the debate turned into a "political hot 
potato", and to avoid failure, the Bill had to meet some of these concerns by undergoing 
major restructuring. Consequently, the whole essence of the Bill was lost.220 
a) Child Abuse 
Opponents of the Bill claim that reasonable physical punishment and child abuse are not the 
same thing.221 In essence, they argue that the domestic discipline defence did not protect 
abusers, so to remove it would make no difference, and instead it would make good parents 
criminals for using light physical punishment. This argument not only requires an analysis of 
what constitutes 'abuse', it also reinterprets the purpose of the Bill. It supposes that the Bill 
was intended to combat child abuse. 
219 For a comprehensive summary of the public resistance to the Bill, see chapter 7: "Public 
Attitudes" in Wood, B., Hassall, I., Hook., G, Unreasonable Force. New Zealand's journey 
towards banning the physical punishment of children, Save the Children New Zealand, 2008. 
Chapter 8 is an insightful analysis of the role of the media in fuelling the debate. 
220 See chapter 3 for an analysis of how the amendments to the original Bill changed its very 
essence and purpose. 
221 "It is clear that physical abuse leads to long-term problems, but physical abuse is not 
currently permitted by section 59 ... There is a qualitative difference between moderate 
physical discipline and abuse, such that there is a divide between the two behaviours" This 
statement was made as part of a submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the 
Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, by the 
Maxim Institute, Auckland. 
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Sue Bradford herself has said, "The epidemic of child abuse and child violence in this 
country continues, sadly. My bill was never intended to solve that problem."222 
The connection between child abuse and physical discipline was strengthened by the media, 
with the portrayal of the two issues becoming increasingly intertwined.223 Many of the 
submissions made to the Justice and Electoral Committee sought to distinguish legitimate 
smacking of children from severe beatings and cases of child abuse that had managed to slip 
through the 'reasonable force' test in the past. Such options were put forward by MP's and 
the Auckland District Law Society,224 and considered by the Law Commission,225 however 
Sue Bradford was adamant that her Bill would never be compromised on hitting for the 
purposes of correction. 226 
While the Bill was not about addressing New Zealand's child abuse problems, it was 
intended to do away with socially accepted physical practices against children. 227 The 
Swedish experience has shown that there is a low rate of child deaths by abuse in a country 
222 National Radio, 21 December 2007. Family First quoted this in a full page Sunday Star 
Times Advertisement against the "Anti-Smacking" law. The advertisement cited examples of 
cases where parents had been investigated for using force against their children in various 
"trivial matters", and stated, "meanwhile the unacceptable rate of child abuse continues". 
Please Don't Take my Daughter, Sunday Star Times, 27/1108. 
223 See Chapter 8, Wood, B., Hassall, I., Hook., G, Unreasonable Force. New Zealand's 
journey towards banning the physical punishment of children, Save the Children New 
Zealand, 2008. Editorial comment and coverage of child homicides in the media enhanced 
the assumption that child abuse is liked with physical punishment. 
224 Auckland District Law Society, Criminal responsibility for domestic discipline: the repeal 
or amendment of Crimes Act 1961, section 59, Public Issues Committee, Auckland New 
Zealand, 2005. 
225 Supra No. 20 
226 Supra No. 37 
227 See above, An exercise in social change. Also, Sue Bradford's comment, "Our country 
has an all-pervasive culture of violence against children that leads to us having one of the 
highest abuse and child mortality rates in the developed world. People coming to this country 
for the first time, even from places like Israel, are shocked by the culture of violence we have 
here in the household and in the family" (2005) 627 NZPD 22086 
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that does not support the use of force against children.228 One of the oft-cited reasons for 
disallowing smacking is that when an avenue for hitting is open, people will abuse it, often 
unintentionally.229 The saying, "give them an inch and they'll take a mile" rings true in cases 
where what started out as discipline ended up as severe child abuse: 
"Most parents who punish their children to death claim that they didn't mean to kill 
them. Few think of hands as deadly weapons, but in a way, a severe spanking might 
be analogous to an accidental shooting. There are many cases where children get shot 
accidentally because guns were available. Hitting the kids is an available procedure 
for parents, and there are cases where it "accidentally" leads to death, too. 
Of course I have heard the argument that it is not guns that kill people, it is people 
who kill people. But if you accept this reasoning, shouldn't it apply to spanking? It is 
not their hands, fists, electrical cords, whips, or other instruments that kill the 
children, it's the parents who do it. Sounds somewhat silly to me. But as is 
demonstrated in many other countries such as Japan and Singapore, it is possible to 
limit gun ownership and therefore reduce death by guns. In the same vein you could 
eliminate severe spankings by eliminating the acceptance of spanking. If no child was 
spanked, none would be spanked severely, thereby reducing deaths of children in their 
homes."230 
The Bill was about establishing children as equal rights bearers with equal protection from 
assault. This eventually would bring about social attitude change regarding physical force 
against children, which in turn would eventually curb the use of violence. The Bill was not a 
tool for dealing with child abusers directly, but the abuse focus meant that the public lost 
sight of the bigger picture?31 
228 Between 1976 and 1990 no child died in Sweden as a result of abuse. 
Newell, P. "Ending corporal punishment of children" in Fottrell, D. (Ed.) Revisiting 
Children's Rights, Kluwer Law International, Great Britain, 2000. 
229 Many instances of child abuse are simply corporal punishment gone too far. Freeman, M. 
The Rights and Wrongs of Children, Francis Pinter, London, 1983. For specific New Zealand 
examples see Coddington, D. Disciplined to Death, North and South, February 2000, 32-44. 
230 Supra No. 163, page 31. 
231 For an assessment of the connection between child abuse and physical punishment see, 
Straus, M. A. Corporal Punishment and Primary Prevention of Physical Abuse (2000) 24(9) 
Child Abuse and Neglect, 1109-1114. 
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b) The Criminalisation of Parents. 
One of the biggest reasons for opposition to the Bill was the fear that parents were going to 
be criminalised for lightly smacking their children, or even for applying any force at al1.
232 
This fear was rife despite reassurance from Sue Bradford, the Police,233 the Justice and 
Electoral Committee234 and other legal experts235 that inconsequential or minor uses of force 
are very unlikely to be prosecuted: The editor of the Press commented that the "claim that 
parents would become criminals is simply scare-mongering, because the Police would 
become involved only if there was a serious fear of child abuse occurring."236 Nevertheless, 
the concern was widespread. 237 In chapter 3 I will discuss how the Bill was amended to 
address these concerns and to give parents further protection from prosecution. 
232 See Chapter 3 for a discussion on the gap in the law prior to the 2007 amendment that 
meant uses of force other than for the purposes of correction technically amounted to assault. 
233 Police Practice Guide, http://www.police.govt.nz/news/release/3149.html, 19 June 2007 
(Appendix 3) and Pope, R. Three month review of Police activity following the enactment of 
the Crimes (Substitued section 59) Amendment Act 2007, 
http://www.police.govt.nz/resources/2007/section-59-activity-review/ 
234 Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, As 
reported from the Justice and Electoral Committee 
235 for example, see Nick Davidson QC's comments in "Supernanny Busted" (2006) 65 
Investigate 28. 
236 Editor, "Ban the rod", Press, 14 March 2007. 
237 A sample of media headlines demonstrates how prevalent this issue became: "Please don't 
take my daughter", Sunday Star Times 27/1/08; "CYFS files on smackers" NZ Herald, 
28/6/07; "Toddler's tantrum brings three cops knocking" NZ Herald, 14/8/07; "School dobs 
mum to CYF for hand smack" stuff.co.nz, 28110/07; "Mother reported for smacking child's 
hand" NZ Herald, 28110107. 
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c) Religion. 
Religion played a significant role in the debate leading up the amendment of s59. Religious 
advocates of corporal punishment find support for their position from the Bible,238 with 
statements such as "spare the rod and spoil the child" and proverbs such as "Those who spare 
the rod hate their children, but those who love them are diligent to discipline them" (13:24) 
and "Withhold not correction from the child: for if thous beatest him with the rod, he shall 
not die" (23:13). New Zealand has no state religion, and many proponents of disciplinary 
smacking did not rely on religious arguments to support their position.239 However it has 
been suggested that age-old habits of using smacking as a disciplinary tool are related to 
religious assumptions that exist in our culture: 
"Most secular issues involving punishment cannot escape the enduring assumptions 
and perspectives generated over the centuries by American and European religious 
rationales. So embedded are these assumptions in our minds and culture, and so 
familiar are they to most of us, that it is often almost impossible to discern their actual 
influence on us."240 
Some religious arguments state that smacking is a "biblical mandate" and to ban it would 
equate to a breach of parents' rights to practise their religion.241 However, in The Queen on 
the application of Williamson v Secretary of State for Education and Employmenr42 Judge 
Elias pointed out that corporal punishment is not a religious conviction in its own right: 
238 For a comprehensive analysis of the religious foundations for corporal punishment 
arguments, see Greven, P. Spare the Child/ The religious roots of punishment and the 
psychological impact of physical abuse, Vintage Books, New York, 1992. 
239 Supra, No. 37 
240 Supra No 238, page 97. 
241 "Christian schools' smacking plea fails" Daily Telegraph, London, 16 November 2001. 
See also Drake, M. By Fear or Fallacy. The repression of reason and public good by the 
anti-smacking lobby in New Zealand, Wycliffe Christian Schools, Auckland, 2006. 
242 [2001] EWHC Admin 960, [2002] 1 FLR 493, [2002] ELR 214 
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"Corporal punishment is not being invoked for its own sake but in order to help 
secure the religious convictions that underpin the Christian convictions of these 
families. Accordingly I do not accept that the belief in the desirability of corporal 
punishment, even although it is derived from the Christian convictions held by these 
parents, can properly be defined as a religious conviction in its own right."
243 
The judge in this case also pointed out that a ban on smacking in schools does not infringe 
the human rights of any of the claimants, because not all Christians believed in corporal 
punishment and it could not be considered an integral part of the religion. 
In the New Zealand debate, not all religious groups were resistant to the Bill. The Bishops of 
Aotearoa New Zealand released a statement in May 2007 in favour of repeal of s59, stating 
that Biblical assertions must be read in the light of Christ's teaching, which places children in 
a position of respect. 244 The two major groups in New Zealand who have actively 
campaigned for the right to smack, and a referendum on repealing the new s59 base their 
positions in Judeo-Christian values.245 
Whatever the reason behind the public resistance to the Bill, it was obvious that the New 
Zealand public struggled with the change. A study of the massive amount of submissions 
(1716) made to the Justice and Electoral Committee showed that many people were 
concerned with parental rights and viewed children as 'human becomings' rather than 
'human beings'246 1t is not surprising then that this, coupled with the public's 
243 At para 45. 
244 For the full statement, see Woods, Hassell and Hook, Supra. No. 37, pages 96-97. 
245 Family First www.familyfirst.org.nz and the Kiwi Party www.thekiwiparty.org.nz. See 
also www.casi.org.nz 
246 Debski, S., Buckley, S., Russell, M., Just who do we think children are? An analysis of 
submissions to the Justice and Electoral Committee (2007) Health Services Research Centre, 
University of Victoria. 
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misunderstanding about the outcomes of physical punishment, 
247 resulted in widespread 
resistance. To change the law would mean that people would have to view children 
differently. Children would go from being small, voiceless extensions of their parents to 
being accepted as human beings with equal rights. Arguably, this scared a lot of people, 
perhaps because children with rights are threatening,
248 in that a parent has less control over 
them and they have the potential to get parents into trouble with the law. Irwin A. Hyman 
gives a classic example of parental fear and loathing of the plight to ban smacking, in the 
form of callers on talk back radio: 
"She claimed that we should return to the good old days when children respected their 
parents and teachers ... I was stunned by the vehemence of the majority of the callers 
who had a field day accusing me and all other child psychologists and fellow travelers 
of poisoning the minds of American parents. Somehow, we were the Commie, pinko, 
liberal elements in our society that fostered permissiveness so that our country would 
lose the cold war."249 
Comparing anti-smackers to communists demonstrates how people are scared of giving 
children rights. Communism was something that people were afraid of and it seems that 
people are just as afraid to give up the power they have to hit their children. However, 
removing the power to smack is not taking away a parental right, we are giving children an 
equal right. The right to hit did not belong to parents in the first place, it was a negative 
discrimination against children that is being levelled. Likening anti-smacking to communism 
suggests giving people equal rights where they are not deserved or earned, and this speaks 
volumes about the way people view children. 
247 Taylor, A. Section 59: Crimes Act 1961: The Impact of Corporal Punishment on Children 
and Young People (2005) 3 Te Awatea Review 1, 14-16. Taylor examines the place of 
physical punishment in the law (in 2005) and the outcomes for children. She concludes that 
the research is not reflected in public opinion, and there remains a gap between what is 
known from studies, and what the public understands. 
248 Ritchie, J. & Ritchie, J. Spare the Rod, George Alien and Unwin, Sydney, 1981. 
249 Supra No. 163, page XI 
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Hyman proposes that everyone considers himself to be an expert on the topic: 
"Why? Because almost everyone has either been spanked, observed someone being 
spanked, read about it or heard or saw it in the media. I quickly discovered that most 
Americans whom I encountered were deeply and emotionally enmeshed in their 
beliefs whether they were for or against spanking ... These deeply held beliefs about 
what to do when children misbehaved, based on personal experiences, religious 
assumptions, family and regional patterns of child rearing, and political orientation, 
needed to be challenged."250 
The intense debate over the Bill to repeal s59 of the Crimes Act meant that peripheral issues 
managed to disguise the main purpose, which was to recognise children as citizens in society, 
deserving of the same human rights as everyone else in the context of bodily integrity and 
protection from assault. The message behind the Bill got lost, and amendments were made to 
it that changed its very essence and effect. 
250 Supra No. 163, page XIII. See also Pritchard, R. Children are Unbeatable. 7 very good 
reasons not to hit children, Office of the Children's Commissioner, UNICEF New Zealand 
and the Families Commission, New Zealand, 2006. 
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Chapter 3: The Problem of Parental Control. 
Under the old s59, a parent, or person in the place of a parent, was justified in using force by 
way of correction towards a child if the force used was reasonable in the circumstances.
251 In 
its initial stages, the Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) 
Amendment Bill (the Bill), or as it came to be known, the 'anti-smacking bill', proposed to 
simply remove the s59 defence to assault from the Crimes Act 1961.
252 By the time it reached 
its third reading however, the Bill had been amended to represent a political compromise, in 
the wake of intense debate and public concern. The Amendment removed the justification for 
using force against children in circumstances where the force is used for the purposes of 
correction, 253 how~ver it created a fresh justification for parents to use force on children in 
other specified circumstances.254 
The amendments made to the Bill have compromised its original purpose by replacing one 
form of justification for the use of force against children with another. They were drafted to 
placate resistance to the Bill, but failed to address the issue that the public was most 
concerned about, which was 'smacking.' Instead, in an attempt to fill the gap in an already 
unproblematic area of the law, the amendments have created ambiguities and loopholes that 
could potentially disguise the use of force for the purposes of correction. Ironically, the law 
251 Section 59 'Domestic Discipline', Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 amendment. 
252 Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill2005, 
no 271-1. 
253 Section 59(2)Crimes Act 1961 as substituted by section 5 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) 
Amendment Act 2007. 
254 Current Section 59(1)(a)-(d) Crimes Act 1961. 
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would be clearer if it was silent on the use of force against children, and children would have 
achieved an equal status with adults with respect to bodily integrity. 
1. Section 59 of the Crimes Act: Parental Control 
Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1961 sets out the situations that qualify as 'matters of justification or 
excuse'. The Amendment has transformed the justification for the use of force in s59 from 
"Domestic discipline" to "Parental Control", essentially removing the powers of parents to 
physically chastise their children and replacing them with powers to use force in other 
specified circumstances. 
s59 Parental Control. 
( 1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified in using force 
if the force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of-
(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or 
(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal 
offence; or 
(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or 
(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use of force for the purpose of 
correction. 
(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1). 
(4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against a 
parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the use of 
force against a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no public 
interest in proceeding with a prosecution.] 
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New Zealand's ratification of UNCRC255 in 1993 was a significant step towards the 
recognition of children as bearers of human rights. While the convention doesn't necessarily 
advocate full autonomy256 for children, the various articles set out fundamental rights which 
state parties are required to promote, and where necessary, amend domestic law to 
accommodate.257 The Convention supports the premise that the right to bodily integrity, or 
more specifically, the right not to be hit, is a fundamental human right.
258 This right is innate 
in every human,259 and does not require capacity to be exercised.
260 The United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has expressly disapproved of the legal use of corporal 
255 The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 20th of 
November 1989. 
256Dependency and capacity are often regraded as the necessary elements that disqualify 
children from being treated as fully autonomous. Freeman remarks that the convention hasn't 
done enough to reduce the idea that being 'dependent' means being deprived of basic rights. 
Supra No. 110 
257 Article 4 of the Convention requires that state parties "undertake all appropriate 
legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized 
in the present Convention." 
258 Specifically, Article 19 requires that state parties "protect the child from all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or neglectful treatment, maltreatment or 
exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any 
other person who has care of the child." Article 37 requires that state parties ensure that "no 
child shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." While the 
words of these articles do not specify corporal punishment, the Committee_has expressly 
denounced it in its definition of physical punishment. See below at No. 261 
259 Judge von Dadelszen comments that the Care of Children Act 2004 was built on the 
premise that children are legitimate citizens, therefore they deserve the same protection from 
assault as adults. He remarks that the existence of the right of parents to use corporal 
punishment is inconsistent with this. 
Von Dadelszen, P. Judicial Reforms in the Family Court of New Zealand (2007) New 
Zealand Family Law Journal267 
26° Children should not be denied basic human rights or 'dignity-based' rights by virtue of 
their incapacity. These rights recognise their status as individual persons. Dignity-based 
rights are different from 'needs-based' rights which recognise that children are different from 
adults, and require protection and nurture. 
Supra No. 106 
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punishment261 as it disregards a child's right to be free from violence
262 and the right to 
physical integrity and basic human dignity?63 
New Zealand's attempt to abolish corporal punishment has answered the Committee's 
concerns in one respect, however the defence of reasonable force that replaced the domestic 
discipline section has not properly addressed the child's right to physical integrity, human 
dignity, or equality before the law. The Committee clearly states that the child's right to 
human dignity and bodily integrity in the Convention was built upon principles in 
international human rights law, which state that these rights belong to everyone: 
"Before the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International 
Bill of Human Rights - the Universal Declaration and the two International 
Covenants, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
- upheld "everyone's" right to respect for his/her human dignity and physical integrity 
and to equal protection under the law. In asserting States' obligation to prohibit and 
eliminate all corporal punishment and all other cruel or degrading forms of 
punishment, the Committee notes that the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
builds on this foundation. The dignity of each and every individual is the fundamental 
guiding principle of international human rights law."
264 
The effect of codifying the circumstances where parents can use force has, on one hand, 
reassured parents that they can still legally use force on their children, however, on the other 
hand, it has once again set children apart from other groups in society as the group who can 
still be legally assaulted. Although it would be absurd and impractical to assert that parents 
261 The Committee defines "corporal" or "physical" punishment as any punishment in which 
physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however 
light. Most involves hitting ("smacking", "slapping", "spanking") children, with the hand or 
with an implement - a whip, stick, belt, shoe, wooden spoon, etc. 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2006) General Comment No. 8, 
The right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading 
forms of punishment (arts. 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, inter alia), 42nd session, CRC/C/GC/8, 
Geneva, 15 May-2 June 2006 
262 Ibid at (4). 
263 Ibid page (26). 
264 Ibid at (16). 
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should not have the ability to use force against their children in emergency situations, the fact 
that it has been spelt out in the criminal code, where it was never needed before, says 
something about the way we view children as rights bearers. It tends to show that as a 
society, while we liked the idea of bringing a child's right to bodily integrity to the level of an 
adult's, we were not ready to do so, preferring a "compromise" instead. Leaving the law 
silent on this issue would not have prevented parents being justified in using force against 
their children to protect them. The common law already protects the use of force against 
adults in similar situations. 
The codifying of the parental control justification was unnecessary for several reasons: 
a) The non-existence of the defence prior to June 2007 
Before the Amendment, parents could be found guilty of assaulting their children in two 
ways. Firstly, if the force used for the purpose of correction was considered not to be 
reasonable in the circumstances265 and, secondly, if the force used was not for the purposes of 
correction. 266 The Amendment has removed the first situation, and has tried to clear up the 
second by codifying it. 
Where there is no statutory justification for the use of force, an action technically amounts to 
assault under the Crimes Act 1961.267 Section 2 defines assault as: 
"the act of intentionally applying or attempting to apply force to the person of 
another, directly or indirectly, or threatening by any act or gesture to apply such force 
265 Yv Y Unreported, High Court Auckland, HC 122/97, 27 February 1998, Baragwanath J. 
266 Ausage v Ausage [1998] NZFLR 72, 80. See also, Ahdar, R. and Alien, J., Taking 
Smacking Seriously: The case for Retaining the Legality of Parental Smacking in New 
Zealand [2001] New Zealand Law Review 1, page 3. 
267 Section 196. An assault provision specific to children and male assaults female exists 
under section 194. 
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to the person of another, if the person making the threat has, or causes the other to 
believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; and to 
assault has a corresponding meaqing." 
Before the Amendment, s59 provided a defence for parents to use reasonable force for the 
purposes of correction only. 
59 Domestic discipline 
(1) Every parent of a child and, subject to subsection (3) of this section, every person in the place of the 
parent of a child is justified in using force by way of correction towards the child, if the force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
(2) The reasonableness of the force used is a question of fact. 
[(3) Nothing in subsection (1) ofthis section justifies the use afforce towards a child in contravention of 
section 139A of the Education Act 1989.] 
This does not include for the purposes of changing a nappy, for example, or other normal 
parenting tasks. Technically, before the law change parents could legally smack their children 
for the purposes of correction, but uses of force for other purposes, e.g. holding a child down 
to change a nappy, could have amounted to assault. 
The Crimes Act itself does not include a definition of correction. The relevant definitions 
from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary268 are: 
"( 1) The action of putting right or indicating errors 
(2) Reproof of a person for a fault of character or conduct 
(3) Chastisement, disciplinary punishment; esp. corporal punishment ... " 
The Justice and Electoral Committee, in recommending the amendments to Sue Bradford's 
bill, stated that the provisions under the new Parental Control defence would address the gap 
in the law: 
268 Brown (ed) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, 
2002) Volume 1, 523. 
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"The new section 59 clarifies that reasonable force may be used for other purposes such 
as protecting a child from harm, providing normal daily care, and preventing the child 
doing harm to others. We consider that this amendment provides for interventions that 
are not for the purpose of correction by parents and every person in the place of a 
parent. Additionally it will address a gap in the law, as under the current wording of 
section 59 the application of force from any motivation other than correction may 
amount to an offence." 269 
However, in attempting to legislate for parental uses of force in situations that would 
technically amount to assault, the amendments to the original bid for a full repeal have 
undermined one of its crucial purposes, to give children equal protection from assault under 
the law. 270 Sue Bradford's bill intended for children to be equal citizens in the eyes of the law 
with equal rights to bodily integrity .271 The inclusion of a new defence of reasonable force 
has not achieved this. While the removal of corporal punishment brought children's rights in 
line with adults', the defence of Parental Control has set them apart again. 
Prior to 2007, the "gap in the law" did not present itself as a problem. The absence of this 
defence in the past never caused any ridiculous outcomes, because checks and balances 
already existed in common law272 and the ability of police to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion. 
269 Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, As 
re~orted from the Justice and Electoral Committee, page 2. 
27 In the explanatory note to Sue Bradford's Members Bill (Crimes (Abolition of Force as a 
Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill2005, no 271-1) it states that the effect of 
the amendment is that parents and guardians will be "in the same position as everyone else so 
far as the use of force against children is concerned." 
271 In the first reading of the Bill, Sue Bradford said about its purpose, "It is about giving 
children and young people the same legal protection from physical assault that adults have. I 
do not understand at all why it is illegal in New Zealand to beat my spouse, another adult, a 
policeman, or even an animal harshly with a horse crop or a piece of wood, but it can be legal 
to do the same thing to my child." (2005) 627 NZPD 22086. 
272 See below, 'the availability of alternative defences.' 
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In recommending the changes to the original Bill, the Justice and Electoral Committee 
conceded that the purpose of the amendments is clarity in the wake of widespread 
misunderstanding, rather than a genuine need to have the gap in the law filled. 
"We consider that there is widespread misunderstanding about the purpose and possible 
results of the bill as introduced. We do not consider that the repeal of section 59 will 
lead to the prosecution of large numbers of parents and persons in the place of parents 
in New Zealand. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, we have recommended 
amendments to the bill to clarify that parents may use reasonable force in some 
circumstances, but not for the purpose of correction. We note that there are several 
potential offences directly related to the care of children that are rarely prosecuted. 
Such an example is if a caregiver sends a child to its room against its will, this 
technically constitutes kidnapping under section 209 of the Crimes Act. However, the 
police are not regularly prosecuting parents for this. We consider that logic dictates the 
police will adopt a similar approach to parents who use minor physical discipline 
following the changes to section 59."77 
However, in attempting to achieve clarity, the amendments to the Bill have caused two main 
problems. Firstly, children's rights to bodily integrity and equality under the law, the original 
purpose behind seeking repeal of s59, have been compromised. Secondly, over-legislating the 
point has created new ambiguities274 and fails to cover a circumstance involving force that 
parents were perhaps the most concerned about. 275 
The committee acknowledges that there are everyday occurrences in child rearing that 
technically amount to an offence, however the reality of the situation means that parents will 
not get prosecuted. They illustrate this point with the kidnapping example above. By the 
same token, a parent doing any of the things contemplated by s59(1)(a)(d) would be unlikely 
to be prosecuted if the statutory defence did not exist, because the current police guidelines 
273 Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, As 
reported from the Justice and Electoral Committee, no 271-2 page 7. 
274 See below, 'the prescriptive quality of the parental control defence.' The parental control 
defence has created loopholes for the use of force for the purposes of correction, by framing 
legitimate uses of force very widely. 
275 See below, 'putting a child on the naughty step.' 
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recommend that there should be public interest in proceeding with a prosecution.
276 
Obviously, there is little public interest in prosecuting a parent for the use of force against a 
child intended to protect them from harm, or holding a child down while changing a nappy. 
b) The availability of alternative defences 
The lack of statutory defence for a particular action does not leave a "gap in the law" if an 
existing common law defence adequately covers it. Peter McKenzie QC points out that the 
defence of necessity would have potentially covered some of the situations in s59(1), making 
their codification somewhat unnecessary. 
13. The Law Commission in para.8 of its report, expressed the view that the non-
disciplinary interventions which parents are permitted to make under subclause (1) 
cover a gap in the law that needed to be addressed, "because, on the wording of section 
59, the application offorcefrom any motivation other than correction is an offence 
currently" (the Law Commission emphasis). I doubt that the gap is as wide as the 
Law Commission suggests. The common law defence of necessity which is preserved 
by s.20 of the Crimes Act is likely to cover interventions which are needed in order to 
prevent harm to the child or prevent the child from engaging in criminal activity or 
disruptive behaviour. In my opinion, the defence of necessity would under the present 
law cover interventions such as restraining a child from walking in front of traffic and 
removing an offensive weapon or seriously harmful drugs from a child. 
14. The Courts have recognised in cases such as Kapi v. Ministry of Transport (1991) 8 
CRNZ 49 (CA) and Police v. Kawiti [2000] 1 NZLR 117 that the defence of necessity 
may be available not only if there are grounds of imminent peril of death or serious 
injury to the accused, but also danger to another person where "necessity of 
circumstances" justifies the accused breaking the law. 277 
In addition to the defence of necessity for the actions described above, the Crimes Act 1961 
already provides justification for the use of force to prevent suicide or certain offences in s41. 
276 Prosecution Guidelines, Crown Law Office, March 1992, para 3.3.1 (See Appendix 4) 
277 McKenzie, P. Crimes (Abolition of Force as a justification for Child Discipline) 
Amendment Bill- Effect on Parental Corrective Action, legal opinion prepared for Gordon 
Copeland MP, 21 March 2007, page 5. Reference to Palmer, G., Section 59 Amendment: 
Options for Consideration, Report of the Law Commission for the Justice and Electoral 
Committee, 8 November 2006. 
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41. Prevention of suicide or certain offences278 
Every one is justified in using such force as may be reasonably necessary in order to prevent the 
commission of suicide, or the commission of an offence which would be likely to cause immediate and 
serious injury to the person or property of any one, or in order to prevent any act being done which he 
believes, on reasonable grounds, would, if committed, amount to suicide or to any such offence. 
Arguably, this defence would have been sufficient to cover the sorts of situations 
contemplated in s59(1)(b). However, it is strange that the words "criminal offence" were used 
rather than "crime", which is defined in Section 2 of the Crimes Act 1961.279 
Adams on Criminal Law points out that s59(1)(a) is unnecessary because it closely resembles 
self defence:280 
"Subsection 1(a) is self-explanatory and largely replicates self-defence/defence of 
another [s48] ... However it confers a somewhat narrower defence than s48 insofar as 
the accused's belief in the circumstances justifying their actions falls to be tested by 
an objective standard."281 
While it would be difficult to establish that children impliedly consent to everyday uses of 
force upon their bodies, Lord Justice Goff in Collins v Wilcock282 suggests that the common 
law might excuse "all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct 
of daily life". This might include parental uses of force that have always been generally 
accepted in New Zealand before we felt the ne~d to codify them. 
278 Crimes Act 1961. 
279 Adams suggests that the word "criminal" is unhelpful, and that the power conferred on 
parents in s59(1)(b) extends to the prevention of any offence by virtue of the fact it is not 
restricted to "crime" only. 
Adams on Criminal Law, para CA 59.03, accessed 6 March 2008 
28° Crimes Act 1961, s48. 
281 Adams on Criminal Law, para CA 59.03, accessed 6 March 2008 
282 [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1173. In this case it was held that everyday jostling does not constitute 
assault. 
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Finally, judges have the power to discharge without conviction283 where the indirect 
consequences of a conviction would be out of proportion to the gravity of the offence. 
284 This 
would be one more safeguard against parents being prosecuted for uses of force that 
technically amount to assault, in the absence of the unnecessary parental control provision. R 
v Hendi85 illustrates this point, where a creche worker was discharged without conviction 
for smacking a child on the bottom: 
"There was no justification for treating the incident as involving anything more than a 
pat on the bottom. Although technically assault, it did not merit the stigma of a 
conviction ... "286 
A similar case involving a parent would not have had the same result under the new Parental 
Control provision, because the use of force for the purposes of correction is explicitly 
prohibited. If, as Sue Bradford's original Bill intended, the s59 defence of Domestic 
Discipline had simply been repealed, the trivial uses of force for any purpose would have 
been caught by the safeguards that we already have in our law, as demonstrated above. 
2. The prescriptive quality of the Parental Control defence 
The amended s59 has three purposes. Firstly, it removes the justification for the use of 
corporal punishment. Secondly, it affirms the police discretion not to prosecute cases that are 
not in the public interest or are inconsequential. Thirdly, it sets out the circumstances where 
parents or persons in the place of a parent can invade a child's bodily integrity, in what 
amounts to a fresh defence of reasonable force. 
283 Sentencing Act 2002 Section 106 
284 Sentencing Act 2002 Section 107 
285 [1996] 1 NZLR 153 
286 At 158 
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Section 59(1)(a)-(d) is intended to fill the gap in the law, to provide a statutory defence for 
parents in situations where technically their use of force would amount to assault. However, 
by setting out all of the situations in which a child's bodily integrity can be legitimately 
invaded, the amended s59 has developed a prescriptive quality. In essence, by listing all of 
the circumstances where children do not have the right to bodily integrity, it demonstrates 
that children are not equal citizens deserving of equal rights. Before the amendment, children 
enjoyed the same right to bodily integrity as adults in the Crimes Act, except of course when 
the force used on them was for the purposes of correction. Now that the correction defence 
has been removed, it would be logical to think that children would be completely equal to 
adults, however the amendments have prevented that from happening. What we are left with 
is an exhaustive, unnecessary and largely ambiguous list of ways parents can use force 
against their children. For example, subsection (l)(c) allows parents to use force to prevent 
the child from engaging in offensive or disruptive behaviour. Woods, Hassell and Hook 
suggest that this provision seeks to cover the situation of a child having a tantrum in a 
supermarket, to allow a parent to remove or restrain the child, as opposed to smacking to stop 
the anti-social behaviour.287 However, there is no requirement in s59(1)(c) that the behaviour 
be public, or that any person needs to be disturbed or offended by it. 288 The term is 
deliberately vague to cover a whole host of situations, but the sorts of situations contemplated 
by this provision would probably be such minor instances of assault, there would be no 
public interest in prosecuting them anyway?89 
287 Supra No. 37, page 85. 
288 Adams on Criminal Law, para CA 59.03, accessed 6 March 2008 
289 Supra No. 276, para 3.3. (Appendix 4) 
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The justification of parental force in s59(1) has presumably been drafted in such a way as to 
maximise the cover for potential situations where parents use force. However, the lack of 
specificity, and failure to define terms has perhaps blurred the boundary290 between force 
used to correct a child and the listed 'legitimate' uses of force. 291 
The terms "child",292 "person in the place of a parent", "reasonable force" and "correction" 
have still not been defined by this amendment, which is strange seeing as the Justice and 
Electoral Committee was trying to clear up the law in this area. The Police Practice Guide 
(Appendix 3) highlights the lack of formal definitions, and consequently there is an attempt 
to fill the gap, which in itself is problematic. For example, the guideline for "force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances" reads: 
"No definitions are offered about what constitutes reasonable force. In using force 
parents must act in good faith and have a reasonable belief in a state of facts which 
will justify the use of force. The use of force must be both subjectively and 
objectively reasonable. 
Any force used must not be for the purposes of correction or punishment; it may only 
be for the purposes of restraint (s 59(l)(a) to (c)) or, by way of example, to ensure 
compliance (s 59(1)(d))."293 
290 The difference between legitimate uses of force in s59(1)(a)-(d) and the uses of force for 
the purposes of correction lies in the motive of the parent, and this may often be difficult to 
establish. The section is so vague that it would be relatively easy to reclassify a corrective use 
of force within one of the four situations set out in s59(1). See example on page 93. 
291 Adams on Criminal Law, para CA 59.01, accessed 6 March 2008 
292 "Child" means a person 17 years of age or under in the Care of Children Act 2004, but 
means a person of 14 years of age or under in the Children, Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989. The practice guide suggests that the age of the child will impact on the 
reasonableness of the force used. The older the child gets, the less justifiable the uses of 
reasonable force listed in s59(1) will become. 
292 Police Practice Guide for new Section 59, 19 June 2007, page 2 (Appendix 3) 
293 lbid, page 3 
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This definition reads into s59(1)(d) the legitimate use of force to ensure compliance. 
Arguably, the definitions of 'ensuring compliance' and 'correction' are interchangeable, and 
in some cases it would be difficult to assess whether the force used was to ensure compliance, 
or whether it was for the purposes of correction. Too much responsibility is left with the 
prosecutor to distinguish the purpose behind the use of force, that in some circumstances may 
be indistinguishable.294 This problem would not exist if s59 had simply been repealed, 
because the police would not have had to assess the motive behind each use of force, in 
addition to its inconsequentiality. 
This ambiguity in an amendment which is meant to provide clarity means that the 
justifications in s59(1) could potentially be used as a 'loophole' to the prohibition of force for 
the purposes of correction in s59(2). The above example of the police definition illustrates 
this point. Similarly, consider the scenario where a child is talking back to his parent at home; 
if the parent picks the child up and puts him in his room as punishment for his behaviour, 
there has technically been an assault (see below, 'putting the child on the naughty mat'), 
however a parent could reasonably justify the action under s59(1) as preventing the child 
from continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour. This justification does not 
require the behaviour to be public, or for it to be established that anyone was actually 
offended or disturbed. By the same token, if the parent gave the child a small smack on the 
hand instead of taking him to his room, the same justification could be raised, and it makes a 
difficult task for the prosecutor to establish the motive behind the force. Reasonable force is 
294 Supra No. 277, page 8 Peter McKenzie QC expressed a concern for the amount of 
discretional responsibility entrusted in the police. He felt that there was a danger in leaving 
the police with too much discretion, because invariably the outcomes would be inconsistent. 
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not defined in s59, therefore 'smacking' is not specifically banned. Parents may still use any 
form of reasonable force against their children, so long as the intention behind the force is not 
discipline. Of course, this kind of situation is so inconsequential that it would be very 
unlikely to be prosecuted. However it demonstrates that the amendments have not sufficiently 
clarified matters to a degree that warrants their existence in the first place. 
The Law Commission highlights the fact that the requirement that motive is established may 
cloud the issue: 
"We need to emphasise that, in any given case, the parental motive will be a question 
of fact that varies in the circumstances of each case. This means that it is impossible 
for us to provide a blanket reassurance that prosecution will never be appropriate 
when force has been used to achieve "time out". It will be a matter for prosecutorial 
discretion and, ultimately (if the discretion is taken to prosecute) the decision of a 
jury. 
However, in this regard, there is a very important point to note. The "Solicitor-
General's Prosecution Guidelines" require prosecutors, in the exercise of their 
discretion, to assess the likelihood of achieving a conviction. We suggest that, in the 
vast majority of "time out" cases, parents will be prompted by a mix of motives, 
which may include prohibited correctional purposes, but in all likelihood will also 
include other permitted purposes. It is thus questionable whether in such cases a jury 
could ever properly convict a parent beyond reasonable doubt, which in turn may tell 
against the likelihood of prosecution. "295 
In other words, the differentiation between the use of force for the purpose of correction and 
the legitimate use of force is often difficult, and might preclude prosecution in contentious 
cases. It is difficult to see then how the amendments to the Bill added further clarity or how 
they have helped to achieve successful abolition of all uses of force for the purposes of 
correction. 
295 Palmer., G., Law Commission, Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Bill: Opinion 
of Peter McKenzie QC, Table in Parliament on 13 March 2007, (2007) 637 NZPD 7871. 
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3. The effect of affirming police discretion. 
Section 59(4) affirms the police discretion not to prosecute certain offences. 
(4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against 
a parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the 
use of force against a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no 
public interest in proceeding with a prosecution. 
The inclusion of this affirmation was to further address public and political anxieties about 
the Bill.296 It was the work of Prime Minister, Helen Clark, and former Prime Minister, 
Geoffrey Palmer, who then gained the approval of the bill's creator, Sue Bradford. The 
Amendment was also approved by the leader of the opposition, in a political about-turn to 
support the Bill. Affirmation of the police discretion, while it did nothing to change the 
current practical situation, seemed to be the magical cure for the major discord in the House 
of Representatives. Following an historic press conference where the Prime Minister and 
leader of the opposition formed a united front, the House voted overwhelmingly in favour of 
the amendment. There were speeches applauding the cooperation of people who worked to 
resolve the 'impasse' .297 It appeared that a simple recognition of something that already 
existed was enough to reassure those who feared a change in the law would bring the worst. 
However, the inclusion of an affirmation that the police have discretion not to prosecute 
inconsequential offences is unusual and unnecessary.298 The purpose of its inclusion was to 
ensure that the Bill made it through its final reading, by calming the nerves of those who 
296 Supra No. 37, page 183. 
297 lbid, 183-184. 
298 Supra No. 259. Judge Paul von Dadelszen remarks that the addition of the affirmation of 
police discretion is "a little superfluous, as the Police have this discretion in any case." 
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feared the prosecution of parents was going to be widespread and out of control. In that 
sense, its inclusion is more of a political tool than a necessary element of the parental control 
provision. While it was successful in getting the law passed, its overall effect is perhaps the 
most damaging to our perception of children in New Zealand and their status as equal rights 
bearing citizens. The motivation for including an additional point to a piece of legislation 
should never be getting it passed in to law, rather it should be because it is necessary to 
achieve the original purpose. In this case, the inclusion of an affirmation of police discretion 
actually does more damage than good, because it seriously compromises the entire purpose 
and essence of the Bill. The fact there was a perceived need to make explicit mention of 
police discretion as it applies to child discipline and abuse cases is indicative of the 
classification of children into a subset of human beings. Seemingly, the public were unwilling 
to apply the same laws to children as are applied to adults, despite the fact that the end results 
are the.same. This goes against the essence of the Bill, which sought to remove distinctions 
between adults and children with respect to bodily integrity. 
The damage is not confined to children's rights. The affirmation of police discretion dilutes 
the perception of children as equal rights bearers, but its inclusion in statute might also be 
problematic for judicial review of police discretion. 
a) Police discretion already exists 
The existing prosecuting guidelines assist the police with the decision of whether or not to 
prosecute an offence. Two major factors must be taken into account when making the 
decision to prosecute or not to prosecute. The first is evidential sufficiency, which requires 
the prosecutor to ask whether there is sufficient reliable and admissible evidence that an 
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offence has been committed by a particular person, and additionally whether a properly 
directed jury could find the person guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The second is whether 
there is public interest in proceeding with prosecution. The guidelines set out 16 additional 
factors to be considered when assessing the public interest in prosecution. Some of the more 
relevant factors in a child assault decision might be: 
a) the seriousness or, conversely, the triviality of the alleged offence; i.e. whether the 
conduct really warrants the intervention of the law; 
b) all mitigating and aggravating circumstances; 
e) the degree of culpability of the alleged offender; 
f) the effect of a decision not to prosecute on public opinion; 
i) the availability of proper alternatives to prosecution; 
j) the prevalence of the alleged offence and the need for deterrence; 
k) whether the consequences of any resulting conviction would be unduly harsh and 
oppressive; 
n) the likely length and expense of the trial; 
p) the likely sentence imposed in the event of conviction having regard to the 
sentencing options available to the Court.299 
The fact that this discretion already exists was considered by the Justice and Electoral 
Committee when they recommended the amendments to the original bill. 
"As with any other offence, the prosecution of parents and every person in the place 
of a parent for the use of force against children for the purpose of correction will be a 
matter for police discretion, although private prosecutions remain a possibility. We 
were advised that all prosecution decisions are guided by the Solicitor-General's 
Prosecution Guidelines. The guidelines state that police must decide whether a 
prosecution is required in the public interest. They also state that ordinarily a 
prosecution will not be in the public interest unless it is more likely than not that it 
299 Supra No. 276, para 3. (Appendix 4) 
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will result in a conviction ... There are safeguards in the criminal justice system to 
minimise the likelihood of parents and every person in the place of a parent being 
prosecuted for minor acts of physical punishment. Various options other than formal 
prosecution are available to police, including warnings and cautions. Under the 
Solicitor-General's Prosecution Guidelines, a prosecution should proceed only where 
it is in the public interest and there is sufficient evidence".300 
This recognition of existing police discretion supported their belief that a change in law 
would not lead to a significant increase in prosecutions. The Justice and Electoral Committee 
did not recommend an affirmation of police discretion within the words of the Act, and 
remarked "We do not believe that the changes we have proposed to section 59 of the Act will 
lead to a large increase in convictions or the removal of children from their families for the 
use of minor physical discipline."301 
b) How s59( 4) effects the underlying message of the provision 
Repealing s59 was supposed to put children's right to bodily integrity on an equal level with 
adults. In the second stage of the Bill the Justice and Electoral committee deviated from that 
purpose by creating amendments that would legitimise certain forms of force used against 
children but not adults. At least, however, in the second stage the message was very clear 
about the use of force for the purposes of correction. Subsection 2 specifically prohibits this 
use of force, and subsection 3 reinforces the importance of this message by making it prevail 
over anything in subsection 1. Unfortunately, by the third stage of the Bill even the message 
about the use of corrective force was weakened, by the inclusion of an affirmation of police 
discretion. John Key, leader of the opposition party, in explaining his support for the 
30° Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, As 
reported from the Justice and Electoral Committee, page 5 (Appendix 2) 
301 Ibid page 7. 
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addition of subsection 4, effectively hit the nail on the head when he stated that the purpose 
of the affirmation was to: 
"give parents confidence that they will not be criminalised for lightly smacking their 
children. It makes it clear that police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints 
against a parent where the offence is considered to be 'so inconsequential' that there is 
no public interest in the prosecution going ahead."302 
Mr Key succinctly implied that the intention of s59(4) is to undermine the whole purpose of 
the Act, which is to abolish the use of parental force for the purposes of correction?03 He has 
affirmed that smacking is acceptable, so long as it is not more than inconsequential. If this 
was the actual intention of the Bill, then the integrity of the Act would have been better 
served by being clear about its purpose. 304 
Even though this discretion exists for every offence, the fact that it is reiterated only in s59 
weakens the strength of the purpose of that section. To make a comparison, s219 of the 
Crimes Act 1961, 'Theft or Stealing' does not affirm the police discretion not to prosecute 
inconsequential cases within the words of the section. The message about theft is clear, that it 
is wrong to steal. If this section were the only section in the whole of the Crimes Act to 
include an affirmation of police discretion, the message would become compromised. The 
302 Key, John, Some sense on smacking- at last! Newsletter: Keynotes No 9, 
http://johnkey.co.nz/index.php?/archives/101-NEWSLETTER-KeyNotes-No-9.html, May 2 
2007. 
303 Section 4 Crimes (Substituted Section 59 Act) Amendment Act 2007 
304 The Law Commission actually reviewed two options for the Justice and Electoral 
Committee, one being the narrowing of the scope of 'reasonable force', put forward by 
Chester Burrows MP. This option would resemble the s59 equivalent in England, by 
providing a non-exhaustive list of conduct which is to be considered unreasonable (e.g. use of 
a weapon or tool; causes injury that is more than transient or trifling), rather than abolishing 
corporal punishment altogether. This is obviously not the option the Committee chose. 
Palmer, G., Section 59 Amendment: Options for Consideration, Report of the Law 
Commission for the Justice and Electoral Committee, 8 November 2006. 
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message might instead be that it is wrong to steal in general, but minor thefts are not so bad. 
This is not ideal. The Criminal code of a country should be able to be relied upon to tell the 
people what is expected of them, without vague qualifications. In the context of children's 
rights, s59 does not properly convey that children have the right to bodily integrity, or even 
that they are completely deserving to be free of the use of force for the purposes of discipline. 
The underlying message of the Bill was originally intended to be, 'children are the same as 
adults with respect to bodily integrity and assault'. The amendments and the unnecessary 
inclusion of the affirmation of police discretion have transformed this message into, 'Here are 
the ways children are not equal to others and their bodily integrity can be invaded. Do not use 
force against them for the purposes of correction, but if you do, make sure it is sufficiently 
inconsequential so as to avoid prosecution'. 
c) Integrity of the Crimes Act and immunity from review 
The police discretion not to prosecute is affirmed in only one section of the entire Crimes 
Act, s59. In practice, police have discretion not to prosecute any offences if they do not have 
sufficient evidence or if it would not be in the public interest. The fact that this discretion is 
affirmed in only one section of the statute not only undermines that section, it undermines the 
Act as a whole by implying that it is somehow different from the other sections. It suggests 
that this section really only has face value, or that perhaps police have extra discretion in 
these cases because the discretion has not been affirmed anywhere else even though this was 
probably not the intention of the legislature. 
This could potentially cause problems if a police decision not to prosecute an offence is 
challenged. Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to review the exercise of 
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discretion, 305 however it is debateable whether the inclusion of the discretion in statute brings 
its application within the judicial realm. In Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne
306 it was held that 
while review of discretion cannot be completely ruled out, "it will only be in rare cases",
307 
that is "if it were established that the prosecuting authority acted in bad faith or brought the 
prosecution for collateral purposes."308 The judge in the case found that the decision not to 
prosecute is also amenable to review: 
"Halletl09 is authority for the proposition that judicial review is only likely to be 
obtained in such a case where there has been a failure to exercise discretion, such as by 
the adoption of a general policy that in certain classes of cases, prosecutions will not be 
brought. There may be other grounds but it is likely only to be in exceptional cases that 
a court would intervene where a decision has been taken not to prosecute in a specific 
case not affected by factors such as the adoption of a general policy."
310 
It is possible the courts will remain reluctant to review the exercise of discretion, except in 
cases of bad faith, despite it now being affirmed within the Act. 
311 Before the discretion was 
included in statute, it was difficult, yet possible, to challenge it by way of judicial review, 
However now that it has been codified to form a substantial part of s59 it could potentially be 
open to more direct review in a criminal prosecution. It is difficult to predict whether the 
legislative reference to police discretion will allow the courts will find more legitimacy in 
reviewing it in s59 cases. Some theorists believe that the affirmation will not further fetter 
the discretion to, or not to prosecute, because the statute itself does not confer the discretion, 
305 Fox v Attorney General [2002] 3 NZLR 62 
306 [2005] NZAR 408 
307 lbid at 62 
308 lbid at 64 
309 Hallett v Attorney-General (No.2) [1989] 2 NZLR 96, 100. 
310 Polynesian Spa v Osborne at 69 
311 Knight, Dean, Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Bill, Laws 179 Elephants in 
the Law, http://www .laws 179 .co.nz/2007 /06/crimes-substituted-section-59-amendment.html, 
June 20 2007 
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it merely recognises it.312 Regardless, the inclusion of the affirmation in the section has 
permitted people to feel entitled to a fair and transparent exercise of discretion, 313 which was 
not the purpose of the Bill. The Criminal code should set society's minimum standard of 
behaviour, without qualification?14 The practical application of the code should be kept quite 
separate. 
To avoid the implication that police have extra discretion in s59 cases, or that s59 is not to be 
taken too seriously, the affirmation should either have been left out altogether, or made a 
general provision, applicable to the whole Act. The words of s59(4) are clear about the 
purpose of its inclusion, which is 'to avoid doubt'. This purpose could have been achieved by 
affirming a general police discretion not to prosecute, without setting s59 apart. By making 
the affirmation a general provision of the Crimes Act, the underlying message in s59 and the 
consistency of the statute would not have been compromised. 
312 Ibid at 5. Knight points out that the court has existing power to control prosecutions to 
prevent abuse, and to discharge without conviction. He concludes that prosecutorial 
discretion is irrelevant in the eyes of the court. 
313 See Smacking Crimes "Inconsequential"- Yet Police Still Prosecuted, Press Release: 
Society for the Promotion of Community Standards, 7 May 2007, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/P00705/S0012l.htm for an example of how people will 
expect the application of the "inconsequential" standard to be transparent. It shows a sense of 
entitlement to be free from prosecution for uses "benign" corrective force after John Key's 
promise that the inclusion of subsection 4 protects parents from criminalisation for light 
smacking. 
314 Supra No. 37, page 87. 
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4. Putting a child on the 'naughty step ' 315 
The purpose of amending s59 was to make better provision for children to live in a safe and 
secure environment free from violence by abolishing the use of parental force for the 
purposes of correction.316 Parents today are being discouraged from raising their children in 
a context of discipline and punishment, and instead are being persuaded to use positive 
encouragement techniques and child guidance. 317 The introduction of the Crimes (Substituted 
Section 59) Amendment Act meant that parents in New Zealand can no longer resort to the 
use of physical force for the purposes of correction and have to learn new ways of dealing 
with problem behaviour. The task of explaining the new law and assisting parents to find 
alternatives to physical discipline has, at this point, been left with non-governmental 
organizations (NGO's).318 The Families Commission website319 recommends several positive 
reinforcement techniques, and provides links to other NGO's with advice on alternatives to 
smacking. The use of 'time-out" is recommended by "Littlies",320 specifically, the picking up 
and removing a child to a room, corner, or step for bad behaviour.321 
In a legal opinion for Gordon Copeland MP, Peter McKenzie QC concludes that the 
application of force to carry a child to a "naughty mat" or another room for the purposes of 
315 The 'naughty step' was an alternative to smacking advocated by Supernanny, TV2's 
popular parenting show. Supernanny, Jo Frost, recommended physically putting misbehaving 
children on the naughty step or naughty mat as a form of time-out. 
http://www. supernanny .eo. uk/ Advice/ -/Parenting -Skills/ -/Discipline-and-Reward/The-
Naughty-Mat.aspx 
316 Section 4 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 
317 Child discipline and the law, Bardardos Information Sheet No.61, July 2007; Choose to 
Hug, not to Smack, Office of the Commissioner of Children and EPOCH, 2001. 
318 Supra No. 37, page 87. 
319 http://www .nzfamilies.org.nz/parenting/positive-discipline. php 
320 http://www.littlies.co.nz/page.asp?id=246&leve1=3 
321 Taylor, J., & Redman, S. The smacking controversy: what advice should we be giving 
parents? 46 Journal of Advanced Nursing 3, 311-318. 
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"time-out" amounts to use of force for the purposes of correction, and therefore constitutes . 
assault. 
The 'justifications" for parental intervention set out in s.59(1) which is proposed to be 
inserted into the Crimes Act by clause 4 of the Crimes (Abolition of Force as a 
Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill, do not provide any justification for 
parental intervention for the purpose of correction. Any use of force for the purpose of 
correction is expressly excluded by reason of clause 3 and the proposed s.59(2) and (3). 
In my opinion, the carrying of a child against the child's will to a "naughty mat" or 
another room in order to provide correction or discipline to the child cannot be justified 
under the proposed Bill and would, therefore, come within the meaning of an assault 
under the Crimes Act. 322 
The definition of assault in the Crimes Act 1961 does not provide for varying degrees of 
force used, or the motivation behind the application of force. The force used to put a child in 
time out would be considered inconsequential, and therefore would be unlikely to be 
prosecuted, however it raises the question, if a gap in the law still exists, what then was the 
point in making the amendments? 
a) Is this another "gap in the law"? 
The media fuelled public hysteria and concern around the repeal of s59 was focused on 
physical punishment, 323 not on non-disciplinary uses of force. 324 When the amendments were 
322 Supra No. 277 page 9 
323 In an analysis of the submission made to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the Bill, 
it was found that "in general those submitters who advocated physical punishment would 
oppose the Bill and those who supported the Bill would oppose the use of physical 
punishment. .. none who opposed the Bill opposed physical punishment and only five who 
supported the Bill clearly stated that they also supported physical punishment." 
Debski, S., Buckley, S., Russell, M., Just who do we think children are? An analysis of 
submissions to the Justice and Electoral Committee (2007) Health Services Research Centre, 
University of Victoria. 
324 The Family First petition for a referendum had, at 29 April 2008, gathered approximately 
269,500 signatures. One of the questions they aim to have a referendum on is, "Should a 
smack as part of good parental correction be a criminal offence in New Zealand?" Clearly, 
the focus is still on the use of force for the purposes of correction, not on other uses of force. 
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made by the Justice and Electoral Committee after considering over 1700 submissions, the 
uses of force for non-disciplinary reasons were legitimised, but the non-violent uses of force 
for the purposes of correction, such as picking a child up for time out were not. People and 
politicians325 seemed to be reassured that this gave them further protection, but in reality it 
changed nothing. People felt further relieved when the police discretion not to prosecute was 
affirmed,326 but again, in reality, it changed nothing. People wanted to be reassured that they 
were not going to be made criminals for disciplining their children, but the focus on 
'smacking' meant that less attention was paid to the fact that any use of force for the purposes 
of correction amounts to assault, not just hitting or smacking. 
b) What was the point in the amendments? Why not just repeal s59? 
The Justice and Electoral Committee felt there was a gap in the law that needed to be 
, addressed, and that widespread misunderstanding about the effect of the bill would be cleared 
up by spelling out the law regarding the use of force against children.
327 However, there is 
still a gap, and it is the one that people were concerned about. It is the gap concerning 
h . 1 . h 328 p ys1ca pums ment. 
Smacking petition falls short, retrieved 29 April 2008 from 
http:/ /stuff.co.nz/print/450 1944a19715 .html 
325 See above No. 273. The Justice and Electoral Committee state that they have drafted the 
amendments to achieve clarity amongst widespread confusion about the purpose and possible 
results of a law change. Implicit in this, is the also the attempt to reassure tho~e who 
misunderstand the Bill, by legislating further protections for them. 
326 The Police Guidelines specifically refer to time out situations, classifying them under 
either s59(b)(c) and (d). This lends further support for the notion that the use of force for the 
purposes of discipline can easily be reinterpreted to fit within the four legitimate uses of force 
in s59. 
326 Police Practice Guide for new Section 59, 19 June 2007 (Appendix 3) 
327 See above No. 273. 
328 The Law Commission suggests that to legislate for the 'timeout' scenario would have 
created a loophole in the law for parents to use force for the purposes of discipline. 
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When Sue Bradford introduced her Bill, it quickly became known as the "anti-smacking bill" 
despite the fact that Bill sought to abolish all uses of force against children for the purposes 
of correction, not just smacking. Wood, Hassall and Hook suggest that this label originated 
from opponents of the bill, who wanted to alarm the public with the notion that good parents 
would be made criminals for light smacking.329 The amendments were introduced, especially 
in the final stages, to create enough reassurance that there would not be widespread 
criminalisation in an effort to get the law passed. It was meant to be a compromise, a less 
severe form of Sue Bradford's original bid, but all the amendment did was answer a 
completely different issue. 
The issue of the use of force was split in two by the time the Bill reached its third reading: 
Issue 1. Physical force for the purposes of correction. 
Issue 2. Physical force for purposes other than correction. 
The amendments made to the bill answered the second issue, but this was not what was 
concerning the New Zealand public. The proposed law change was still as severe as Sue 
Bradford's original bill in the context of physical force for the purposes of correction, 
therefore there was no reason for people to feel reassured by the amendments. The addition 
of the affirmation of the police discretion was meant to further reassure people, but again, it 
did nothing to change the current reality, because police discretion has always existed. 
Palmer., G., Law Commission, Supra No. 295. 
329 Unreasonable Force. New Zealand's journey towards banning the physical punishment of 
children, Save the Children New Zealand, 2008, page 140. As result, the public's attention 
turned toward smacking, despite the fact that the concern for this issue stemmed from the 
successful application of the s59 defence in cases where the force used was far more severe 
than smacking. 
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The amendments have done nothing to change the current reality concerning the use of non-
disciplinary force against children, nor have they softened the blow with respect to abolishing 
corporal punishment, because there are still gaps in the law. However, the vague drafting of 
the section means there is potential for corrective uses of force to be disguised as one of the 
legitimate uses in s59(1). We would be in a better, clearer position if we had simply repealed 
s59 and simply left it at that. The fact that a defence has been legislated to appease the 
concerns for something completely different is illogical, especially since it has done nothing 
to change the current reality. 
Sweden successfully banned corporal punishment almost 30 years ago. By framing the ban in 
terms of children's rights and respect for children they managed to avoid the problems that 
New Zealand has created with the Parental Control provision. The Swedish Parents Code, as 
amended in 1983 states: 
"Children are entitled to care, security and a good upbringing. They shall be treated 
with respect for their person and their distinctive character and may not be subject to 
corporal punishment or any other injurious or humiliating treatment) (Children and 
Parents Code, eh. 6, § 1. )"330 
New Zealand was not trying to achieve something different from Sweden, but did so, by 
virtue of the way the abolishment was phrased. The Swedish code makes a point of 
establishing children's rights. This conveys to the people that children are valued citizens, 
deserving of the right not to be hit, just like everyone else. Sweden lists all of the things that 
children are entitled to, but New Zealand lists all of the ways children are not entitled to 
physical integrity instead. Although they are designed to achieve the same purpose, 
330 Surpa No. 33 
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(abolishing the use of force for the purposes of correction) the messages the two laws send 
are completely different, and Table One shows. 
Table One: Comparison between Sweden's and New Zealand's legislation. 
Sweden's Parental Code New Zealand's section 59 
Positive wording. Children are entitled Nothing mentioned about children's 
to respect. rights, the treatment of children or 
respect. 
The aim and purpose is to remove The aim and purpose is to remove 
corporal punishment corporal punishment 
The overall message is that children are The overall message is that parents 
humans and humans do not deserve to be cannot hit for correctional purposes, but 
hit. can hit or use other force for situations X, 
YandZ. 
It does not go into other situations where It does go into situations where force can 
force can be used. be used. 
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Chapter 4: Putting Parental Control through the 
tests. 
The 2007 amendment331 to s59 of the Crimes Act 1961 fails to recognise children's human 
right to bodily integrity, and does not provide children with the same protections from assault 
that every other member of society enjoys. In chapter 3 I examined the problems that the 
new Parental Control332 provision presents, and suggested that the law would have been 
clearer on this issue if it were silent. In other words, the amendment has done more damage 
than good because having a statutory direction actually confuses the situation more than it 
clarifies it. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the Parental Control provision has not 
improved the Domestic Discipline333 provision sufficiently to warrant its existence, and that 
children's rights and protection would have been better advanced if s59 had simply been 
repealed. To do this, I will run various scenarios through three tests: 
1. The old law: Domestic Discipline, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 
2007 amendment. 
59 Domestic discipline 
(1) Every parent of a child and, subject to subsection (3) of this section, every person in the place of the parent 
of a child is justified in using force by way of correction towards the child, if the force used is reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
(2) The reasonableness of the force used is a question of fact. 
[(3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section justifies the use of force towards a child in contravention of section 
139A of the Education Act 1989.] 
331 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Act 2007 
332 Section 59(2) Crimes Act 1961 as substituted by section 5 Crimes (Substituted Section 59) 
Amendment Act. 
333 Section 59 'Domestic Discipline', Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 amendment. 
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2. The new law: Parental Control, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, after the 2007 
amendment. 
s59 Parental Control. 
(1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified in using force if the 
force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of-
(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or 
(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal 
offence; or 
(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or 
(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use of force for the purpose of 
correction. 
(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1). 
(4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against a parent 
of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the use of force against 
a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no public interest in proceeding 
with a prosecution.] 
3. The position if Section 59 had simply been repealed. 
In its original form, the Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) 
Amendment Bi11334 (the Bill), proposed to simply remove the s59 defence to assault from the 
Crimes Act 1961. If this had occurred, there would be no specific statutory justification for 
the use of force for parents or persons in the place of parents. In essence, children would 
have, in the eyes of the law, the same protection from assault335 as everyone else. Existing 
common law defences and police prosecutorial discretion would act as the safeguards to 
334 2005 no 271-1 
335 Secti~n 2 of the Crimes Act 1961 defines assault as: "the act of intentionally applying or 
attempting to apply force to the person of another, directly or indirectly, or threatening by any 
act or gesture to apply such force to the person of another, if the person making the threat 
has, or causes the other to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect 
his purpose; and to assault has a corresponding meaning." 
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ensure that a lack of statutory direction for the trivial uses of parental force would not result 
in widespread prosecution. 
The scenarios that I will run through these tests all involve the parental use of force against 
children. The use of force can be divided into two main areas: 
a) The use of force for the purposes of correction 
b) The use of force for purposes other than correction. 
Within these groups I will also examine the outcomes for different forms of force used: 
a) When the force used is 'hitting' or similar striking actions.336 
b) When the force used does not involve hitting, for example, restraint. 
The factual scenarios for the following analysis are simple, yet more relevant to the smacking 
debate than the more the extreme forms of physical punishment that dominated the debate 
surrounding the legislation. In the lead up to the Bill, smacking supporters made a distinction 
between light smacking for the purposes of discipline and more extreme forms of corporal 
punishment337 that passed the s59 test, and were used as evidence in support of repeal.338 
336 See introduction. 'Hitting' encompasses all striking actions that are commonly understood 
to be forms of corporal punishment: smacking, slapping, whacking, or any form of blow. The 
public debate that surrounded the amendment of section 59 of the Crimes Act focused on 
'smacking', which is only one form of invasion into physical integrity. Section 2 of the 
Crimes Act does not restrict assault to blows or similar actions, therefore all applications of 
force technically can amount to assault, including those that are not generally associated with 
corporal punishment. · 
337 In a 2001 survey it was found that "80% of the public agreed that a person parenting a 
child should be allowed by law to smack them with an open hand if they are naughty. The use 
of objects to smack a child and smacking them in the head and neck area drew an 
overwhelmingly negative response from the public, indicating that only using an open hand 
was acceptable to most people." 
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Therefore, this analysis will focus on the type of physical force that caused so much debate: 
smacking. 339 
1. The use of force for the purposes of correction. 
The parental use of force against a child for the purposes of correction was justified prior to 
the 2007 amendment to s59, so long as the force used was reasonable in the circumstances. 
The Parental Control provision now prohibits any use of force for the purposes of correction. 
The scenario I will use for this analysis is the situation in which a parent punishes a child for 
swearing by either smacking him across the bottom with an open hand or putting him in time 
out. 
Carswell, S. Survey on public attitudes towards the physical punishment of children, Ministry 
of Justice, 2001. 
338 Sue Bradford, in support of her Bill, referred to some extreme cases that had successfully 
raised the s59 defence, despite causing injury or using implements: "At the moment, judges 
and juries have it within their power to find parents not guilty of assault when, for example, 
they beat their children with things like belts, canes, hosepipes, jug cords, pieces of wood, 
and horse crops." (2005) 627 NZPD 22086 
See: R v Wilson Unreported, CA 216/01, 24 October 2001; R v Newell Unreported, High 
Court Palmerston North, 12 September 2002, France J. 
339 Wood, Hassall and Hook suggest that the focus on smacking came from the Bill's 
nickname, and clouded the real issue: "The popular label became 'the anti-smacking bill'. 
The use of this term continued in spite of the fact that the cases which had aroused public 
concern were ones in which parents had successfully used section 59 as a defence for 
prosecutions for assaults that involved much more than what is usually meant by the term 
'smacking'. A more fitting title might have been 'the anti-child assault bill', although this 
does not have quite the same populist ring." 
Supra No. 37, page 140. 
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a) Force used for the purposes of correction, when the force used is 'hitting' or 
striking actions- smacking the child as punishment for swearing. 
i) The old law: Domestic Discipline, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 
amendment. 
The parent in this scenario would be warranted in using force against the child to punish him 
for swearing. Hitting a child, by way of a smack or slap, for disciplinary purposes, was 
justified under the old s59, so long as the force used was reasonable in the circumstances.
340 
In Re I, T, M and i 41 Moss J suggested that anything beyond this would not fall within the 
realm of s59: 
"The use of a weapon will generally render the punishment unreasonable. Similarly, 
punishment leading to bruising or injury will usually be physical abuse rather than 
physical discipline."342 ' 
ii) The new law: Parental Control, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, after the 2007 
amendment. 
Under the new law, any use of force is prohibited if its purpose is to correct the child. 
Smacking a child as punishment for swearing would not be defensible under the current 
s59,343 and the action would amount to assault. However, police have the discretion not to 
prosecute minor inconsequential instances of assault,344 if it is deemed not in the public 
interest to proceed with prosecution. 345 In this instance, a smack across the buttocks would 
probably not be enough to trigger a prosecution: 
"The use of objects/weapons to smack a child, strikes around the head area or kicking 
would not be inconsequential assaults ... In addition, while smacking may, in some 
circumstances, be considered inconsequential, a prosecution may be warranted if such 
340 Re the Five M Children [2004] NZFLR 337 at [43] 
341 [2000] NZFLR 1089 
342 at [3] 
343 s59(2) specifically prohibits the use of force for the purposes of correction. 
344 This is affirmed in s59( 4 ), however adds nothing to the existing powers of police to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion. See chapter 3. 
345 Prosecution Guidelines, Crown Law Office, March 1992. See Appendix 3 
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actions are repetitive or frequent, and other interventions or warnings to the offender 
have not stopped such actions."346 
If prosecution were to proceed however,347 it would have to be proved that the purpose 
behind the smack was correction, and not one of the legitimate purposes set out in s59(1). 
This means that prosecution is precluded if it can not be established that the motive behind 
the smack was correction, and not for example, preventing the child from engaging or 
continuing to engage in offensive behaviour. 
348 As the Police Guidelines point out, 
"offensive" is not defined in the Act, and therefore it is open to interpretation: 
In Ceramalus v Police (1991) 7 CRNZ 678 Tomkins J adopted the following as a 
helpful description of "offensive behaviour": 
"[The behaviour] must be such as is calculated to wound the feelings, arouse 
anger or resentment or disgust or outrage in the mind of a reasonable person." 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "offensive" as: 
"1. Pertaining or tending to attack; aggressive; ... 
2. Hurtful, injurious ... 
3. Giving, or of a nature to give, offence; displeasing; annoying; insulting ... "
349 
Arguably, using swear words is offensive, displeasing, annoying and insulting to some 
people. This means that the action of smacking a child for the purposes of correction for 
346 Police Practice Guide. See Appendix 3. 
347 Even cases that do not fall within the inconsequential criteria set out by the police 
guidelines might not make it to prosecution, and will instead be met with a warning. For 
example, a Christchurch man who flicked his child on the ear. 
Hamilton, P. "Father warned for disciplining boy, 3" The Press, 14 January 2008. 
This man was later charged after police had reviewed the evidence. 
"Dad charged with assault for flicking son's ear" The Press, 29 January 2008 
In the three months following the amendment, there had been no prosecutions. Police had 
attended 111 child assault events and "all of the 15 child assault events involving "smacking" 
or "minor acts of physical discipline" were determined to be "inconsequential" by either the 
attending and/or investigating Police Officer." 
Pope, R. Three month review of Police activity following the enactment of the Crimes 
(Substitued section 59) Amendment Act 2007, 
http://www .police. govt.nz/resources/2007 /section-59-activity-review/, 20 December 2007. 
348 S59(1)(c) 
349 Police Practice Guide. See Appendix 3 
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swearing could potentially be reinterpreted as a justified act of preventing the child from 
continuing to engage in offensive behaviour, i.e. swearing. Section 59(1) has provided a 
loophole, because s59(2) rests on the ability of the prosecutor to prove the intention behind 
the use of force. 
iii) The position if Section 59 had simply been repealed. 
If s59 was repealed, a smack to a child would be the same as a smack to any other person: it 
would amount to assault. There would be no special defence for persons acting in a parental 
control capacity, and therefore no loopholes for acts of smacking to slip through. 
However, as mentioned earlier, police have the discretion not to prosecute minor 
inconsequential instances of assault, if it is deemed not in the public interest to proceed with 
prosecution. If s59 had simply been repealed, this task would be more straight forward for 
police, as they would not have to first establish whether the smack was intended for the 
purposes of discipline. A smack would be a smack, regardless of the motive. After the repeal 
of s59, the Police Commissioner could have released a practice guide similar to the one 
released for the Parental Control provision in 2007,35
0 to detail what sorts of uses of force 
against children would be considered sufficiently serious to prosecute, and which uses of 
force should be considered inconsequential. However, in the absence of confusing and 
ambiguous statutory language (as is the case with the new s59), this sort of guidance would 
be largely superfluous. The existing prosecution guidelines
351 provide ample guidance on the 
factors to be taken into account when deciding whether to proceed with a prosecution. 
350 See Appendix 3 
351 See Appendix 4 
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For example, in the current scenario, the prosecutor might choose to classify the smack as 
inconsequential, taking into account, among other things: 
a) the seriousness or, conversely, the triviality of the alleged offence; i.e. whether the 
conduct really warrants the intervention of the law; 
b) all mitigating and aggravating circumstances; 
i) the availability of proper alternatives to prosecution; 
j) the prevalence of the alleged offence aJ;J.d the need for deterrence; 
k) whether the consequences of any resulting conviction would be unduly harsh and 
oppressive; 
p) the likely sentence imposed in the event of conviction having regard to the 
sentencing options available to the Court. 
352 
Ironically, it seems like the likelihood of being prosecuted for the use of force for the 
purposes of discipline would be higher under the amended s59, because this action is 
specifically prohibited. If s59 had simply been repealed, children would be in the same 
position as adults, and police would be able to assess the force used on a case by case basis, 
without having to worry about whether a smack is administered for correction or for some 
other purpose. 
352 Prosecution Guidelines, Crown Law Office, March 1992, para 3. (Appendix 4) 
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b) Force used for the purposes of correction, when the force used is not 'hitting' 
or striking actions- putting the child in time out as punishment for swearing. 
In this scenario, instead of hitting the child to punish him for swearing, the parent picks him 
up and puts him in time out, which could be either a room or a corner or a step. The main 
point is that the parent forcibly removes the child to that place. 
i) The old law: Domestic Discipline, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 
amendment. 
Under the old law, the use of force for the purposes of correction was justified, so long as the 
force used was reasonable in the circumstances. Picking a child up and moving him is an 
application of force, and so long as the intention was correction, the defence would cover this 
action. 
Not all of the cases that were successful in raising the old s59 defence involved hitting or 
similar actions. In R v Giles353 a father chained his 14 year old daughter to himself after she 
had run away, and was found not guilty of cruelty, kidnapping and unlawful detention after 
raising the domestic discipline defence. 
ii) The new law: Parental Control, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, after the 2007 
amendment. 
Under the new law, any use of force is prohibited if its purpose is to correct the child. This 
means that if the intention behind picking the child up and putting him in time out is to 
discipline him, then the action is prohibited by s59(2).354 Technically, this is an application of 
353 Unreported, High Court Palmerston North, T42/99, 16 November 1999, Wild J. 
354 See chapter 3: Putting a child on the naughty step. 
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force, and if there is no justification it amounts to assault under s2. Therefore, in an attempt 
to ban smacking and violent forms of corporal punishment, the new law created a specific 
statutory ban on every other disciplinary use of force as we11?
55 
Again, police have the discretion not to prosecute inconsequential cases, and again it is easy 
to reclassify this action under one of the legitimate uses of force in s59(1). The police 
practice guide actually reclassifies this action for us: 
" ... a parent may send or take their child to, by way of example, their room against the 
child's will at the time the intervention is required. Force may be required to perform 
such a task and the use of reasonable force in such circumstances may be justified 
under this subsection i.e. to prevent the child from continuing to engage in the 
behaviour (s 59(1)(b) or (c)) or to restore calm. However, if the child is detained for a 
period or in a manner that is unreasonable in the circumstances, this subsection will not 
provide a defence to such action."356 
iii) The position if Section 59 had simply been repealed. 
If s59 had been repealed, any application of force would technically amount to assault. 
However, again, the police have always had a discretion not to prosecute inconsequential 
cases. Additionally, alternative defences for the application of disciplinary force might better 
succeed when the force used does not involve hitting.
357 While the intention behind the force 
is still to discipline, it lacks the necessary element that hitting has- the intention to cause a 
degree of pain. It is not really relevant how transient or trifling the pain from a smack might 
be, the intention to cause pain is what separates hitting as a form of discipline from other, less 
violent applications of force for the purposes of correction. 
355 Section 4 of the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 states its purpose: 
"The purpose of this Act is to amend the principle Act to make better provision for children 
to live in a safe and secure environment free from violence by abolishing the use of parental 
force for the purpose of correction." 
356 See Appendix 3. 
357 See chapter 3: the availability of alternative defences. 
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In the explanatory note to Sue Bradford's original Bill, it was made explicit that "the repeal 
of section 59 ought not revive any old common law justification, excuse or defence that the 
provision may have codified."358 This means that in the event that s59 was completely 
repealed, a common law defence of domestic discipline could not be raised in its place. 
However other defences that are already in existence might apply. They are distinguishable 
from domestic discipline because they are not specific to children, or a parent's prerogative to 
hit their child for whatever reason. 
2. The use of force for the purposes other than correction. 
The parental use of force against a child was justified prior to the 2007 amendment to s59, so 
long as the force used was reasonable in the circumstances, and was for the purposes of 
correction. The use of force for any other reason technically amounted to assault. The new 
parental control provision now prohibits the use of force for the purposes of correction, and 
legitimizes the use of force for other reasons. Because 'reasonable force' is left undefined, it 
means that smacking or striking actions have not been abolished by the amended s59. 
Technically, a child can still be hit, so long as the reason behind the hitting is not correction. 
a) Force used for purposes other than correction, when the force used is 'hitting' 
or striking actions. 
The scenario I will use for this analysis is the situation where a parent smacks a child on the 
hand to stop him touching a hot element. I will also look at how the situation differs when the 
358 Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill2005, 
no 271-1. 
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child is hit on the hand to stop him touching things in a shop, and when he is hit on the hand 
out of the parent's anger or frustration. 
i) The old law: Domestic Discipline, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 
amendment. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the only use of force against a child that was permitted by statute 
before the 2007 amendment was force used for the purposes of correction. Technically, the 
application of force for any other purpose amounted to assault, therefore when parents were 
picking a child up, or holding a child down to change a nappy, their actions were not 
protected by s59. Technically under the old law, a smack on the hand for the purpose of 
protecting the child from a burn would have constituted assault, however the common law 
defence of necessity would almost certainly have justified the action.
359 
Smacking a child on the hand to stop him touching things in a shop is slightly different, 
because the motive is not necessarily to discipline the child, nor to defend them from harm, 
but rather to stop the child breaking objects that do not belong to the parent or child. A smack 
on the hand for this could not have been covered by the domestic discipline defence if the 
intention was not correction, and it is not the sort of situation where necessity could be 
properly raised because there is no real imminent threat or danger. It is possible that s41
360 
could be raised, which is a justification for the use of force for the prevention of suicide or 
certain offences. In that section, a person is justified in using force that is reasonably 
necessary in order to prevent the commission of an offence which would be likely to cause 
359 Police v. Kawiti [2000] 1 NZLR 117. Also see legal opinion on Peter Williams QC in 
chapter 3. 
36° Crimes Act 1961. 
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immediate and serious injury to the person or property of any one, or in order to prevent any 
act being done which he believes, on reasonable grounds, would, if committed amount to any 
such offence. Taken literally, this section might justify the use of force to stop a child 
breaking the shop keeper's property. However, the fact that suicide is the focus of the section 
implies that the sorts of situations contemplated in 'certain offences' would be more serious 
than breaking objects in a shop.361 Furthermore, the force used in these situations must be 
'reasonably necessary' to prevent the offence from happening. A smack might not satisfy this 
test, because there are alternative, less violent ways of preventing a child from touching 
things, for example, leaving the shop, or picking the child up. Undoubtedly this sort of 
situation would have occurred when the old s59 was current, but there were no prosecutions, 
presumably because police have always had the discretion not to prosecute minor offences. 
Smacking a child out of frustration or anger was not permitted under the old domestic 
discipline provision. Section 59 could not be raised to defend the use of force that was 
vindictive or stemming from malice. 
362 
361 S41 has been raised in cases where self-defence is the alternative justification. "If a person 
claims to have acted in self-defence, but crime prevention may also have been a distinct 
purpose, each possibility may have to be considered: R v Kelbie [1996] Crim LR 802; ... R v 
Hebert (1996) 107 CCC (3d) 42; 135 DLR (4th) 577 (SCC)." 
Adams on Criminal Law 
http://www. brookersonline.co.nz/databases/modus/criminal/adams/toc ?si= 15 
362 R v Drake (1902) 22 NZLR 478; R v Accused (1994) DCR 883 
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ii) The new law: Parental Control, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, after the 2007 
amendment. 
The amendments in subsection 1 of the new Parental Control provision are specifically 
designed to address the issue of parental force in circumstances such as a child reaching for a 
hot element.363 Nothing in s59 prohibits smacking as the type of force used. The 'reasonable 
force' test has survived the amendment, and there is no guidance as to what amounts to 
'reasonable'. The Justice and Electoral Committee, in considering options for the s59 
amendment, intentionally did not specify that the force used must be in the form of restraint 
or the like, and not smacking: 
"[a]lternative language that was suggested to us, such as "restraint" would not 
necessarily be apt for some of the parental interventions in issue (e.g. knocking a 
child's hand away from a boiling pot on the stove, pushing or pulling a child out of 
the path of an oncoming car, carrying a child out of the supermarket or to his 
bedroom.) "364 
Therefore, a parent might be justified in smacking a child's hand as he reaches for the 
element, depending on the fact finder's particular construal of what is reasonable in the 
circumstances. This test has been notoriously inconsistently applied in the past, in the context 
of domestic discipline, 365 and it has been suggested that the success of the defence was 
intrinsically linked with decision maker's individual moral position on the issue of corporal 
punishment of children,366 making the test entirely subjective and inconsistent across cases. 
363 Specifically s59(1)(a) 
364 Supra No. 20, para 11 
365 Hancock, J., (2004) The Application of Section 59 of the Crimes Act in the New Zealand 
Courts, Children's Issues Centre Seminar- "Stop it, it hurts me": Research and Perspectives 
on the Physical Punishment of Children- 18 and 19 June 2004, Wellington. 
366 Action Children and Youth Aotearoa (inc ), Parental Corporal Punishment of Children in 
New Zealand, Report for UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/93/ Add.4, 28 
August 2003. 
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One person's light smack is another person's strong whack. As Judge lnglis said of s59 in 
Kendall v Director-General of Social Welfare:
367 
[ w ]hat is "reasonable" must be a matter of degree and will depend in large on what 
can be perceived to be the current social view at the time. 
The lack of statutory definition in the Parental Control provision will potentially lead to the 
same problem. 
Smacking a child's hand to stop him touching objects in a shop might be justifiable under 
s59(1). The action could be defined as preventing the child from engaging in offensive or 
disruptive behaviour, insofar as it would cause disruption for the child to break the shop 
owner's property. The police practice guide loosely describes what amounts to disruption as 
"yelling and screaming or throwing objects or food".
368 This means that the child does not 
even necessarily need to be touching things to warrant a smack, he need only be yelling. 
Section 59(1)(b) could also potentially be raised, as a justification of preventing the child 
from engaging "in conduct that amounts to a criminal offence." Adams suggests that the 
conduct that the child is engaging in might not necessarily need to be criminal. The provision 
is unclear on this, but it might be sufficient that the parent merely has a reasonable belief that 
the conduct amounts to a criminal offence. 
369 
367 (1986) 3 FRNZ 1 at 12 
368 See Appendix 3 
369 Adams on Criminal Law 
http://www. brookersonline.co.nz/databases/modus/criminal/adams/toc ?si= 15 
The Police Practice Guide permits the use of force for this reason: "[a] parent of a child and 
every person in the place of a parent of the child can use reasonable force to prevent their 
child, by way of example, from damaging or stealing property, or assaulting other people or 
themselves. See Appendix 3 
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A justification for smacking a child out of anger or frustration might be found under the new 
Parental Control provision. Exemplifying the use of force to prevent the child from engaging 
in offensive or disruptive behaviour might have opened the door for parents to smack for 
reasons that they previously were not allowed to, namely when the child is being annoying or 
irritating. The provision itself does not define 'offensive' or 'disruptive', so the Police 
Practice Guide has attempted to do so: 
"The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "offensive" as: 
"1. Pertaining or tending to attack; aggressive; ... 
2. Hurtful, injurious ... 
3. Giving, or of a nature to give, offence; displeasing; annoying; insulting ... " 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "disruptive" as: 
"1. Causing or tending to disruption ... " 
Examples of behaviour that may amount to offensive or disruptive behaviour, 
depending upon the specific circumstances, could include, by way of example, yelling 
and screaming or throwing objects or food."
370 
Following this guide, it is enough to satisfy s59(l)(c) if the child is being 'annoying' or 
'displeasing' or if they are yelling. Therefore, if a child is yelling in a public place
371 or even 
at home, a parent might be justified in giving him a smack, not as discipline, but because his 
yelling was annoying. 
370 See Appendix 3 
371 The provision does not require the behaviour to be in any way public. I have used a public 
place in this example to heighten the 'annoyance factor' for a parent. 
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iii) The position if Section 59 had simply been repealed. 
If s59 had simply been repealed, the situation regarding the use of force for purposes other 
than correction would not have changed. Technically the use of force on a child would 
amount to assault, however common law justifications might cover some circumstances?
72 
It is possible that if s59 was repealed, it might be harder to resort to common law defences for 
the application of force for purposes other than correction, when the force used is hitting or 
smacking. Similarly, police might more readily prosecute smacking cases, because smacking, 
as a behaviour, was abolished in the repeal. The fact that the legislature went to the effort to 
remove a defence for smacking indicates that smacking is not to be tolerated, for whatever 
reason. Under this regime, there would be no loop hole for parents to hide behind when 
hitting their children. Hitting per se would have to stop. 
b) Force used for purposes other than correction, when the force used is not 
'hitting' or striking actions 
This analysis is looking at the application of force that is not hitting and is not for the 
purposes of correction. A common scenario is that of a parent restraining a child before he 
runs onto the street, or restraining a child while changing his nappy. 
i) The old law: Domestic Discipline, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 
amendment. 
Under the old law, this type of force still technically amounted to assault, because its purpose 
was not correction, however the common law defence of necessity would have been available 
372 See above analysis: The use of force for purposes other than correction when the force 
used is hitting or striking actions: i) The old law: Domestic Discipline, Section 59 of the 
Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 amendment. 
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to justify the use of force to stop a child running on to a street. The justification for "physical 
contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life"
373 might have 
covered nappy changing or similar situations, if they ever made it to prosecution. Police had a 
discretion not to prosecute minor cases, and thus there were never any ridiculous 
prosecutions for assault in situations of normal parental contact that did not involve hitting. 
ii) The new law: Parental Control, Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, after the 2007 
amendment. 
Arguably, the amendments to s59 were specifically designed to legitimise the kind of force 
considered here: Non-violent, everyday uses of parental force for purposes other than 
correction. When considering the current Parental Control provision as a possible amendment 
to s59, the Justice and Electoral Committee said that it would "offer protection for 'good 
parenting' interventions, short of correction."
374 Section 59(1)(a) allows a parent to apply 
force in the form of restraint to protect the child from harm as he runs out on to the street. 
Section 59(1)(d) would justify the force used to change a nappy, as this is arguably a normal 
daily task that is incidental to good care and parenting. 
'Performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting' describes 
such a wide range of behaviours, it is difficult to imagine the sorts of contact that this 
justification would not cover. Adams suggests s59(1)(d) is intended to cover the applications 
of force against children in the infant stage, and would be unlikely to be applied to older 
children. The age of the child is therefore relevant in determining the reasonableness of the 
373 Collins v Wilcock. Supra No. 6 
374 Supra No. 20, para 10 
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force. It is also suggested that cultural values may impact on what is considered to be 
"normal" daily tasks of "good" parenting: 
"[a]ny assessment of the use of force to be justified under this head ma~ have to take 
into account relevant cultural and, perhaps, religious understandings."
3 5 
Cultural values were taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the force used in 
some domestic discipline cases, however in Ausage v Ausage, 
376 Judge Somerville avoided 
this reasoning, preferring a uniform test for all cultures, since New Zealand had become a 
party to UNCRC. If religious and cultural factors were brought back into the reasonableness 
test, it would seem like a step back in time. It would be unfortunate if the amendments to s59, 
intended to update its purpose, meant that old legal tests were revived. 
iii) The position if Section 59 had simply been repealed. 
Again, ifs 59 had been repealed, the situation regarding the use of force for purposes other 
than correction, regardless of its form, would not have changed, because there never existed a 
defence in the past. Technically the use of force on a child, even restraint, would amount to 
assault, however common law justifications would cover most circumstances?
77 There were 
never any problems with nappy changing and child restraint in the past, and it is unlikely that 
a complete repeal of s59 would have changed that. 
c) Summary of Analysis 
The following table is a summary of the three options discussed above, 
375 At CA59.03. 
376 Supra No. 266 
377 See above analysis: The use of force for purposes other than correction when the force 
used is hitting or striking actions: i) The old law: Domestic Discipline, Section 59 of the 
Crimes Act 1961, prior to the 2007 amendment. 
129 
Table Two. Hitting or Other uses of Hitting or Other uses of 
smacking for the force for the smacking for a force for a 
Summary of purposes of purposes of purpose that is purpose that is 
Analysis. correction correction, e.g. NOT correction. NOT correction. 
time-out. 
Domestic ALLOWED ALLOWED NOT ALLOWED NOT ALLOWED 
Discipline 
As long as the As long as the R vDrake • Existing 
(old section 59) force used was force used was R vAccused common law 
reasonable in the reasonable in the defences might 
circumstances circumstances • Police discretion cover situations 
means that that do not 
Re the Five M R v Giles inconsequential involve hitting. 
Children cases are unlikely 
to be prosecuted. • Police discretion 
Re I, T, M and J means that 
inconsequential 
cases are unlikely 
to be prosecuted. 
Parental NOT ALLOWED NOT ALLOWED ALLOWED ALLOWED 
Control 
However ... However ... As long as the As long as the 
(new section 59) force used was force used was 
• Might be able to • Might be able to reasonable in the reasonable in the 
be reclassified as be reclassified as circumstances. circumstances. 
a legitimate use of a legitimate use of 
force under s59(1) force under s59(1) 
• Police discretion • Police discretion 
means that means that 
inconsequential inconsequential 
cases are unlikely cases are unlikely 
to be prosecuted. to be prosecuted. 
Repeal NOT ALLOWED NOT ALLOWED NOT ALLOWED NOT ALLOWED 
(no section 59) However. .. However. .. However. .. • Existing 
common law 
• Police discretion • Police discretion • Police discretion defences might 
means that means that means that cover situations 
inconsequential inconsequential inconsequential that do not 
cases are unlikely cases are unlikely cases are unlikely involve hitting. 
to be prosecuted. to be prosecuted. to be prosecuted. 
• Police discretion 
• Existing means that 
common law inconsequential 
defences might cases are unlikely 
cover situations to be prosecuted. 
that do not 
involve hitting. 
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Perhaps the most pertinent point to be taken from the analysis is that the new Parental 
Control provision has not banned smacking. On the contrary, it has opened the door for 
smacking in situations that never existed before. Now a parent may smack a child for a whole 
host of reasons, except correction. There is no definition of reasonable, so there has been no 
solution to the problem of inconsistent application that existed under the old law. 
Table Two demonstrates how the situations in the new Parental Control provision in which 
force (hitting and non-hitting) may be applied to a child are a complete mirror image to those 
in the old Domestic Discipline provision. This is not necessarily a good thing, because while 
the new provision has banned hitting children for the purposes of correction, it has 
legitimised the use of force, including hitting, for all other purposes. This did not exist under 
the old law, and would not exist if s59 had simply been repealed. Creating a brand new 
defence for hitting children cannot be said to have furthered children's rights to bodily 
integrity. Bringing children's rights up to the level of adults with respect to bodily integrity 
and protection from assault would have involved the prohibition of all hitting. It is not 
acceptable to hit adults, and it should not be acceptable to hit children. Legislating an 
amendment that allows children to be assaulted in this way may not have been intentional, 
but it is poor law making nonetheless. 
The law would have been clearer, and safer, if s59 had been repealed altogether. As Table 
Two demonstrates, repealing the section achieves the same purpose as the Parental Control 
provision insofar as the use of force for the purposes of correction is concerned. A repeal 
would have abolished this defence. 
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Regarding the use of force for purposes other than correction, a simple repeal would have 
been much more effective, and would have abolished hitting or smacking. It would not have 
changed the current reality, because the old Domestic Discipline provision never 
contemplated anything other than corrective force anyway. But most importantly, a simple 
repeal would not have opened all sorts of loopholes for the use of force that involves hitting. 
The Parental Control provision has not only failed to improve anything in this area, it has 
made things worse. 
3. Furthering children's rights beyond repeal. 
A straightforward repeal of s59 would not only have placed children on an equal footing with 
adults and all other members of society with regards to bodily integrity and assault,
378 it 
would also have recognised a child's right to protection. In chapter one I explored rights that 
are specific to children, by virtue of their immaturity and vulnerability. The Domestic 
Discipline provision was completely at odds with the notion that children should be protected 
from harm, because not only did it not give them special protection from assault, it actually 
gave them less protection than everyone else. Arguably, the Parental Control provision has 
not done any better. 
To really recognise a child's right to protection, the law needs to be more than just neutral. It 
needs to give extra protection from assault to children. It seems like common sense that we 
should guard our smallest and most vulnerable citizens the most, to recognize their 
underlying human rights first and foremost, and then respect their dependency. 
Repealing s59 would not have left children in a neutral position insofar as assault is 
concerned, because recognition of their inherent vulnerability and need for protection already 
378 Nicholson, A. Choose to hug not hit (2008) 46 Family Court Review 1, 11-36 
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exists in the Crimes Act, in the form of a special provision dedicated to assaults against 
children. Therefore, if s59 had been simply repealed, children's rights to protection from 
assault would have naturally fallen into place. 







have less rights to 
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Repeal of section 
59. Children have 
extra rights to 
protection from 
assault. 
Under the Crimes Act, smacking a child under the age of 14 would technically amount to 
assault under s194,379 which carries a heavier penalty than for common assault under section 
196?80 Therefore, assault against children is more serious than assault against other citizens. 
It is unlikely that for smacking, police would prosecute under s195, cruelty to a child, which 
379 Assault on a child, or by a male on a female. 
380 The maximum penalty for assault is 2 years, compared with a maximum of one year for 
common assault. 
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carries a maximum penalty of five years, because the assault provision is more likely to result 
in conviction.381 
As mentioned above, if s59 had been repealed the police commissioner could have released 
practice guidelines to aid in prosecution decisions for smacking and other child assault cases. 
However, the existing Solicitor General's prosecution guidelines
382 should have been 
sufficient to fully recognize children's rights to protection. Furthermore, the age and 
vulnerability of the victim could be added to the list of factors to be considered under 3.3.2. 
The youth, old age, physical or mental health of the offender is currently taken into account. 
The victim's age and vulnerability is already a relevant consideration in sentencing 
legislation. For example, when deciding whether the minimum non-parole term for murder 
should be extended beyond ten years, one of the factors to be taken into account is the 
victim's vulnerability due to age.383 This indicates that the crime is more culpable if the 
victim is vulnerable. Similarly, assaults against children, who, by virtue of being children, are 
vulnerable and in need of protection, should be treated as more serious than assaults against 
adults. Having this factor incorporated into the prosecution guidelines would mean that police 
would be more inclined to prosecute an assault if the victim was a child. 
381 "The case law on sl95 generally involves more serious and sustained ill-treatment. For 
example, R v Mead [2002] 1 NZLR 594 (CA) involved a step father beating children, placing 
them in cold baths, forcing them to eat rotten food, and in one case, forcing the child to eat 
cloves. R v Murphy unreported, CA 18/83, 2 August 1893, Cooke J, involved a mother hitting 
the child with a rolling pin and twisting the child's arm behind her back, consequently 
breaking her arm." 
Pickford, S. (2006) The Anti-Smacking Bill: Implications for Parents. LLB (Honours) 
dissertation, University of Otago, page 23 
382 See Appendix 4 
383 s 1 04(g) Sentencing Act 2002. 
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Conclusion. 
Children have a right not to be hit. This is not some special right afforded to them by virtue 
of the fact they are children, nor is it something extraordinary that imposes an extra duty on 
parents or the state. It is a fundamental human right, and since children are humans they are 
entitled to this right. 
The 2007 amendment to the Crimes Act to abolish domestic discipline went some way 
towards recognising children's rights. Repealing this section would have meant that children 
would cease to be the only group in society who could legally be hit. However, the 
substitution of 'Parental Control' for 'Domestic Discipline' means that the advancement of 
children's rights in this area was purely cosmetic. Children are still the only people in society 
who can be legally hit: the Parental Control provision is drafted in such a way that hitting for 
purposes other than correction is still permitted. Hitting for disciplinary purposes has been 
banned on the face of it, however the inclusion of an affirmation of police discretion serves to 
undermine the abolition. Furthermore, the provision has created fresh avenues for hitting that 
never existed before. The message about children's right to bodily integrity has been diluted 








The purpose of this Bill is to stop force, and associated violence and harm under the pretence 
of domestic discipline, being inflicted on children. Presently, section 59 of the Crimes Act 
1961 acts as a justification, excuse or defence for parents or guardians using force against 
their children where they are doing so for the purposes of correction and the force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances. The Bill will repeal that provision. 
The effect of this amendment is that the statutory protection for use of force by parents and 
guardians will be removed. They will now be in the same position as everyone else so far as 
the use of force against children is concerned. The use of force on a child may constitute an 
assault under s194(a) of the Crimes Act, a comparatively new provision in the criminal law, 
and the repeal of section 59 ought not revive any old common law justification, excuse or 
defence that the provision may have codified. 
Clause 4 simply repeals section 59 
Clause 5 makes consequential amendments to section 139A of the Education Act 1989 to 
remove the exemption for guardians in the prohibition of corporal punishment in schools. 
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4. Domestic discipline 
5. Consequential amendments to Education Act 1989 
The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows: 
1 Title 
(1) This Act is the Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) 
Amendment Act 2005. 
(2) In this Act, the Crimes Act 1961 is called "the principle Act". 
2 Commencement 
This Act comes into force on the day after the date on which it receives Royal assent. 
3 Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to amend the principle Act to abolish the use of force by 
parents as a justification for disciplining children. 
4 Domestic Discipline 
Section 59 of the principle Act is repealed. 
5 Consequential amendments to Education Act 1989 
(1) Section 139A(1) of the education Act 1989 is amended by omitting the words", 
unless that person is a guardian of the student or child". 
(2) Section 139A(2) of the Education Act 1989 is amended by omitting the words ", 




Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification 
for Child Discipline) Amendment Bill 
Member's Bill 
As reported from the Justice and Electoral Committee 
Commentary 
The Justice and Electoral Committee has examined the Crimes 
(Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) Amendment 
Bill and recommends by majority that it be passed with the 
amendments shown. 
Introduction 
Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides a statutory defence for 
parents and every person in the place of a parent who use force 
against their children for the purpose of correction. The bill as 
introduced repeals this provision. In the absence of section 59 parents 
and every person in the place of a parent would be in the same 
position as any other person. If charged with any offence that 
involves the use of force against a child, correction would no longer 
be a defence. 
The first part of this commentary sets out the amendments to the bill 
the majority recommends. We would like to emphasise that we 
made every endeavour to reach consensus on the bill. We are disappointed 
that, despite our best intentions, agreement was not reached. 
The remainder of the commentary details some of the issues we 
considered as a result of submissions on the bill. 
Amendments 
Title 
We recommend that the title of the bill be amended, as it does not 
adequately reflect the effect of the bill as amended, and suggest the 
bill be renamed the Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment 
Bill. 
Purpose 
We recommend that clause 3, which states that purpose of the bill, 
be amended to better reflect the intention of the bill. The purpose of 
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this bill is to amend the principal Act to make better provision for 
children to live in a safe and secure environment free from violence 
by abolishing the use of parental force for the purpose of correction. 
Parental control 
We recommend that section 59 of the Crimes Act be repealed and 
replaced by a new section 59. This new section will effectively 
remove the defence of using "reasonable force" against a child for 
the purpose of correction. The new section 59 clarifies that reasonable 
force may be used for other purposes such as protecting a child 
from harm, providing normal daily care, and preventing the child 
doing harm to others. We consider that this amendment provides for 
interventions that are not for the purpose of correction by parents 
and every person in the place of a parent. Additionally it will address 
a gap in the law, as under the current wording of section 59 the 
application of force from any motivation other than correction may 
amount to an offence. 
This amendment will require a consequential amendment to sections 
139A(l) and (2) of the Education Act 1989. 
Committee consideration 
Summary of submissions 
The committee received 1,718 submissions on the bill. The majority 
(1,471) came from individuals. Of these, 385 submitters identified 
themselves as parents or caregivers, and 76 as children or young 
people. We received 247 submissions from organisations. 
Opposition to the bill 
The majority of submitters who opposed the bill commented on 
child discipline and associated matters generally, rather than on 
specific provisions of the bill. Opponents of the bill raised a number 
of concerns, including the following: 
· that repeal of section 59 would lead to the prosecution of 
parents and the removal of children from their homes as a 
result of minor acts of physical discipline 
· that the rights of parents to discipline their children or simply 
to raise them as they see fit would be eroded by a form of 
statutory control 
· that the use of physical discipline, which they argued is an 
effective tool for raising children, would be prohibited 
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· that the repeal of section 59 would lead to children being 
raised poorly with no conception of discipline or boundaries 
· that the repeal of section 59 would remove the right to discipline 
children according to specific belief systems. 
A number of submitters predicted various detrimental effects on 
parents, children, and society if section 59 were repealed. 
Support for the bill 
Submitters who supported the bill raised the following arguments: 
· that physical discipline on children is ineffective compared 
with other forms of discipline 
· that there is a connection between the physical disciplining of 
children and child abuse 
· that section 59 provides less protection against assault for 
children than adults 
· that physical discipline is linked with longer-term psychological 
and developmental problems 
· that is was not the intention of the bill to criminalise parents 
and that fears of prosecution for trivial use of physical discipline 
are unfounded 
·that repealing section 59 would send a strong anti-violence 
message to society and encourage behavioural change. 
A number of supporters of the bill argued that, while repealing 
section 59 would send a positive message, it would need to be 
reinforced with Government support and ongoing public education. 
Proposed amendments 
A number of submitters suggested specific amendments to the bill, 
most of them defining ''reasonable'' and ''unreasonable'' force. 
They were often illustrated with examples of acceptable and unacceptable 
forms of, and reasons for, physical discipline. 
Other submitters illustrated the difficulties of defining ''reasonable'' 
and ''unreasonable'' force, and the possible consequences. They 
noted the following issues in particular: 
· It would be very difficult to draft a definition that captured the 
desired behaviour with sufficient certainty and provided adequate 
protection to children (since, for example, a lack of 
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visible injury may not necessarily mean no harm has been 
done). 
· Difficulties are likely to arise in applying any definition in 
individual cases, particularly if terms such as "minor", "trivial", 
and ''harm'' are used, which are relative or open to 
interpretation and argument. 
· ''Reasonable force'' is not defined anywhere in statute, so it 
would be out of line with the rest of statute law to define it 
here. 
· Health professionals are averse to providing guidelines on the 
use of physical force against children. 
· Such amendment could be seen as sanctioning or legitimising 
the use of force against children. 
We were advised that most of the amendments proposed by submitters 
were fraught with difficulties both in practice and in principle, 
and would prove unworkable in terms of legal interpretation. 
Public education 
We recommend that if the bill is enacted the appropriate agencies 
should conduct public awareness and education campaigns about the 
effect of the recommended changes to section 59 and alternatives to 
physical discipline. We received positive feedback about the Strategies 
with Kids-Information for Parents (SKIP) programme. This 
programme has been adopted by thousands of parents, community 
groups, and educational groups throughout the country. We consider 
that the extension of the SKIP programme and similar parental 
educational programmes would be most beneficial in conjunction 
with the recommended changes to section 59. 
Prosecution practice under the new section 59 
We were advised that any impact on the rate of prosecution of 
parents and every person in the place of a parent for the use of force 
against their children will depend on police practice in such cases, as 
well as the public response to the law change (regarding, for example, 
the reporting of incidents to the police). As with any other 
offence, the prosecution of parents and every person in the place of a 
parent for the use of force against children for the purpose of correction 
will be a matter for police discretion, although private prosecutions 
remain a possibility. 
We were advised that all prosecution decisions are guided by the 
Solicitor-General's Prosecution Guidelines. The guidelines state 
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that police must decide whether a prosecution is required in the 
public interest. They also state that ordinarily a prosecution will not 
be in the public interest unless it is more likely than not that it will 
result in a conviction. The likely success of section 59 as a defence 
in a particular case is therefore a relevant factor in a decision 
whether to prosecute. Therefore, the recommended changes to 
section 59 would remove the "correction" justification, which was 
one obstacle to prosecutions of assaults against children. Factors, 
unrelated to section 59, such as failures to detect or report assaults, 
would continue to limit prosecutions following repeal. 
We were advised that the police will not actively solicit reports of 
the use of force against children. The police are obliged to investigate 
any reports they receive, but such reports may not require 
significant investigation, other than, for example, follow-up with the 
adult concerned and witnesses. While police may investigate (or 
make inquiries about) reports of alleged assault, not all such cases 
will require prosecution or other action. 
There are safeguards in the criminal justice system to minimise the 
likelihood of parents and every person in the place of a parent being 
prosecuted for minor acts of physical punishment. Various options 
other than formal prosecution are available to police, including 
warnings and cautions. Under the Solicitor-General's Prosecution 
Guidelines, a prosecution should proceed only where it is in the 
public interest and there is sufficient evidence. 
Judges have an inherent power to control proceedings that are an 
abuse of the court's processes. Vexatious or trifling matters are an 
abuse of the court's processes. We would not expect prosecutors to 
bring trifling matters before the court. 
The police advised us that the discretion to lay charges lies with the 
investigating officer, after considering any advice that they may 
receive from a supervisor or other person such as Police Prosecution 
Services or Legal Services. 
Advice from the Department of Child, Youth and Family 
Services 
The Department of Child, Youth and Family Services told us that it 
has various policies for dealing with situations that endanger children. 
It told us that it would expect the thresholds at which it removes 
children to remain the same if section 59 were repealed. If section 59 
were repealed, Child, Youth and Family told us that it would expect 
a greater volume of reports, but that the legislative principle that 
intervention in family life should be the minimum necessary to 
ensure a child's or young person's safety would remain. Child, 
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Youth and Family is concerned with child abuse and neglect but will 
consider removing children only if they are at serious risk. It told us 
that if section 59 were repealed it would look at developing operational 
guidelines in conjunction with all affected agencies, especially 
the police. 
We acknowledge that the police and Child, Youth and Family need 
to maintain their professional discretion when dealing with complaints 
regarding physical force used against children. We expect the 
police and Child, Youth and Family to develop effective operational 
guidelines and protocols and to maintain a close working 
relationship. 
Conclusion 
While considering this bill we noted the high level of public interest 
stimulated by the possible repeal of section 59 of the Crimes Act. 
The submissions we received demonstrated a range of views about 
the use of physical discipline in New Zealand. Submissions were 
received from a wide variety of individuals and organisations, and 
often expressed strong views on the matter. 
We consider that there is widespread misunderstanding about the 
purpose and possible results of the bill as introduced. We do not 
consider that the repeal of section 59 will lead to the prosecution of 
large numbers of parents and persons in the place of parents in New 
Zealand. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, we have recommended 
amendments to the bill to clarify that parents may use 
reasonable force in some circumstances, but not for the purpose of 
correction. We note that there are several potential offences directly 
related to the care of children that are rarely prosecuted. Such an 
example is if a caregiver sends a child to its room against its will, 
this technically constitutes kidnapping under section 209 of the 
Crimes Act. However, the police are not regularly prosecuting parents 
for this. We consider that logic dictates the police will adopt a 
similar approach to parents who use minor physical discipline following 
the changes to section 59. 
We do not believe that the changes we have proposed to section 59 
of the Act will lead to a large increase in convictions or the removal 
of children from their families for the use of minor physical discipline. 
2005/25 Petition of Barry Thomas and 20,750 others 
We considered the issues raised by this petition, which supports the 
bill. We have no matters to bring to the attention of the House in 
respect of the petition. 
New Zealand National minority view 
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In the best interests of children, the New Zealand National members 
of the committee believe it is imperative to lower the usage of 
section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 as it is being used as a shield to 
conviction by some parents and guardians who have obviously 
abused their children. 
Some high-profile recent cases involving severe beatings with 
implements are seen as obvious examples of child abuse, yet no 
convictions have resulted when the accused have successfully used 
the "reasonable correction" justification offered by section 59 in 
jury trials. 
There is less concern about interpretation of the language of section 
59 by Judges. 
Alongside the need for lowering the threshold of violence against 
children in this country is the often-confirmed position that 80% of 
New Zealanders believe, and the New Zealand National members 
agree that parents should not be rendered liable to prosecution 
( criminalised) for smacking their children. 
Firm statistics as to the use of corporal punishment in New Zealand 
are not readily available .. There is a blurring of the lines as many 
researchers place child abuse on a continuum from the least application 
of force by way of ''smacking'', through to child homicide. The 
New Zealand National members agree with most New Zealanders 
who do not place "smacking" in the same category as "child 
abuse''. The difficulty also remains that ''smacking'' itself is ill 
defined and has various meanings to various people. What may seem 
an acceptable ''smack'' to one parent is not to another and can be 
described as "the bash" by the child, and "abuse" byothers. 
In the course of hearing submitters, those in favour of repeal were 
told that a win all/lose all scenario would occur if there was no 
suggested amendment. Submitters were also asked to discuss and 
suggest compromise positions that could be included in an amendment, 
which would operate as a ''fall-back'' position to offer better 
protection for children while not achieving their first choice of full 
repeal. The National Party members were disappointed that few 
submitters would consider any other option than full repeal. 
The New Zealand National members believe that this "all or nothing" 
approach fails to accurately reflect current thinking of the vast 
majority of New Zealand parents. 
The New Zealand National members of the committee believe that 
the fundamental rules of law are certainty and clarity. The repeal of 
section 59 but retention of some protection for parents by way of 
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guidelines for practise or commentary on this bill are insufficiently 
precise for parents to have confidence that they live within the law. 
The New Zealand National members of the committee intend offering 
amendments to the bill to ensure the three common objectives of 
both sides of the debate (a) to send a message that child abuse is 
wrong; (b) to prevent child abusers from hiding behind section 59; 
(c) to prevent good parents from being criminalised; are achieved. 
The New Zealand National members of the committee believe that 
there needs to be a common-sense approach to the issues around 
child assaults in New Zealand and that Parliament should only enact 
laws that work. 
Appendix 
Committee process 
The Crimes (Abolition of Force as a Justification for Child Discipline) 
Amendment Bill was referred to the Justice and Electoral 
Committee on 27 July 2005. The closing date for submissions was 
28 February 2006. We received and considered 1,718 submissions 
from interested groups and individuals. We heard 207 submissions 
and held hearings in Wellington, Auckland, Hamilton, and Christchurch. 
We received advice from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry 
of Social Development, the New Zealand Police, and the Department 
of Child, Youth and Family Services. We sought additional 
advice from the Law Commission. 
Committee membership 
Lynne Pillay (Chairperson) 





Dr Richard Worth 
Chester Borrows and Sue Bradford were replacement members for 
this item of business. 
The committee appointed a subcommittee for the consideration of 
this bill. 
Subcommittee membership 
Lynne Pillay (Chairperson) 
Chester Borrows replacing Christopher Finlayson 
AnnHartley 
Sue Bradford replacing N'andor T'anczos 
Nicky Wagner 
Key to symbols used in reprinted bill 
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As reported from a select committee 
Struck out (majority) 
Subject to this Act, Text struck out by a majority 
Struck out (unanimous) 
Subject to this Act, Text struck out unanimously 
New (majority) 
Subject to this Act, Text inserted by a majority 
<Subject to this Act,> Words struck out by a majority 
(Subject to this Act,) Words struck out unanimously 
<Subject to this Act,> Words inserted by a majority 
Subject to this Act, Words inserted unanimously 
Sue Bradford 
Crimes ((Abolition of Force as a Justification 









A Principal Act amended 
Purpose 
New section 59 substituted 
59 Parental control 
Member's Bill 
Contents 
5 Amendments to Education Act 1989 










This Act is the Crimes ((Abolition of Force as a Justification 




This Act comes into force on the day after the date on which it 
receives the Royal assent. 
2A. Principal Act amended 
This Act amends the Crimes Act 1961. 
3 Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to amend the principal Act to 
<abolish the use of reasonable force by parents as a justification 
for disciplining children> <make better provision for 
children to live in a safe and secure environment free from 
violence by abolishing the use of parental force for the pur-
pose of correction>. 
Struck out (unanimous) 
4 Domestic discipline 
Section 59 is repealed. 
New (majority) 
4 New section 59 substituted 
Section 59 is repealed and the following section substituted: 
''59 Parental control 
"(1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a 
parent of the child is justified in using force if the force used is 
reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of-
"(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another 
person; or 
''(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to 
engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal offence; or 
"(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to 
engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or 
"(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to 
good care and parenting. 
"(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies 
the use of force for the purpose of correction. 
"(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1)." 
5 <Consequential> Amendments to Education Act 1989 
New (majority) 
(1AA) This section amends the Education Act 1989. 
(1) Section 139A(1) and (2) of the Education Act 1989 
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are amended by omitting the words '', unless that person 
is a guardian of the student or child''. 
Struck out (majority) 
(2) Section 139A(2) of the Education Act 1989 is amended 
omitting the words '', unless that person is a guardian of the 
student or child''. 
Legislative history 
June 2005 Introduction (271-1) 
July 2005 First reading and referral to Justice and Electoral 
Committee 
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Appendix 3: Police Practice Guide 
Introduction 
The Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act ("Amendment Act") comes into force 
on 22 June 2007 and amends section 59 of the Crimes Act. 
Section 59 of the Crimes Act provided a statutory defence for every parent of a child and 
every person in place of the parent of a child to use force by way of correction towards the 
child, if the force used was reasonable in the circumstances. The purpose of the Amendment 
Act is to amend the Crimes Act to make better provision for children to live in a safe and 
secure environment free from violence by abolishing the use of parental force for the purpose 
of correction. 
The purpose of this practice guide is to advise staff about the new section and to give 
guidance on the application of it. Until case law develops on the section, it is not known how 
it will be interpreted and applied by the Courts. 
If staff require any advice about the application of section 59 to any particular circumstances, 
they should consult Prosecution Services, a Child Abuse Investigator, a Family Violence Co-
ordinator or Legal Services. 
New Section 59 
Section 59 states: 
" ( 1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified 
in using force if the force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of -
(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or 
(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a 
criminal offence; or 
(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive 
behaviour; or 
(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use of force for the 
purpose of correction. 
(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1). 
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( 4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute 
complaints against a parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation 
to an offence involving the use of force against a child, where the offence is considered to be 
so inconsequential that there is no public interest in proceeding with a prosecution." 
Analysis of the new section 
Child 
"Child" is not defined for the purpose of section 59. Because "child" is not defined, it is not 
clear whether it includes those persons 17 years of age and under (as it is defined in the Care 
of Children Act 2004), or perhaps, under 14 years of age (as it is defined in the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989). As children get older, the use of reasonable 
force for the purposes listed in section 59 will become less justifiable. Factors that will need 
to be considered in determining whether the force used is justified under section 59 include: 
• age of the child 
• maturity of the child 
• ability of the child to reason 
• characteristics of the child, such as physical development, sex and state of health, and 
• the circumstances that led to the use of force. 
Person in the place of a parent 
"Person in the place of a parent" is also not defined, but includes step parents and foster 
parents, and other persons who take on parental responsibility in the absence of a parent. 
Force used is reasonable in the circumstances 
No definitions are offered about what constitutes reasonable force. In using force parents 
must act in good faith and have a reasonable belief in a state of facts which will justify the 
use of force. The use of force must be both subjectively and objectively reasonable. 
Any force used must not be for the purposes of correction or punishment; it may only be for 
the purposes of restraint (s 59(1)(a) to (c)) or, by way of example, to ensure compliance (s 
59(1)(d)). 
Preventing 
To "prevent" is to hinder or stop something from occurring. From this it is implicit that 
reasonable force can only be used at the time that the intervention by the parent is required 
i.e. force cannot be used after the event to punish or discipline the child. This distinction is 
made clear in the new subsections (2) and (3)- nothing ins 59(1) will justify the use of force 
for the purposes of correction. 
150 
Preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person 
This subsection allows reasonable force to be used to prevent or minimise harm to the child 
or another person. For example, to stop a child from: 
• running across a busy road 
• touching a hot stove 
• inserting a metal object into a power point 
• striking another child or person with an object. 
Preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to 
a criminal offence 
This subsection authorises the use of reasonable force to prevent children from committing 
offences. Although a child under 10 cannot be convicted of an offence (section 21 Crimes 
Act 1961), and a child aged 10 to 13 can only be charged with murder or manslaughter 
(section 272 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989), a child of any age can 
commit an offence e.g. theft, wilful damage or assault. Therefore, a parent of a child and 
every person in the place of a parent of the child can use reasonable force to prevent their 
child, by way of example, from damaging or stealing property, or assaulting other people or 
themselves (Note: the defence of self defence could equally apply in such cases). 
Preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive 
behaviour 
Offensive or disruptive behaviour is not defined in the Crimes Act and it is not known where 
the boundaries lie in the context of this subsection. While current case law can offer some 
insight, the analysis provided by the Courts is more particularly targeted at types of behaviour 
that warrant the interference of the criminal law. 
In Ceramalus v Police (1991) 7 CRNZ 678 Tomkins J adopted the following as a helpful 
description of "offensive behaviour": 
"[The behaviour] must be such as is calculated to wound the feelings, arouse anger or 
resentment or disgust or outrage in the mind of a reasonable person." 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "offensive" as: 
"1. Pertaining or tending to attack; aggressive; ... 
2. Hurtful, injurious ... 
3. Giving, or of a nature to give, offence; displeasing; annoying; insulting ... " 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "disruptive"'as: 
"1. Causing or tending to disruption ... " 
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Examples of behaviour that may amount to offensive or disruptive behaviour, depending 
upon the specific circumstances, could include, by way of example, yelling and screaming or 
throwing objects or food. 
Performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting 
Many everyday tasks require parents to use force when interacting with their children. For 
example, when changing nappies, dressing or securing a child in a car seat, or applying 
sunscreen. The use of reasonable force in performing such tasks is permitted under this 
subsection. 
Also, a parent may send or take their child to, by way of example, their room against the 
child's will at the time the intervention is required. Force may be required to perform such a 
task and the use of reasonable force in such circumstances may be justified under this 
subsection i.e. to prevent the child from continuing to engage in the behaviour (s 59(1)(b) or 
(c)) or to restore calm. However, if the child is detained for a period or in a manner that is 
unreasonable in the circumstances, this subsection will not provide a defence to such action. 
Inconsequential offences where there is no public interest in prosecuting 
Parliament has expressly affirmed that for minor cases of assault against children, Police 
have discretion not to prosecute where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that 
there is no public interest in a prosecution. The Crown Law Office Prosecution Guidelines for 
Crown Solicitors also states that a factor that may arise for consideration in determining 
whether the public interest requires a prosecution includes: 
"the seriousness or, conversely, the triviality of the alleged offence; that is, whether the 
conduct really warrants the intervention of the criminal law." 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the word "inconsequent" as: 
"Of no consequence" 
And the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word "inconsequential" as: 
"Unimportant" 
The use of objects/weapons to smack a child, strikes around the head area or kicking would 
not be inconsequential assaults. While all mitigating and aggravating circumstances would 
need to be considered, such assaults will generally require a prosecution in the public interest. 
In addition, while smacking may, in some circumstances, be considered inconsequential, a 
prosecution may be warranted if such actions are repetitive or frequent, and other 
interventions or warnings to the offender have not stopped such actions. 
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Application of the Police Family Violence Policy (1996/2) 
The Police Family Violence Policy outlines the principles, policy and procedures for best 
practice when members of Police deal with family violence within their community. The 
term 'family violence' includes violence which is physical, emotional, psychological and 
sexual abuse, and includes intimidation or threats of violence. The term 'family' includes such 
people as parents, children, extended family members and whanau, or other people involved 
in relationships. 
Paragraph 19 of the Police Family Violence Policy states: 
"Given sufficient evidence, offenders who are responsible for family violence offences shall, 
except in exceptional circumstances, be arrested. In rare cases where action other than arrest 
is contemplated, the member's supervisor must be consulted." 
Force used on children that is not permissible under section 59 is covered by the Family 
Violence Policy. 
It is considered good practice that assault investigations involving children be referred to 
Child Abuse Investigators, and investigated in conjunction with Child, Youth and Family. 
Where an assault on a child is witnessed by Police or where a report of an assault needs to be 
dealt with promptly, Police Officers will need to determine whether section 59 provides a 
good defence and if it does not, arrest the alleged offender unless there are exceptional 
circumstances. 
Police investigating cases where force is used against a child, as is the case with all assault 
investigations, must consider the amount of force used in the circumstances, among other 
things, before making a decision about whether a prosecution is required in the public 
interest. In such cases Police need to: 
• establish whether there is sufficient admissible and reliable evidence that an offence has 
been committed 
• where and when possible, refer appropriate cases to Child Abuse Investigators where they 
may be investigated further 
• depending upon the amount of force used, take into account whether it is in the best 
interests of the child/family and the public to prosecute i.e. "exceptional circumstances" will 
justify a departure from the requirements of paragraph 19 of the Police Family Violence 
Policy. Staff must apply their common-sense. 
In Attorney-General v Hewitt [2000] NZAR 148 a full bench of the High Court held that 
adopting a policy to automatically arrest a suspect without allowing for exceptional 
circumstances was not lawful. The High Court also held that a failure to consider the 
discretion to arrest was unlawful and arbitrary under section 22 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act. Discretion must be used by staff. 
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Referrals and documentation 
In cases where the force used is found to be minor, trivial or inconsequential, it will be 
appropriate to record the event on a POL400 and forward the file to the Family Violence Co-
ordinator. The expected outcome for such events will be one using common sense and of 
offering guidance and support, dependent on the context following discussion by the Family 
Violence Co-ordinator. 
In repeat events (where other interventions or warnings have been unsuccessful) involving 
the same family or more serious cases the matter should be recorded on a POL400 and 
consideration given as to whether prosecution may be appropriate. A Notification to Child 
Youth and Family must be made by faxing the POL400 to the Child Youth and Family Call 
Centre. The matter will also be forwarded in the usual way to the Family Violence Co-
ordinator. 
For clear events of abuse or neglect, the event will be recorded on a POL400 and dealt with 
in terms ofthe CAT/SAT Protocol as a Care and Protection issue. A Notification to Child 
Youth and Family must be made by faxing the POL400 to the CYF Call Centre. The matter 
will also be forwarded in the usual way to the Family Violence Co-ordinator. 
Appropriate charging 
If a parent of a child or a person in the place of a parent of a child uses force that is not 
justified under section 59, and there are no exceptional circumstances and it is in the public 
interest to prosecute (refer to the above guidance and commentary), the appropriate charge 
would be assault pursuant to section 9 of the Summary Offences Act 1981 where the offence 
is not overly serious. For more serious cases, the offence against section 194(a) of the Crimes 
Act (assault on a child under 14 years of age) would be more appropriate. 
Copyright 2008 New Zealand Police 
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Appendix 4 
Selected paragraphs of the Solicitor General's Prosecution Guidelines, 1992 
3. The Decision to Pro5eCUte 
In making the decisian to irutine i p:r.osecmia.n the~:e :am t'!.vo ~ b.ctOG to be 
C1[)!l~ed; evidemhl ~cy md the poolic :inte£est. 
'I'he fu-st question :alw-ays ro be eom:ideoed '!ll:ldei: thi.s head fi whethei: the 
p.coseen:to.c is ~ thit th&e is ulmissibJe ~ :reliAble evidence that an 
offe:nce has been com:mitted by m iden:rifu.bl.e pe.cson. 
'I'he seeaOO. qu.estiCMJ. is 'Wheth& thit evidence is s1lfficiendy sttong ro 
establish a prima ficie case; thit is, if 1hat evidence is a-ccepted as a:edible 
by ;a ~ dii-ected ;my it co-uld find gWit: proved beyond .ce~le 
doOOt. 
3.2 tm the ocigmal. ~is no ~ph 3.2) 
3.3 'I'he POOlic !:merest 
3.3. J The secCMJ.d .ma;o.c coruide.catian ~s ~ ~ thzt m 
~ bislS fo.c ·the pi'OSeeuti.Ofl exists, the public mte.re"St 
.cequit:es the pmsecu.tio.t:l to pi=oceed. Facto.cs which cm lea.d to a 
decisiotl to p~ o.c not, w.ill vuy mfi:n:itely ami from ease to 
ease. Genenll.y, the mme seri.ou.s the ~ md th.e s.tt~ the 
evidence ro s:tlpport: it, the less likely it will be th;at it e;an p~y 
be disposed of othet: than by p.c~ A domio:aot flctoi: .is 
dut o.cd.Uurily the pOOli.c ~t uriiJ. not .ceqni:re a prosecution to 
p:rooceed unless it is mrue likely thJa .IIJ.Ot that it will. :result .:in :a 
Cotlviction. ~ :assessment will.o.fte:n be :a d:ifficult one to nuke 
:and :in some eases it m:ay net be poss.ihle to say with ;any 
~ that eitbe.c :a eomfictiofl. o.c :an :aeqw1:till is the more 
likely .cesuh. In c~ of such do* it m:ay be ;;tppfOp.ci&te to 
proceed 'With th-e p.cosecut.ifm as, .if the b.al.:anoe is so even, it could 
p.cobably be sm that the :6m1 ~e~: should be a Ccmrt. It needs 
to be s.aid aho that the public :inte.ces.t may imiica.te that so.me 
classes of off"Eruliog,. eg driVmg with ~s b:re:ath o.c blood 
alcohol levels, may .ceqW:re that pt:oseeution will almost ~ly 
follow .if the JJ.OOeSsaty evid.ence is :available. 
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3.3.2 othei: fad:Ofi which ~ u::ise fuJ: oo.m.ideati.Ofl. m ~ 
-wiJ.ethe!: the public mt&es£ ~es 4 ~mclmJe: 
(a) the ser.iou.saess or., con~, the triv~ of the alleged 
offence; ie whetha the COfl.duct :t:eilly w-m:J1lit:s the 
~011. of the crimim.l hw; 
{b) <illroitigaringO:£ ~ring~~ 
(c) he youth, old age, physic;al O:£ memal he;tltb of the alleged 
offende!; 
(d) the ~'5 of the :alleged of.fianee~ 
(e) the~ of ~of the ~d offende!; 
{f) the effect of a decision :1:110t to p!Osecllte 011. public 
Clfml!OJl; 
{g) the obsoleseen.ce m: obscw:ity of the hw; 
(h) ~ the ~tion ~ be CO"J.:W.tei:-p~:~; 
fof: example by em.bliflg :m ;areu.sed to be seen :a:s a 
~ 
(j) the p:t:evalenee of the illeged Offence .00 the need fuJ: 
d~ 
(k) -whethex the eo~ of ;my :t:erohing COfl.victioill. 
~ be tmdnl.y h:a!:-sh and oppres~ 
(l.) the entitl.eme:o.t of the Crowill. oc :my othe! pe!SOfl. to 
compeo:szrioill, ~011. o.r ~e ll.S a ~ce 
ofc~ 
{m) the attitude of the vi.>C"I:i!n of the alleged offet:J.ce to a 
p.ros.ecu.ti.Ofl.; 
{o) ~dl.e.z: the :a.oou.:sed is willing to co-opeate m the 
investig:a.tion oc p.ro~ of othe!:s o.r the extent to 
wh.~ dl.e :aeeu.sed lus llie:ady done ~ 
fp) the likely ~ :imposed in the evem of cOillcictioill. 
having J:egli.Ed to the sentencing optiaill.S ~ble to the 
Court. 
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3.3.3 None of these Drtofi, oc indeed any o1!hea wh:idl mn.y a:ris.e in 
~ eases, 'Will neeessacily be determinative m themselve:s; all 
:releVam &ctocs must be bilanced. 
3.3.4 A decisioo. whecthe:r oc :1:1ot to· prosecute must clearly not be 
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(d) the pos~ble effect 0\ll the pe:rsonal o:r profession;ll 
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